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Preface
The lowering of tariﬀs has, in eﬀect, been like draining a swamp. The lower water
level has revealed all the snags and stumps of non-tariﬀ barriers that still have to
be cleared away. (Baldwin, 1970)
Trade theory stresses the gains from trade: through comparative advantage and
specialization (Dixit and Norman, 1980); economies of scale (Krugman 1979, 1980);
inter-ﬁrm reallocations and selection into exporting (Melitz, 2003); intra-ﬁrm real-
locations (Eckel and Neary, 2010; Bernard et al., 2011); input- and task-sourcing
(Hummels et al. 2001; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008); and innovation (Ver-
hoogen, 2008; Lileeva and Treﬂer, 2010). Indeed, although globalization creates
winners and losers (Felbermayr et al., 2011; Autor et al., 2013), the overall gains
from trade are now empirically well documented (Arkolakis et al. 2012; Feyrer,
2009a,b).
There remains a puzzle, however: most trade models predict signiﬁcantly more
trade than can be observed empirically (Head and Mayer, 2013; Anderson, 2000;
Treﬂer, 1995). The economics literature has gained many insights into the quan-
titative eﬀect of tariﬀs and quotas, as highlighted in reviews by Yeaple (2013) as
well as Hornok and Koren (2016). However, tariﬀs and quotas are far too low to
account for the diﬀerence between actual and predicted trade volumes (Grossman,
1998). This `missing' trade is also visible at the extensive margin: the matrix
of disaggregated bilateral trade ﬂows displays a large number of zeros (Helpman
et al., 2008; Armenter and Koren, 2014). If there are untapped gains from fur-
1
2 PREFACE
ther market integration, the missing trade requires an explanation. A prominent
suggestion is that non-tariﬀ border frictions remain sizeable  the `dark matter'
of trade costs (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004; Head and Mayer, 2015). The
nature and importance of these trade frictions are poorly understood. What is the
true extent of non-tariﬀ barriers? How important are intangible factors such as
culture, regulatory costs, and information? Answers to these questions can help to
reconcile the gap between predicted and actual trade ﬂows and ultimately inform
the debate on globalization.
The trade literature on border frictions is in its infancy; many questions remain
open for future research. However, there have been some signiﬁcant advances in the
recent literature as models have moved away from treating trade costs exclusively
as ad-valorem costs. New approaches include ﬁxed entry costs (Das et al., 2007),
time costs (Hummels and Schaur, 2013), per-unit costs (Irrazabal et al., 2013),
and per-shipment costs (Hornok and Koren, 2015). Yet despite these advances, a
better and more quantitative understanding of the causes of cross-border frictions
is still needed.
This dissertation comprises three empirical chapters, which work towards a better
understanding of non-tariﬀ and non-quota frictions to trade and, more generally, to
economic exchange. Under this common theme, I study a diverse range of topics.
In particular, the dissertation contributes insights into the importance of frictions,
such as the eﬀects of cultural familiarity (Chapter 1), import regulations (Chapter
2), and the role of information (Chapter 3). Chapter 1 provides an examples of
how frictions may re-direct trade. It highlights the importance of cultural links
between former members of the Habsburg monarchy. Chapter 2 provides a direct
measure of cross-border barriers. Chapter 3, which focuses on the German inter-
city bus market, is not a trade paper. However, the studied eﬀect, namely frictions
due to habits or lack of information, oﬀers a broader applicability that extends to
international trade. From a methodological point of view, all chapters share a
3strong emphasis on empirical analysis using newly collected datasets. Although
thematically related, the three chapters in this dissertation are self-contained and
can be read independently.
Chapter 1, which is based on joint work with Ferdinand Rauch, studies trade
in Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain. We show that the countries of the
former Austro-Hungarian monarchy traded signiﬁcantly more with one another
after 1989 than predicted by a standard gravity model. The surplus trade is
approximately four times the eﬀect of a monetary union in 1990. This surplus
then declines linearly and monotonically and becomes statistically insigniﬁcant
after two decades. Both the initial surplus trade between the former members of
the Austro-Hungarian monarchy after 1989, and its subsequent decline need to be
accounted for.
We argue that these results can best be explained by dissolving `trading capital',
a term coined by Head et al. (2010). They ﬁnd that after independence former
colonies continue to trade for a long period with their colonizers, but at a declin-
ing rate. Trading capital is built up during colonization, and deteriorates after
independence. In Chapter 1, we think of trading capital in three broad categories:
physical capital, such as roads or railways; capital relating to direct human inter-
action; and a third category capturing all other factors facilitating trade such as
notions of cultural familiarity.
The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy oﬀers a natural experiment set-
ting in which we can observe some components of trading capital. Prior to its
collapse in 1918, the monarchy was a well-integrated and interconnected market
with signiﬁcant trading capital. The Iron Curtain divided the East and West of
the old monarchy between 1945 and 1989. As a result, all formal and business
relationships between East and West were severed, almost all trade ceased, and
maintaining personal contacts became very costly. Transport infrastructure link-
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ages were left to deteriorate. Institutions and norms diverged into two distinct
blocks.
We argue that the surplus trade observed between East and West after 1989 over-
whelmingly results from the third category of trading capital; historical legacies
and cultural linkages persisted. Trading capital, established under Habsburg rule,
survived over four decades of separation and provided an initial boost to trade.
This proved short-lived: the surplus trade disappeared rapidly as countries rear-
ranged themselves according to changing geopolitical circumstances.
Chapter 1 contributes to the literature by showing that the degree to which cultural
forces inﬂuence trade appears to be signiﬁcant. While trade that is once interrupted
takes a long time to recover (Felbermayr and Gröschl, 2013; Nitsch andWolf, 2013),
we demonstrate that linkages between countries are highly resilient once built
up. This chapter thus adds to the growing literature which emphasizes the long
persistent eﬀects of borders, institutions and culture (Guiso et al., 2009; Becker et
al., 2014). Further, we contribute to this literature by providing an example and
new measure of both the resilience of such historical and cultural eﬀects on trade,
as well as on its decline.
Chapter 2, which is a joint work with Anne-Célia Disdier and Lionel Fontagné,
studies the microeconomic impact of rejection risk at European borders on safety
grounds. We examine how the risk aﬀects Chinese agri-food exporters. Despite low
tariﬀs, access to the EU remains diﬃcult because individual exporters are required
to meet stringent safety regulations.
Using a rarely exploited dataset of information from the European Rapid Alert
System for Food and Feed (RASFF) combined with Chinese ﬁrm-level export data,
we analyse the impact of border rejections on ﬁrms' export decisions. We ﬁnd that
Chinese exporters of agri-food products are more likely to exit the European market
if the product they export has been rejected in previous years. At the same time,
5rejections favour the entry of new ﬁrms. Thus, border rejections increase turnover
at the extensive margin of trade. Furthermore, the impact is heterogeneous across
ﬁrms. Small ﬁrms are aﬀected more strongly than big ﬁrms by this turnover. At
the intensive margin, border rejections boost the exports of surviving ﬁrms. This
suggests some re-allocation eﬀect towards big and productive exporters.
Chapter 2 contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we provide a more nu-
anced understanding of the uncertainty component of non-tariﬀ measures (NTMs),
which has, somewhat surprisingly, been largely overlooked in the literature on
NTMs and border inspections. In this regard, we particularly highlight the im-
portance of information externalities and reputation eﬀects. Second, whilst details
on the occurrence of regulations give evidence on de jure NTMs, knowledge about
rejections sheds light on their de facto trade impact. Border rejections represent an
example of a speciﬁc trade-impeding NTM where regulations are enforced. Third,
to the best of our knowledge, this chapter is the ﬁrst to study the eﬀect of sanitary
measures on ﬁrm-level exports from a large and signiﬁcant developing economy.
We pay explicit attention to the role of ﬁrm heterogeneity, and show that big ﬁrms
are more resilient to the risk of border rejections.
Chapter 3 studies the eﬀect of the 2014-2015 rail strikes on German inter-city buses.
I combine three novel and extremely rich datasets: detailed booking data provided
by Germany's largest bus provider MeinFernbus (MFB), emergency timetables
published by Deutsche Bahn (DB) during the strikes, and a dataset of all rail
itineraries. This data is used to study how the rail strikes aﬀected bus ticket sales
and to test for persistence as rail operations returned to normal.
Firstly, I ask which bus routes were most aﬀected during the rail strike. While the
exposure of rail routes to the strike can be deduced from the emergency timetables,
the exposure of bus routes is not ex-ante clear to the researcher. On the one hand,
travellers might not have had suﬃcient information about their route's exposure
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to the rail strike to decide if they could remain with DB services. On the other
hand, travellers may only switch to inter-city buses if the bus service is a close
enough substitute to rail. I ﬁnd that the primary channel that drives ticket sales
during the strike is whether the absolute bus travel time was suﬃciently short.
The variation in rail service cancellations across routes does not explain increased
bus bookings: travellers switched to buses even on routes with little or no service
cancellations. It follows that either travellers were not well informed about their
exposure to the rail strike, or they had no trust in DB's ability to implement the
emergency timetables.
Secondly, I study whether the eﬀect of the strike was persistent. Did short routes
have higher ticket sales after rail operations returned to normal? In a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences framework, I compare the change in the number of customers between
high and low strike-exposed routes to identify any demand persistence. Although
the common trend assumption does not seem to be completely tenable in the given
context, my results point to a persistent eﬀect on the ticket sales for inter-city
buses on the aﬀected routes. I follow the methodology of Nunn and Qian (2011),
who employ a similar strategy in a diﬀerent setting. They estimate period-speciﬁc
treatment eﬀects for the pre-period in order to compare these to the post-treatment
coeﬃcients. Following their methodology, my results also remain largely unaltered
to a number of alternative speciﬁcations and robustness checks.
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature by highlighting an unintended and poten-
tially positive eﬀect of a rail strike. If the strike revealed information about an
alternative transport mode, it may have been welfare improving (Larcom et al.,
2016). Chapters 3 is not a trade paper. However, the focus on the German inter-
city bus market oﬀers a broader applicability that extends to international trade.
It provides an example of how information asymmetries may re-direct trade. Some
customers, who were forced to experiment with buses, discovered that their previ-
ous choice of rail was not optimal. This chapter supplements the classic literature
7relating to the way in which individuals decide between alternatives (Weitzman,
1979; Morgan and Manning, 1985). My results cannot be reconciled with the
classical economic assumption of perfectly informed and rational consumers. I
contribute to this literature by providing an example of the Porter hypothesis:
exogenous shocks may help individuals ﬁnd better choices by triggering experi-
mentation (Porter, 1991). Chapter 3 complements the ﬁndings by Larcom et al.
(2016), who study the eﬀect of a London Underground strike, in two ways. Firstly,
I study inter-modal switching across transport modes for inter-city transport  a
less frequent travel decision than daily commuting. Secondly, the longer post-strike
period allows me to better understand the short- and medium-term impacts of the
strikes.
To summarize, this dissertation adds three empirical chapters to the current de-
bate on the role of non-tariﬀ barriers to economic exchange, ﬁlling several gaps
in the academic literature. The ﬁndings contribute to a better understanding of
cross-border frictions, making it easier for researchers to give informed answers to
policymakers. Using the example of trade among countries of the former Austro-
Hungarian monarchy after 1989, Chapter 1 shows that the degree to which cultural
forces inﬂuence trade appears to be large. Chapter 2 studies the eﬀect of border
rejection risk on Chinese ﬁrms. Following a spell of rejections, the number of ﬁrms
tends to decrease but the size of the surviving ﬁrms increases. Chapter 3 estimates
the persistent eﬀect of the 2014-2015 rail strikes on the demand for inter-city buses
in Germany. The strike induced some customers, who would have routinely stayed
with rail, to permanently switch to buses. In these ways, this thesis seeks to con-
tribute a valuable piece of research towards a better understanding of all those
"snags and stumps of non-tariﬀ barriers" (Baldwin, 1970, op. cit.) and ultimately
to close the gap between predicted and actual trade ﬂows.

Chapter 1
A Dissection of Trading Capital:
Trade in the Aftermath of the Fall
of the Iron Curtain
This chapter is based on joint work with Ferdinand Rauch. We are grateful for comments
and suggestions of numerous colleagues and seminar participants including but not limited to
James Anderson, Daniel Baumgarten, Tibor Besedes, Johannes Van Biesebroeck, Carsten Eckel,
Peter Egger, Thibault Fally, Gabriel Felbermayr, Lisandra Flach, Lionel Fontagné, James Harri-
gan, Keith Head, Harald Heppner, Michael Irlacher, Beata Javorcik, Amid Khandelwaal, Helmut
Konrad, Anna Koukal, Thierry Mayer, Guy Michaels, Peter Neary, Volker Nitsch, Chris Parsons,
Steven Poelhekke, Monika Schnitzer, Jens Südekum, Pierre-Louis Vezina, Daniel Wissmann as
well as seminar and conference participants from the LETC conference in Slovenia, EGIT Düs-
seldorf, Paris, Göttingen, ETSG Munich, Vienna and Zurich. We particularly thank two very
helpful anonymous referees.
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1.1 Introduction
In 1989 the Iron Curtain fell quickly and unexpectedly, ending the separation
between Western Europe and the Soviet Union. After 44 years of an almost com-
pletely sealed border, trade was suddenly free to reconnect. Despite the political
and economic turmoil within the Eastern regimes, trade between West and East
almost doubled within ﬁve years after 1990. By the year 2000 it had almost tripled.
We study this trade in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. We pay
special attention to Austria, a country that has engaged in trading opportuni-
ties beyond what would be expected given its size and geographic location, and
might have been the main western beneﬁciary of Europe's economic expansion
eastwards.
In a standard gravity equation setting we document that Austria indeed trades
more with countries east of the Iron Curtain after 1990 than gravity would pre-
dict. However, we ﬁnd that this eﬀect is only found for the members of the former
Habsburg Empire1. It declines linearly and monotonically, and in our preferred
speciﬁcation becomes statistically insigniﬁcant after a decade while the predicted
magnitude becomes zero after two decades. The magnitude of the Habsburg sur-
plus trade in 1990 is very large, about four times the eﬀect of a monetary union.
We ﬁnd no similar surplus trade for other western countries with the East.
We argue that these results can best be explained by assuming a deterioration of
speciﬁc components of `trading capital' built up during the Habsburg years. The
44 years of Iron Curtain division severed all formal and business relationships,
almost all trade between East and West, and made personal contacts very costly.
1Throughout this chapter we use the terms `Habsburg monarchy', `Habsburg Empire' and
`Austro-Hungarian monarchy' interchangeably, knowing that Austro-Hungary is only valid since
1867. We usually refer to the Empire in its extension shortly before World War I, as displayed
in Figure 1.1. Former Habsburg members include Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Ukraine to
diﬀering degrees as detailed in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1.
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However, historical legacies and cultural linkages persist and a Habsburg surplus
trade survives. Its decline reﬂects the continued dissolution of trading capital and
the build-up of trading capital with other countries in Western Europe.
The term `trading capital' is introduced by Head, Mayer and Ries (2010, from
here on we refer to this paper as HMR) who show that after independence former
colonies continue to trade for a long period with their colonizers, at a declining
rate. They suggest that this observation might point to the presence of trading
capital that is built up during colonization, and deteriorates after independence.
Trading capital consists of various components that we can divide into three broad
categories that facilitate trade: (i) physical capital, such as roads, railway lines
or pipelines that connect countries and directly facilitate trade through reduced
bilateral trade costs; (ii) capital relating to personal communication, direct human
interaction and contacts or trust built up in repeated games, such as provided in
structures of multi-national ﬁrms, joint ventures or by frequent personal contacts
and trust won through repeated interaction; and (iii) all other variables that fa-
cilitate trade that are not based on personal interaction and formal or physical
structures. These include all notions of cultural familiarity, such as those facili-
tated by cultural norms, language, history, consumers' familiarity with products,
trust based on similarity and familiarity of people with each other. In the case
of the Habsburg Empire this may relate to people in whose minds the Habsburg
monarchy was the last functioning state before the hardship of the wars and com-
munism. This may have created a brief nostalgic impulse to return to the old state
of aﬀairs when the possibility came. Indeed, below we verify a positive Habsburg
bias in the cultural data by Felbermayr and Toubal (2010). Category (iii) may
also include past decisions on institutional design and standards as basic as which
side of the road to drive on or what type of light bulbs to adopt. However these
latter eﬀects are less relevant in the present example as such standards were fully
harmonized across continental Europe by 1990.
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We argue that the declining surplus trade of Habsburg countries after 1989 is
comparable to the dissolving trading capital described by HMR, but given the
history of Central Europe only relates to that part of trading capital that was
not isolated by the Iron Curtain, the elements described in point (iii). At the
beginning of the century the Habsburg monarchy was a politically and economically
well integrated country. In the second half of the century it was split into two
parts that were strictly separated for 44 years by the Iron Curtain. During the
separation all formal institutions of the Empire ceased to exist as there were several
waves of drastic institutional changes especially east of the Iron Curtain. Personal
relationships were hard to maintain, and multinational ﬁrms connecting East and
West as well as other formal institutions were broken apart. Physical transport
capital such as railway lines, pipelines and roads  already badly damaged in
WWII  were deliberately destroyed, or left to deteriorate. At the same time
institutions and norms converged both within the East and within the West of the
Iron Curtain into two distinct blocks. The historical circumstances thus oﬀer a
natural experiment setting in which we can observe some components of trading
capital only between members of the former Habsburg Empire. In particular,
any surplus trade observed after 1989 will overwhelmingly include those parts of
trading capital that relate to point (iii) above. Comparing these eﬀects to HMR
we ﬁnd that these forces explain a quantitatively large part of trading capital, and
that they deteriorate at a rate smaller than suggested for all trading capital by
HMR.
We add direct evidence for this hypothesis in ﬁve ways. First, we show that this
surplus trade appears for the Habsburg countries, but not for a number of placebo
combinations between western and eastern countries in Europe. We also verify
that our main ﬁnding, the declining surplus trade for Habsburg countries is highly
robust to alternative empirical strategies. When looking at product level, we see
the eﬀect mainly for homogeneous rather than heterogeneous goods. We would
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expect this if countries follow a heuristic not based on economic rationale alone,
since homogeneous goods make substitution less costly. Fourth, we see that the
eﬀect is stronger for those goods that were traded in the Habsburg Monarchy. We
rule out a number of possible alternative explanations. Finally, we cite research
that points to some more general Habsburg nostalgia in the 1990s.
Our chapter adds to the literature showing that the degree to which such cultural
forces inﬂuence trade seems to be large (for example, Algan et al., 2010; Disdier and
Mayer, 2007; and Michaels and Zhi, 2010), linkages between countries are highly
persistent once built up (Djankov and Freund, 2002 and Thom and Walsh, 2002)
and trade once interrupted takes a long time to recover (Felbermayr and Gröschl,
2013; Nitsch and Wolf, 2013). There have been suggestions that culture matters
more for trade than either institutions or borders (Becker et al., 2014). Our chap-
ter also adds to a growing literature which emphasizes the long persistent eﬀects
of borders, institutions and culture. For example, Guiso et al. (2009) establish
the importance of trust and cultural similarity on economic exchange. Meanwhile,
Egger and Lassmann (2015) and Melitz and Toubal (2014) document the impor-
tance of common languages. However, it is diﬃcult to distinguish between cultural
similarity and ease of communication. Cultural proximity is inherently diﬃcult to
measure. A number of recent studies have thus used proxy measures for cultural
proximity such as voting behaviour in the Eurovision Song Contest (Felbermayr
and Toubal, 2010) or the United Nations General Assembly (Dixon and Moon,
1993; Umana Dajud, 2012). Lameli et al. (2015) show that the similarity of Ger-
man dialects is an important predictor of trade within Germany. We add to this
literature by providing an example and new measure of both the resilience of such
historic and cultural eﬀects on trade, as well as its decline.
Our chapter's methodology is related to Redding and Sturm (2008), who study
the development of towns in West Germany and use the fall of the Iron Curtain as
a natural experiment. Nitsch and Wolf (2013) document that it takes between 33
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to 40 years to eliminate the impact of the Iron Curtain on trade within Germany.
Our chapter mirrors Nitsch and Wolf (2013): While they show that borders remain
visible in trade statistics long after they have been abolished, we demonstrate that
borders take a long time to diminish trade when newly constructed. Djankov and
Freund (2002) document that Russian regions continued to trade with each other
60 percent more in the period from 1994 to 1996, which is broadly consistent with
our ﬁndings. Other studies that use a similar setting to our chapter are Schulze
and Wolf (2009) who examine trade within the Habsburg monarchy in the late
19th century and ﬁnd that borders that later emerge become visible in price data
long before the collapse of the Empire. Thom and Walsh (2002) study the trade
eﬀect of Anglo-Irish monetary dissolution and ﬁnd little eﬀect on trade. Becker
et al. (2014) also present evidence on the importance of the Habsburg Empire on
cultural norms. When comparing individuals living east and west of the long-gone
Habsburg border, they ﬁnd that people living on territory of the former Habsburg
Monarchy have higher trust in courts and police. They argue that the former
Empire had an enduring eﬀect on people's values through its decentralized, honest
and widely accepted state bureaucracy.
Trade is only one of many possible measures that could be inﬂuenced by historical
legacies and cultural persistence. Migration and FDI might be others. Like HMR
we choose to discuss this eﬀect in terms of trade given that trade is recorded in
a more consistent way and at a higher frequency than the aforementioned other
measures. It is also less inﬂuenced by political decisions. For example, migration
in Europe remained highly politically regulated until the EU enlargement, and
migration numbers are thus politically constrained.
This chapter proceeds as follows: after a brief historical overview concerning the
decline of the Habsburg Empire, the Iron Curtain and the reunion of the continent
as far as these events concern our study in Section 1.2, we discuss our empiri-
cal strategy in Section 1.3. We then present our estimates of the surplus trade
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and its decline among former Habsburg countries in Section 1.4 and Section 1.5,
which focus on product level results. Section 1.6 discusses the implications of the
surplus trade and Section 1.7 concludes. Appendix A provides more details on
the construction of the dataset, and shows a few additional results and robustness
tests.
1.2 Historical overview
We focus on the borders of the Habsburg Empire just before the outbreak of
World War I as displayed in Figure 1.1. While the Habsburg family had ruled the
Empire for many centuries with changing borders, uniﬁcation attempts and the
introduction of a centralized administration came fairly late in the course of the
18th century.2 For our purposes it is important that the monarchy maintained a
large, stable and well integrated market with large internal trade ﬂows throughout
its last decades:
In 1913 the Austro-Hungarian Empire had a large degree of ethnic and linguistic
diversity, not only across the empire as a whole, but also within major sub-state
regions and cities. All parts of the monarchy were linked by a common oﬃcial lan-
guage, common legal institutions and administration, as well as an expanding rail
network. A strong emphasis on free trade strengthened the economic integration
and trade ﬂows within the country throughout the 19th century (Good, 1984). The
monarchy possessed a fully integrated monetary union with full control maintained
by the Austro-Hungarian Bank in Vienna. Fiscal policy of the Empire was run as a
2In the 13th century Rudolf von Habsburg acquired the thrones of Austria and Styria, which
his family held until the ﬁrst half of the 20th century. The Habsburg monarchy expanded over
the centuries mainly through skilful marriage policy, but also frequently lost territory in battle.
The territory ruled by this family always incorporated diﬀerent languages, customs and religions,
which especially in the early years were allowed to ﬂourish locally. There was little superstruc-
ture until the reforms under Maria Theresia and Josef II. helped by chancellors Kaunitz and
Metternich in the course of the 18th.
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Figure 1.1
Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1910 and modern country boundaries
Source: Habsburg map is from Jeﬀreys (2007), and the modern country boundaries come from
Eurostat (2013).
joint operation with separate budgets in Austria and Hungary contributing to the
same common imperial expenditures and debt services (Dornbusch, 1992).
The monarchy consisted of 53 million people, numbering 13 percent of the total
European population and producing 10 percent of Europe's GDP. As these ﬁg-
ures imply, the economic condition of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in its ﬁnal
decades prior to 1913 was poor in comparison to other European countries.3 Be-
fore the collapse of the Empire some internal trade barriers became visible in price
data at the end of the 19th century, and nationalism was on the rise long before
the collapse contributing to it (Schulze and Wolf, 2009 and 2012). Yet these stud-
ies highlight that the Empire possessed a heavily integrated internal market at the
beginning of the 20th century regardless of these tendencies. The monarchy further
3For example, Schulze (2010) documents poor performance in terms of GDP per capita growth
for the monarchy between 1870 and 1913, and even uses the term `great depression' to describe
the situation in the western half of the Empire in 1873.
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consisted of a well-functioning administration that uniﬁed the workings of many
institutions across the countries it governed. The importance of the attachment
of people to the imperial administration and its government, and the political,
economic and cultural integration of its parts is highlighted by Clark (2013)4 and
Boyer (1989)5 among other historians.
The end of World War I brought about a number of declarations of independence,
which were sealed by the treaties of Saint Germain (1919) and Trianon (1920).
New borders were drawn and new countries appeared, following considerations of
ethnicity, language and trade networks. All the newly founded democracies on
the territory of the former monarchy now included large numbers of ethnic and
linguistic minorities. The newly founded Republic of Austria was left with 23
percent of the population of the former monarchy. Trade between countries of the
former monarchy remained high in the 1920s. De Menil and Maurel (1994) present
some evidence for strong trade in the years 1924-26 among successor states of the
former monarchy, roughly of the magnitude of trade within the British Empire
at that time. They explain the persistence of trade pointing to common history,
shared linguistic and cultural ties, and mention the importance of business and
personal relations as well as networks  all parts of trading capital. Institutional
drift, however, started. New and diﬀerent currencies were introduced. For ex-
ample, Hungary replaced the Austro-Hungarian korona by its own korona after
independence only to replace it again by the pengo in 1925 and forint in 1946
following hyperinﬂation. The Austrian-Hungarian national railways was also split
4"[The administration] was an apparatus of repression, but a vibrant entity commanding
strong attachments, a broker among manifold social, economic and cultural interests. [...] most
inhabitants of the empire associated the Habsburg state with the beneﬁts of orderly government:
public education, welfare, sanitation, the rule of law and the maintenance of a sophisticated
infrastructure."
5" [...] competing popular and ethnic groups all had access to these public institutions [...]
and these social groups quietly obtained some of their most sought after cultural attainments by
means of these mechanisms, one might argue that the political and institutional history of the
Empire presents [...] a state system that was not only more than the sum of its social parts, but
was also psychologically consubstantial with those parts."
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into multiple corporations, though traﬃc across the former monarchy continued at
a signiﬁcant pace.
World War II disrupted trade substantially, and it did not recover in the aftermath.
Beginning in 1947, communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe emerged
under Soviet rule. The Sovietization of these economies caused a breakdown of
their trade relations with the West, and foreign trade was organized as a strict
state monopoly. Much of this remaining trade was arranged from Moscow, and
negotiated at the highest political level, often as part of political bargains. An
example for this was the export of goods worth 6.6 billion Austrian schillings in the
aftermath of its independence in 1955 to the Soviet Union (Resch, 2010). Pogany
(2010) writes on the relationship between Austria and Hungary: "Economic ties [...]
became insigniﬁcant in the years following World War II. Centuries-old relations
were reduced to a minimal level [...]." While Moscow took control of trade in the
Eastern countries, on the western side trade was also heavily politically inﬂuenced.
The main driver of this was the Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls (COCOM), established in 1949, an institution to organize embargoes
against Soviet countries. Austria did not formally become a COCOM member,
but its Eastern trade was inﬂuenced heavily by it under the obligations coming
with Marshall aid (Resch, 2010). Economic cooperation was politically motivated
and largely symbolic.
Large parts of infrastructure, especially the railways, were destroyed by the war
 they would only partially be rebuilt taking into account the new borders that
had emerged. An anecdote might highlight the poor recovery of infrastructure:
The two capitals closest to each other in Europe are Vienna and Bratislava, at a
distance of less than 60 kilometres. During the time of the monarchy there was a
tramway that connected both cities, the `Pressburger Bahn'. There has been no
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similar connection attempt since 1990, and thus the time to travel from one city
to the other is now larger than it was in 1900.6
The Iron Curtain was an ideological boundary, but also primarily a geographical
border. The most substantial cut to trade relations was brought about by the
erection of the physical Iron Curtain, whose construction begun in 1949. The new
border ran right through the former Habsburg countries, splitting Austria and the
formerly Austrian parts of Italy from the rest. After the Hungarian Uprising of
1956 the already very limited possibility of transit ceased and all activity crossing
this border was further suppressed. The border was sealed by barbed wire, land
mines, high voltage fences, self shot systems and other means. Only people with
appropriate restrictions were allowed close to the border. As such the Iron Curtain
thus presented a completely sealed border that cut oﬀ all former local economic
activity between the two sides (Redding and Sturm, 2008).
Furthermore, the economies of Hungary and Czechoslovakia switched to central
planning. Multinational companies were split, personal interaction and communi-
cation over the border became increasingly diﬃcult and rare. To put the decline
of trade in numbers, Austrian imports from Hungary fell from 10% in 1929 to 2%
in 1959 and 1% in 1988, and imports from Czechoslovakia fell from 18% to 4% and
1% in the same period (Butschek, 1996; Lazarevic, 2010); numbers indicate shares
of total Austrian imports). At the same time, Hungarian imports from Austria
went from 77% in 1911-13 to 60% in 1920, to 5% in 1946 and then to below 4% in
1974 (Pogany, 2010). This collapse in trade includes estimates of black market ac-
tivity. As we show in Appendix A.2, the trade relationship of Austria with Poland,
Hungary and Czechoslovakia was essentially ﬂat compared to the relationship with
Germany in the years before 1990.
6In the discussion of the results below we provide further examples of abandoned infrastruc-
ture between East and West.
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The relationships of the West with Yugoslavia were diﬀerent to those with Hun-
gary and Czechoslovakia as Yugoslavia  despite being socialist and autocratic 
maintained looser ties with Moscow (Lazerevic, 2010). This allowed the United
States to contribute to aid programmes from 1952. Eventually this even led to the
accession of Yugoslavia to GATT in 1966. Yugoslavia maintained sizeable trade
relationships with the West, which in some years even exceeded its trade levels
with the Comecon countries. Given its coastal location, its main trade partners
in the West between 1955 and 1986 were the EEA countries (Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, France, Italy, the Netherlands, West Germany, Great Britain, Denmark
and Ireland). For example, in 1986 Yugoslav exports to the EEA countries were
over 7 times as large as exports to EFTA (Austria, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and
Switzerland) (Lazerevic, 2010), which suggests that trade between Yugoslavia and
Austria was not particularly developed during the Cold War.
We mention only two properties of the fall of the Iron Curtain which are important
here, namely that it happened fast and that it was received by almost everyone on
either side of the border with surprise (Redding and Sturm, 2008).
These large changes of the map of Central Europe in the course of the 20th century
are displayed in Figure 1.1. The map shows modern country boundaries and
a map of the Habsburg Empire as of 1910. Table 1.1 displays the percentage
of modern territory that was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire for modern
countries. Most of the countries that were part of the Empire are in the east, by
which we indicate countries that were on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain, to
which we count the countries of former Yugoslavia. These countries are Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia as well as
parts of Poland, Romania, Serbia and the Ukraine. On the western side of the Iron
Curtain we only ﬁnd Austria and South Tyrol, which is now part of Italy.
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Table 1.1
Habsburg Members
Country Share of land East Year of EU Year of Euro
that was Habsburg accession adoption
Austria 1 0 1995 1999
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 1  
Croatia 1 1 2013 
Czech Republic 1 1 2004 
Hungary 1 1 2004
Italy 0.05 0 1952 1999
Poland 0.12 1 2004 
Romania 0.44 1 2007 
Serbia 0.25 1  
Slovakia 1 1 2004 2009
Slovenia 1 1 2004 2007
Ukraine 0.12 1  
Notes: Share of land that was Habsburg denotes the share of the area of the modern
country that was part of the Habsburg monarchy in the year 1910. The Habsburg
dummy consists of countries with values of 1 in Column 1. Missing values in the last
two columns indicate no membership in 2013.
There is plenty anecdotal evidence on Habsburg nostalgia after 1990 in former
members of the monarchy. Wank (1997) describes a consensus view of historians
of the 90s that was nostalgic of Habsburg and run the risk of "distorting historical
reality [...] by emphasizing the monarchy's positive qualities [...]". Furthermore,
historians of the time also implied that "some substitute for Austria-Hungary in
Central Europe must be created" and "there is a legacy of positive lessons that the
Habsburg Empire has bequeathed to Europe." Hartmuth (2011) writes that the
monarchy was not remembered as `prison of nations' any longer but a multicultural
empire, and they point to Hungarian Salami meat being sold with the counterfeit
of Franz Joseph. Becker et al. (2014) discuss the long cultural legacy of Habsburg
on outcomes such as trust. For some speculation on the reasons behind Habsburg
nostalgia see Schlipphacke (2014).
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1.3 Empirical strategy and data
To investigate persistence after decades of Cold War of Austrian trade with coun-
tries east of the Curtain (Austria-East7) and members of the former Habsburg
monarchy, we largely follow the methodology applied by HMR. They develop a
method to address a closely related question, and the similarity allows us to com-
pare our estimates to theirs. We estimate gravity equations to which we add
(Austria×East)× year and Habsburg × year dummies, which are our principal
variables of interest. We run the estimations once jointly with Austria-East and
Habsburg dummies and once separately only including one set of dummies inter-
acted with year. We use the boundaries of the Habsburg Empire in its last days.
The gravity framework captures the counterfactual multinational trade had there
been no Habsburg relationship. The (Austria×East)×year andHabsburg × year
indicators capture any trade in excess of what the gravity model alone would pre-
dict.
The well-known empirical and theoretical formulations of the gravity equation can
be represented in the following form:
Xint = C
ex
it C
im
nt φint (1.1)
where Xint denotes importer n's total expenditure on imports from origin i in year
t, Cexit and C
im
nt are origin and destination attributes in a speciﬁc year, and φint
measures bilateral eﬀects on trade.8 Since there is no set of parameters for which
Equation 1.1 will hold exactly, the conventional approach is to add a stochastic
term and estimate after log-linearizing. We follow the commonly practised gravity
approach. Head and Mayer (2013) and Egger (2000) provide overviews of this tech-
7A variable indicating a trade ﬂow between Austria and a country east of the Iron Curtain
8We follow HMRs notation here.
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nique including a number of theoretical foundations which yield gravity equations.
In particular, we estimate the following equation:
ln(Xint) = µit + µnt + γDint
+ δ(Aus×East)(Aus× East)int
+ δHint + δ
eastHeastint + int,
(1.2)
where µit and µnt denote origin- and destination-year ﬁxed eﬀects respectively and
δ coeﬃcients to be estimated. The inclusion of sets of ﬁxed eﬀects interacted with
year makes separate time ﬁxed eﬀects as in Equation 1.1 multicollinear and thus
redundant. Matrix Dint denotes pairwise covariates that may be time varying or
not. In an eﬀort to distil the main eﬀect of interest as precisely as possible, we
include as detailed ﬁxed eﬀects as possible. In particular, we include the variables
shared border, common oﬃcial and spoken language and common legal institutions
as time varying dummy variables to ﬂexibly account for the many possible changes
in the cultural and political climate in Europe during this period. These sets of
control variables make it redundant to control for the standard right hand side
variables measuring the size of countries, such as population and income, and
allow only to include bilateral variables that vary over time. We include bilateral
indicators for the distance between both countries, indicators for a shared border,
an oﬃcially joint language, a joint spoken language, common legal institutions,
common religion, common currency, the presence of a regional trade agreement as
well as indicators if both are members of the EU, the Eurozone, or to the east of
the Iron Curtain. All these standard bilateral control variables are taken from the
standard source for this type of estimation, and precise deﬁnitions are given there
(Mayer and Zignago, 2011).9
9To summarize a few key properties of these control variables: distance is measured as the
crow ﬂies. Common legal institutions are countries that share Civil Law, Common Law or
Muslim Law. The shared religion variable relies on a breakdown for Buddhist, Christian Roman
Catholic, Christian Orthodox, Christian Protestant, Hindu, Muslim. Having at least 9 percent of
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The main variables of interest are the bilateral coeﬃcients on the interaction term
(Aus×East)int, dummies indicating if the observed ﬂow is between Austria and a
country east of the former Iron Curtain, and Hint which indicates if both countries
were once part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in year t. Since we are only
interested in Habsburg trade that crosses the Iron Curtain, we also include a
Heastint variable, which captures all trade east of the Curtain (there is only Austria
west of the Curtain in our baseline speciﬁcation). Intuitively we estimate how
the fraction of Austria-East and Habsburg surplus trade evolves over time. We
use a comprehensive set of indicators to capture the diﬀerent types of Habsburg
trade. For our main variable we restrict our measure of Habsburg economies to
only those which were fully part of the Habsburg monarchy: Austria, Hungary
and former Czechoslovakia. We argue that this is the safest approach as including
other economies which were only partly part of the Empire, such as Italy, may
pick up eﬀects not speciﬁc to the Habsburg relationship. In Appendix A.2 we
show robustness to diﬀerent choices of this Habsburg deﬁnition.
If we were to control for attributes of the exporter and importer using GDP per
capita and populations, our speciﬁcation would suﬀer from bias caused by omission
of `multilateral resistance' terms (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Multilateral
resistance terms are functions of the entire set of φint from Equation 1.1. We thus
adopt the preferred method of the literature which is to introduce exporter-year
and importer-year ﬁxed eﬀects.10 This full ﬁxed eﬀects approach absorbs the ex-
porting and importing speciﬁc eﬀects.11 Exporter- and importer-year ﬁxed eﬀects
do not work for unbalanced two-way panels as pointed out by Baltagi (1995). If ac-
tual bilateral data are not balanced, as is the case in HMR, one should use the least
square dummy variable (LSDV) approach. However, this concern is not relevant
the population with a shared language has become a standard threshold to measure a signiﬁcant
part of population in similar settings since Mayer and Zignago (2011).
10See Feenstra (2004) who addresses diﬀerent techniques to take care of multilateral resistance
within the gravity framework.
11See Egger (2000).
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to our aggregated European data set which is balanced.12 We therefore adopt the
full ﬁxed eﬀects approach, even though this approach has the disadvantage that
we cannot observe the coeﬃcients of some the right-hand side variables typically
used in gravity models .
We also address the issue of missing and zero trade observations. Zero and missing
observations may be due to mistakes or reporting thresholds, but bilateral trade
can actually be zero. We treat all missing trade observations as zero trade. Our
linear-in logs speciﬁcation of Equation 1.2 removes all observations of zero trade,
thus introducing a potential selection bias. In the literature it has been common
to either drop the pairs with zero trade or estimate the model using Xint = 1 for
observations with Xint = 0 as the dependent variable.13 In our baseline speciﬁca-
tion we choose to drop the zero pairs, but also run a robustness check replacing
zeros as ones. We also adopt the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML)
estimation technique. A natural step would be to use Tobit which incorporates
the zeros, but it assumes log normality and homoskedasticity on the error term, so
we prefer PPML. PPML incorporates zeros, and parameters can be estimated con-
sistently with structural gravity as long as the data are consistent; i.e. provided
the expectation of  conditional on the covariates equals one.14 The estimation
method is consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity.15 Thus, it provides a
natural way to deal with zero values of the dependent variable. We believe this
preferable to other estimators without further information on the heteroskedastic-
ity. However, it may be severely biased when large numbers of zeros are handled in
this way (Martin and Pham, 2015). There are only 53 missing trade observations
out of 13,200 observations in our data since we focus on estimating trade among
12Appendix A.1 lists our data sources and discusses our approach to minimize data inaccura-
cies.
13See, for example, Felbermayr and Kohler (2006).
14See Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
15Consistency of estimating Equation 1.2 depends critically on the assumption that int is
statistically independent of the explanatory variables.
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European economies. The majority of missing trade values involve Albania as a
trading partner for which trade may indeed be zero or so small that it falls below
a minimum reporting threshold.16
The estimation equation for the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML)
estimator expresses Equation 1.2 as
Xint = exp( µit + µnt + γDint
+ δ(Aus×East)(Aus× East)int
+ δHint + δ
eastHeastint )uint,
(1.3)
where uint = exp(int).
Even though we include all the usual controls, our vector of bilateral variables
may remain incomplete, so unobserved linkages end up in the error term. To
capture possible omitted variables in int, we estimate two additional econometric
techniques: a lag dependent variable speciﬁcation and a speciﬁcation with origin-
destination (bilateral or dyad) ﬁxed eﬀects. The lagged dependent variable would
absorb unobserved inﬂuences on trade that evolve gradually over time. Including
a lagged dependent variable biases coeﬃcient estimates in short panel models.17
Monte Carlo experiments suggest that the bias can be non-negligible with panel
lengths of T=10 or even T=15 (Dell et al., 2014). However, the time series di-
mension of our panel (T=22) is likely long enough such that biases can be safely
considered second-order. Furthermore, the lagged dependent variable technique
will not deliver consistent estimates if there is a ﬁxed component in the error term
that is correlated with the control variables. We thus also run a speciﬁcation with
bilateral ﬁxed eﬀects. We can still obtain estimates of our coeﬃcients of interest as
our variation of interest is also varying over time (the Habsburg and Austria-East
dummies are interacted by year). The bilateral ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation identiﬁes
16See Appendix A.1 for more details on the data set.
17Nickell (1981) shows that the bias declines at rate 1T .
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the eﬀect of Habsburg membership based on temporal (within-bilateral) variation.
In the bilateral ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation all time invariant bilateral variables drop
out.
To summarize, we estimate the Habsburg and Austria-East coeﬃcients of inter-
est using four diﬀerent estimation techniques closely following HMR: simple OLS,
Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML), lag dependent variable speciﬁca-
tion and bilateral ﬁxed eﬀects (Dyad FE), each with a strong set of ﬁxed eﬀects.
Our typical estimation has in excess of 13,000 observations and is robust to het-
eroskedasticity. We run these four estimations on the joint set of Habsburg and
Austria-East dummies and separately with one set of dummies interacted with
year. In the product level regressions we run the same speciﬁcations, but restrict
the set of products for which we run the regression in various ways. For exam-
ple, we analyse homogeneous and heterogeneous products separately to compare
estimates.
The sources and details related to the construction of our dataset are documented
in Appendix A.1. All data we use and our treatment of them is standard through-
out the related literature. Here we summarize a few decisions that we take. The
dataset we use contains all European countries in the years from 1990 until 2011,
the ﬁrst year for which Comtrade data is available for all the countries of Europe
after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the last year for which we found a complete
set of data when we embarked on this project. We clean Comtrade data using the
methodology of Feenstra et al. (2005). Trade data for the years before 1990 are
available from sources other than Comtrade, which we do not use given concerns
about the comparability of data. We use data for Europe only as we think that
it provides a cleaner sample of countries to run the proposed tests than the entire
world would, given greater similarity of shipping and other technology in Europe.
The ﬁrst OLS assumption that the correct model is speciﬁed is easier to justify in
a sample of more similar countries. We aggregate a few countries to maintain a
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Figure 1.2
Descriptive GDP and trade ratios
(ratios on year)
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(Datasource: trade data from UN Comtrade, 2013; GDP data from World Bank WDI, 2013)
balanced panel, see details of this in Table A.1 in Appendix A.1. For the product
regressions we use the well known BACI dataset from CEPII, details described
in Appendix A.1. CEPII provided a BACI version that starts in 1992 for our
countries, thus our product level analyses begin only in 1993 throughout.
Before turning to the regression results, we present some descriptive statistics
which document the Habsburg trading surplus relative to Germany.18 Figure 1.2
considers trade of Germany and Austria with Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary.
Czechoslovakia borders on both Germany (both East and West) and Austria, thus
diﬀerences in distance seem negligible. Moreover, changes in multilateral resistance
18We later use Germany as a placebo as it shares the language with Austria, and also directly
borders many eastern countries. A risk of using that placebo might be that Germany could
have also integrated faster with the East for its own particular history. However, as Nitsch and
Wolf (2013) observe, there was "remarkable persistence in intra-German trade patterns along the
former East-West border".
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should also be fairly similar.19 We plot the ratio of German to Austrian GDP(
GDPGt
GDPAt
)
and the ratio of German trade with Czechoslovakia to Austrian trade
with Czechoslovakia
(
XGer,Cze,t
XAus,Cze,t
)
. If Habsburg did not matter, we would expect
the ratio of trade to mirror the ratio of GDP (using GDP as measure for market
and production size). However, we observe a large gap. In 1990 the German
economy is roughly ten times as large as the Austrian economy. At the end of our
sample period this ratio falls to about 8.5. However, trade with Czechoslovakia is
only three times as large for Germany and this ratio rises to just over 6 over the
sample period. We also conduct the same exercise for Hungary and Poland. On the
one hand, Hungary  yet another core Habsburg member  displays an even starker
gap. The trade ratio rises from approximately 2 to 4.5. These graphs highlight that
Austria's trade with these two eastern countries was highly over-proportional given
its size relative to Germany, but that this surplus steadily lowered over time. Even
Poland, which we do not regard as a Habsburg member, since only 10 percent
of its mass belonged to the monarchy, and which does not share a border with
Austria, exported less than ten times its Austrian exports to Germany in 1990.
All the countries show the central empirical ﬁnding in this ﬁgure, a strong Austrian
surplus trade that weakens over time. We now turn to a more rigorous exploration
of these suggested observations.
19A surge in French or Spanish GDP would have similar eﬀects on Germany and Austria.
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1.4 Results
We run three sets of regressions. First, we restrict the sample to Habsburg coun-
tries. Second, we include Austria-East dummies to investigate surplus trade with
all of the East. Third, we control for Austria-East and Habsburg jointly and ﬁnd
that the eﬀect for Austria-East becomes insigniﬁcant once we control for Habs-
burg. The ﬁrst of these speciﬁcations is most important for our conclusion. We
present it in detail and focus on the main elements of the other two.20 It is worth
emphasizing that we use origin interacted with year ﬁxed eﬀects and destination
times year ﬁxed eﬀects separately in all of these regressions. The Habsburg surplus
trade coeﬃcients are bilateral and vary annually by construction. Thus, they are
not multicollinear with the inclusion of this strong set of control variables and ﬁxed
eﬀects.
In Table 1.2 we plot the Habsburg - year coeﬃcients, which we interpret to be
the surplus trade of Habsburg countries relative to what we would expect if trade
followed our gravity model. These coeﬃcients are also depicted in Figure 1.3. All
four estimation methods display a steady decrease of the Habsburg surplus trade
over time. We conﬁrm that the ﬁrst and last estimated coeﬃcients are statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to each other.21 The downward slope of the trend given
in Figure 1.3 is strongly signiﬁcant in all of the speciﬁcations, and the slope is
remarkably similar. It shows a strongly statistically signiﬁcant, monotonic decline
with a slope of around -0.044. Thus the main results, namely that the cultural
component of trading capital declines over time, is insensitive to our estimation
method. Note that the Habsburg trade bonus is large in the ﬁrst year after the
collapse of the Iron Curtain. For example, in the speciﬁcation of column 1 the
20Tables reporting coeﬃcients of control variables and the exact Habsburg and Austria-East
coeﬃcients are omitted for length but available upon request.
21F-test Probability > F values are OLS: .008; PPML: .001; Lag DV: .768; and Dyad FE:
.000.
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Table 1.2
Estimation with Habsburg - year ﬁxed eﬀects only
Habsburg coeﬃcients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS PPML Lag DV Dyad FE
Dependent variable: ln(xint) xint ln(xint) ln(xint)
1990 0.687*** 0.919*** 0.854***
(0.257) (0.199) (0.253)
1991 0.613*** 1.065*** 0.00457 0.771***
(0.227) (0.151) (0.113) (0.220)
1992 0.477** 0.885*** 0.0131 0.609***
(0.232) (0.154) (0.108) (0.206)
1993 0.514** 0.732*** 0.150 0.612***
(0.210) (0.143) (0.116) (0.160)
1994 0.351 0.784*** -0.149* 0.459***
(0.219) (0.136) (0.0812) (0.158)
1995 0.367* 0.783*** 0.00948 0.501***
(0.216) (0.164) (0.0804) (0.149)
1996 0.498*** 0.750*** 0.171* 0.639***
(0.192) (0.105) (0.0997) (0.153)
1997 0.506** 0.795*** 0.0584 0.650***
(0.203) (0.114) (0.0921) (0.153)
1998 0.363* 0.634*** -0.0761 0.509***
(0.215) (0.122) (0.0740) (0.132)
1999 0.212 0.521*** -0.0477 0.412***
(0.212) (0.135) (0.0831) (0.136)
2000 0.205 0.531*** 0.00470 0.392***
(0.199) (0.110) (0.0690) (0.136)
2001 0.134 0.485*** -0.0399 0.316**
(0.204) (0.112) (0.0712) (0.142)
2002 0.0599 0.388*** -0.0714 0.242
(0.194) (0.113) (0.0805) (0.149)
2003 -0.0428 0.334*** -0.110 0.137
(0.199) (0.114) (0.0675) (0.155)
2004 0.112 0.405*** 0.123 0.294**
(0.209) (0.132) (0.0969) (0.147)
2005 -0.0520 0.265* -0.151** 0.131
(0.211) (0.157) (0.0712) (0.160)
2006 -0.111 0.176 -0.102* 0.0691
(0.208) (0.123) (0.0617) (0.146)
2007 -0.209 0.203 -0.154** -0.0448
(0.210) (0.131) (0.0786) (0.149)
2008 -0.159 0.271** -0.000727 0.00778
(0.202) (0.115) (0.0614) (0.145)
2009 -0.215 0.177 -0.109 -0.0509
(0.230) (0.128) (0.0895) (0.161)
2010 -0.179 0.201* -0.0225 -0.0150
(0.216) (0.122) (0.0702) (0.163)
2011 -0.167 0.206* -0.0325
(0.196) (0.115) (0.0554)
Notes: This table and Table 1.3 display diﬀerent coeﬃ-
cients from the same regressions. Columns 1, 2 and 4 pro-
vide estimates of Equation 1.2, Column 2 from Equation
1.3. Coeﬃcients are depicted in Figure 1.3. Stars denote
statistical signiﬁcance on the level of one (***), ﬁve (**)
and ten (*) percent. Robust standard errors used.
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Figure 1.3
Estimation with Habsburg - year ﬁxed eﬀects only
Habsburg coeﬃcient plots
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Notes: Coeﬃcients of the Habsburg by year interaction term Hint in Equation 1.2 and Equation
1.3 with 95 percent conﬁdence intervals. Line of best ﬁt with slope and s.e. are also recorded.
Restricted sample: includes only countries that were fully part of the Habsburg monarchy: Aus-
tria, Hungary and former Czechoslovakia. Coeﬃcients of control variables are reported in Table
1.2.
additional trade in the year 1990 is 0.69, which is about three times as large as the
trade bonus from two countries having a regional trade agreement (0.24), twice as
large as both countries having the same religion (0.34) and 1.6 times as large as
both countries being located in Eastern Europe. This magnitude also corresponds
to additional trade by a factor of e0.69, which is close to two. The surplus trade
declines steadily and becomes statistically insigniﬁcant about ten years after the
fall of the Iron Curtain. Note that the coeﬃcients with Habsburg alone show
stronger eﬀects, smaller margins of error, and are more precisely estimated than
the Austria-East coeﬃcients.
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Table 1.3
Estimation with Habsburg - year ﬁxed eﬀects only
Coeﬃcients of control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS PPML Lag DV Bilateral FE
Dependent variable: ln(xint) xint ln(xint) ln(xint)
Variable of interest:
Habsburg - year ﬁxed eﬀects  Coeﬀ. are reported in Table 1.2 and Figure 1.3 
Time ﬁxed dyadic eﬀects:
Log distance -1.181*** -0.641*** -0.213***
(0.0239) (0.0113) (0.0215)
Common religion 0.344*** 0.108*** 0.0614***
(0.0336) (0.108) (0.0162)
Both East 0.419*** 0.116*** -0.0358
(0.0491) (0.0455) (0.0304)
Shared border - year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Oﬃcial common language - year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Common language spoken - year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Common legal institutions - year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time varying dyadic eﬀects:
Common currency -0.197*** 0.00541 -0.00482 -0.0192
(0.0358) (0.0339) (0.0188) (0.0307)
Regional trade agreement 0.237*** 0.288*** 0.0576 0.344***
(0.0560) (0.0531) (0.0411) (0.0570)
Both EU -0.0119 -0.108*** 0.0175 -0.00553
(0.0396) (0.0319) (0.0198) (0.0222)
Both Euro -0.0862*** 0.271*** -0.0451*** -0.0302
(0.0280) (0.0311) (0.0157) (0.0363)
Lagged exports 0.831***
(0.0126)
Origin country - year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination country - year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bilateral ﬁxed eﬀects No No No Yes
Habsburg - east - year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,147 13,200 12,518 13,147
R-squared 0.937 0.966 0.982 0.976
Notes: This Table and Table 1.2 display diﬀerent coeﬃcients from the same regressions.
Columns 1, 2 and 4 provide estimates of Equation 1.2, Column 2 from Equation 1.3. Table 1.2
shows the Habsburg × year coeﬃcients. These coeﬃcients are depicted in Figure 1.3. Stars
denote statistical signiﬁcance on the level of one (***), ﬁve (**) and ten (*) percent. Robust
standard errors used.
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Figure 1.4
Estimation with Austria-East - year ﬁxed eﬀects only
Austria-East coeﬃcient plots
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Notes: Coeﬃcients of the (Aus × East) × year interaction term in Equation 1.2 and Equation
1.3 with 95 percent conﬁdence intervals. Line of best ﬁt with slope and s.e. are also recorded.
Figure 1.4 displays the Austria-East by year interaction terms from an estimation
with Austria-East coeﬃcients. These results show a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect in
1990 which declines linearly and monotonically in both OLS and PPML estimation
techniques. The other two techniques show no signiﬁcant results. Once we add
controls for the Habsburg × year coeﬃcients, this trend becomes insigniﬁcant in
our preferred speciﬁcation. A weak downward slope remains only in the PPML
speciﬁcation, statistically insigniﬁcant from zero, see Figure 1.5. These graphs
suggest that Austria-East does not play a pronounced role once we control for
Habsburg membership.
In Table 1.3 we proceed to estimate Equations 1.2 and 1.3 from above with only
coeﬃcients for Habsburg membership. As expected, distance negatively impacts
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Figure 1.5
Joint estimation with Austria-East dummies and Habsburg - year ﬁxed eﬀects
Austria-East coeﬃcient plots
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Notes: Coeﬃcients of the (Aus × East)int interaction term in Equation 1.2 and Equation 1.3
with 95 percent conﬁdence intervals. Line of best ﬁt with slope and s.e. are also recorded.
trade in all speciﬁcations where we can include this control variable. The displayed
time varying dyadic eﬀects tend to show the expected sign, but coeﬃcients vary
across speciﬁcations. The latter is expected as these speciﬁcations diﬀer in many
respects, for example, the PPML code is written to be estimated using levels
rather than natural logarithms on the left hand side variable. Silva and Tenreyro
(2006) also ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly smaller eﬀect of geographical distance. Some of
the coeﬃcients show unexpected signs such as negative coeﬃcients for common
currency and `Both EU'. This might reﬂect that some wealthy economies such as
Norway and Switzerland are not part of EU and Eurozone. The PPML coeﬃcient
of distance exactly corresponds with that of HMR.
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One concern about these results might be that the opening of the trade relations
between East and West might be dynamic, increasing or decreasing, in the ﬁrst
years after the opening of the Iron Curtain because of various reasons other than
the decline of historic and cultural ties. For example, the installation or reuse of
transport infrastructure might suggest a dynamic trade relationship between an
eastern and a western country or the slow establishment of personal exchange and
interaction. In both these examples we would expect an increasing relationship,
but there may be others. To mitigate concerns that such eﬀects drive our results we
run a placebo exercise in which we estimate `Habsburg' eﬀects on a relationship
other than Habsburg, for which we do not expect the same decay of cultural
ties. We choose Germany as the placebo country, which shares the language with
Austria, and also a direct border with many eastern countries. When we estimate
the trading relationship with Germany instead of Austria being the `Habsburg'
country west of the curtain, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant relationships. These results
are reported in Appendix A.2, and in this table we use the same speciﬁcation as
applied in Tables 1.3 and 1.2. We also report results for similar placebo exercises
using Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg and Italy as alternative
placebo countries, and we ﬁnd no strong trend for either of these countries with the
exception of a moderate decrease in Italy, which was partly Habsburg. We interpret
this ﬁnding to cast doubt on the relevance of other dynamic eﬀects shaping initial
trade relationships.
Appendix A.2 demonstrates robustness of these results for diﬀerent estimation
strategies, additional control variables, diﬀerent choices for the Habsburg deﬁni-
tion, aggregation of countries, how to deal with missing and zero data, adding
internal trade ﬂows, and diﬀerent treatment of standard errors. We ﬁnd generally
that this main trend is strongly robust to modiﬁcations of this type.
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1.5 Product level results
In this section we shed more light on the mechanism driving our main result by
studying various product categories separately. In Figure 1.6 we report the main
OLS speciﬁcation for each of the two-digit HS product codes except for services
for which no BACI data are available. In 13 of the 15 plots the trend is downward
sloping, and in 10 the downward trend is signiﬁcant at 5% level of signiﬁcance. The
graph is upward sloping for animal products and skins and leather, both of which are
small industries, accounting for 0.7 and 0.6 percent of all exports in Europe in 2000
respectively. This graph shows that our main results of a strong initial Habsburg
surplus that weakens over time is not driven by a few industries, but is observable
for most industry groups individually, to a varying degree however. The strongest
eﬀects in magnitude are found for machinery, foodstuﬀ and miscellaneous. The
general trend within most groups implies that industry composition changes alone
cannot account for the observation of that eﬀect.
If our results are driven by an instinct of going back to where things had been before
the wars, we might expect some correlation across industries from the monarchy to
trade in the 1990s. We next run our main regression separately for products traded
predominantly in the monarchy and other products. Given that the product space
changed considerably materially and in terms of classiﬁcation over the course of
these 50 years, we conduct the match on a broad level. Eddie (1989) characterizes
the dual monarchy as a marriage of wheat and textiles. Good (1984) lists as main
traded items in the monarchy from 1884 to 1913 food and beverages, crops, sugar,
ﬂour crops, sugar and ﬂour originating in Hungary and industrial raw materials,
textiles, machinery, and manufactured products originating in Austria. Following
these classiﬁcations we classify the industries foodstuﬀ, machinery, and textiles as
main industries traded in the monarchy.
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Figure 1.7
Main goods traded in the Monarchy and other goods
foodstuffs, machinery, textiles
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Notes: Coeﬃcients of the Habsburg by year interaction term Hint in Equation 1.2 and Equation
1.3 with 95 percent conﬁdence intervals. The left hand side panel shows the main goods traded
in the monarchy, the right panel all the other goods.
In Figure 1.7 we run our main OLS regression separately for these Habsburg in-
dustries and the others. We ﬁnd that both product classes display a signiﬁcant,
monotonic downward slope, which is not surprising given that we ﬁnd the down-
ward slope for most individual HS2 product categories. The initial trade bonus for
the Habsburg traded goods is almost double that for the others, and the slope in
the plot showing the Habsburg traded goods is also 2.8 times larger. The surplus
trade becomes insigniﬁcant in both cases in the 2000s. This is consistent with the
interpretation that cultural memory plays a part in generating the initial Habsburg
surplus.
We next study the eﬀect by heterogeneous and homogeneous products, following
the standard classiﬁcation by Rauch (1999). We merge the classiﬁcation at the
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Figure 1.8
By degree of heterogeneity and transport costs.
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Notes: Coeﬃcients of the Habsburg by year interaction term Hint in Equation 1.2 and Equation
1.3 with 95 percent conﬁdence intervals. The top two panels compare trade of diﬀerentiated and
homogeneous goods. The bottom two panels consider the diﬀerent transport costs.
level of HS4, keeping only matched trade ﬂows. These are ﬁfteen percent of total
trade ﬂows. We think that the Habsburg bonus disappears over time as Europe
adjusts to the new trading environment and converges to the new optimum. This
suggests that initial deviations from the optimum, which here happen to coincide
with the gravity framework, were not the ﬁrst best choice. We would expect to ﬁnd
that the Habsburg bonuses are thus stronger for homogeneous goods, for which
search costs and the costs of not using the optimum product are smaller, and thus
the temptation to follow an intuitive heuristic when buying greater. As can be
seen in the top panels of Figure 1.8, indeed we ﬁnd the bonus is stronger initially
and falls more rapidly for the homogeneous goods, while there is not such a clear
pattern for the diﬀerentiated products.
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If transport infrastructure surviving from the monarchy was an important driver of
our ﬁndings, we should expect to see a stronger eﬀect for goods easier to transport.
To measure this eﬀect, we obtain data on unit values from the CEPII TUV dataset.
This dataset gives Free on Board (FoB) unit values per ton for each HS6 product.
If, in line with some literature, we assume that the costs to ship a ton of any good
are fairly similar, then inverse unit value data can serve as a proxy for transport
costs as the ratio of transport costs per value transported would be smaller. Using
this proxy we compare above and below median goods separately in the bottom
two panels of Figure 1.8. The panel of `costly' goods refers to above median
transport cost goods while `cheap' refers to below median ones. The standard
pattern emerges, and the initial surplus trade is similar in both speciﬁcations. If
there was a diﬀerence, it would be that the goods that are harder to transport
adjust earlier. An explanation for this earlier drop may be that for these goods the
costs of a suboptimal country to import from are higher, so adjustment may be
quicker. In any case, this diﬀerence is not very strong, and coeﬃcients rest ﬁrmly
within the conﬁdence intervals of the other graph in both cases.
1.6 Discussion of estimates
We consider a number of possible explanations why the countries of the monar-
chy trade more with each other in the ﬁrst years after the collapse of the Iron
Curtain.
First, this result might just be a consequence of a misspeciﬁcation of the gravity
equation. A highly structural approach of the kind we employ is easily prone to
introduce noise when looking at speciﬁc bilateral trade volumes. If, for example, we
overestimated the distance between Austria and the eastern countries, the residuals
for these bilateral observations in a standard gravity model would be positive.22 Or
22Given the location of Vienna in the east of Austria we actually underestimate the distance
relative to the harmonic mean suggested in Rauch (2016).
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there might be some natural geographic advantage that facilitates trade between
these countries, and this reason might have brought about both the Monarchy
before 1918 and the surplus trade after 1989. However, explanations and examples
of this type could cast doubt on the existence of a static Habsburg surplus trade.
What we observe is a trade bonus that declines linearly and monotonically over
time, and it does so robustly across a number of very diﬀerent estimation methods.
This dynamic result is hard to explain as a simple statistical property of miss-
speciﬁcation or measurement error. If it was a purely mechanical speciﬁcation
error, our placebo exercise, that replaces Austria with Germany, would be prone
to suﬀer from the same problem. We further verify that our main speciﬁcation is
robust to the use of diﬀerent measures of distance, such as the distance between
the most populated city and two measures of weighted distances. Our numerous
robustness checks which vary estimation strategy, aggregation of countries and
control variables should also help to address this concern.
Second, this diﬀerence might have to do with better existing transport infrastruc-
ture dating back to the times of the monarchy. However, most of this infrastructure
was unused and laid bare during the Cold War and was derelict by 1989. The main
rail lines connecting Austria with the East were abandoned; for example, in 1945
the track connecting Bratislava and Vienna, the Pressburger Bahn, the rail to the
Czech Republic via Laa an der Thaya and the connection via Fratres-Slavonice
were abandoned. All these lines were not revived until today. Transcontinental
connections such as Vienna-Hamburg or Vienna-Berlin have switched permanently
to run via Passau instead of Prague. There is also evidence that reconstruction and
construction of new networks was slow after 1990, as in Hungary "there were no
signiﬁcant changes in the lengths of the linear transport network in the ﬁrst half of
the 1990s" (Erdösi, 1999). Further, even if a degenerated rail line provides a strong
advantage to trade, we would not expect this surplus to contribute immediately
given the time it takes to renovate such a network. Thus we would expect a slight
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rise of the Habsburg bonus in the ﬁrst years, as this infrastructure is brought back
to full capacity. In the product level section we do not ﬁnd a big diﬀerence between
products that are cheap or expensive to transport, which should also address this
concern.
Third, this trade bonus might just reﬂect the speciﬁc history of bilateral devel-
opments after 1989 that are unconnected to history. Austria might have had a
starting advantage, after all it was between Austria and Hungary that the Iron
Curtain ﬁrst opened. While it is true that the Iron Curtain was symbolically
opened ﬁrst between Austria and Hungary23, things moved rapidly after that. The
ﬁrst symbolic opening on August 19th 1989 was less than three months before the
opening of borders within Germany on November 9th. The ﬁrst time Germans
could ﬂee was on September 10th and 11th. Most of the people who ﬂed in the two
months before the broader opening were East Germans. Thus the head start was
neither long, nor speciﬁcally beneﬁcial to the Austrian economy.
Fourth, it may be that language barriers are initially favourable for bilateral trade
from Austria to the East, given that a higher fraction of citizens in the eastern
countries still speak German than in other European countries. This explana-
tion is similar to the interpretation we favour, however the placebo exercise using
Germany and Switzerland suggest that the German language cannot explain this
surplus trade and in fact does not seem to contribute to its decline.
Fifth, there could be cultural factors other than the monarchy that help to foster
trust between the countries that we call Habsburg countries. It might be, for
instance, that Austria's political neutrality helped to win the trust of eastern
trading partners. This, however, should predict a general increase in trade for
Austria with all eastern countries, rather than the selected members of the former
monarchy, and would be absorbed by the interactions of Austria with all of Eastern
23Curiously enough in the presence of the would-have-been-emperor Otto von Habsburg.
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Europe that we include. Further, we would not expect this or similar eﬀects
to decline over time, as, in spite of the monarchy, Austria's political neutrality
persists.24 The placebo exercise using Switzerland may also help to address this
concern.
Sixth, there may be historical legacies and cultural forces that foster trust between
these countries. For example, the surnames of the Austrian and Czech prime min-
isters at the ﬁrst oﬃcial state visit between Austria and the Czech Republic after
1990 provide a suggestive anecdote: Vranitzky is a typical Czech surname25 while
Klaus is a German ﬁrst name. The cultural proximity of the Habsburg countries
is also present in the Eurovision voting data by Felbermayr and Toubal (2010).26
Historic, cultural and genetic similarities establish trust which in turn supports
trade relationships. The monarchy was also the last memory of a functioning state
before the wars and communism for many people in the East, and there may have
been the impulse to return to what worked last when the chance appeared. This is
the explanation that we favour. Why should this trade bonus deteriorate relative
to other countries over time? The answer might partially be found in HMR as
these factors are part of trading capital, and like other forms of trading capital
they tend to deteriorate over time. In this particular case, as other countries of
Western Europe establish relationships based on trust with the East, the Austrian
advantage disappears as countries reorient themselves towards the new geopolitical
reality. At the same time the last inhabitants on both sides of the Iron Curtain
who personally remember the monarchy died in the two decades after 1990, which
further may contribute to the weakening importance of the monarchy in culture.
24Despite joining the EU and the Euro, neutrality remains an important part of the Austrian
political identity, and is a core element of its constitution and political identity.
25It means in Czech from the town of Vranice.
26In the Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) data available from Toubal's website we compute the
mean Eurovision score given from country i to j and from j to i for each year and country pair.
We deﬁne Habsburg as the countries in their dataset that we count as part of the monarchy in
our main measure, these are Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and
Slovenia. Conditional on time ﬁxed eﬀects these Habsburg countries have a score that is 0.048
higher than the mean of the sample, a diﬀerence that is signiﬁcant at the 5% level of signiﬁcance.
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This explanation is consistent with our observation that the eﬀect does not hold
for the Eastern countries once we control for the Habsburg eﬀect and is stronger
in magnitude and signiﬁcance for Habsburg alone than for all the countries of the
east. This ﬁnding is consistent with the examples of Habsburg nostalgia mentioned
at the end of the history section.
To compare these ﬁndings to HMR we conduct a few simple calculations using our
estimates. HMR write that on average trade remains 31 percent higher after 60
years following their OLS speciﬁcation which they obtain by exponentiating the
surplus trade eﬀect and subtracting one. Using this same methodology and the
numbers provided in their paper, this implies that colonial relationships lead to
a trade boost of 350 percent in the year of colonial break up. We can use our
estimates directly to produce equivalent estimates. Following column 1 in Table
1.2 our corresponding numbers are surplus trade of 69 percent in year zero and 21
percent in year 10. We assume for mathematical convenience and sake of simplicity
that the decay is linear. This assumption is consistent with the graphs provided
by HMR, and by our own Figure 1.3, and implies a negative slope of 5.3 for the
decay of trading capital, and 4.8 for the decay of the cultural part of it.27 We can
conclude that the decay of the cultural component of trading capital is 10 percent
slower than the decay of all trading capital. This comparison does not require us
to specify the start year of the decay.
Remarks on the estimated share of the stock of trading capital that is cultural are
less precise as we do not know which year we should use as the equivalent year for
colonial break up of the Habsburg monarchy. 1989 is not the end of the colonial
relationship. In fact, we do not know the end we should use in our example, as we
do not know if the heavy involvement of the Soviets in the East sped up cultural
27As an additional robustness check, we repeat our analysis including a year trend and Habs-
burg × year interaction term. This is a more parametric analysis compared to our main speciﬁ-
cation as it forces the slope to be linear. We ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant negative slope on the
interaction term in all speciﬁcations.
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memory loss, or froze it compared to a situation in the free market. Our analysis
of trade ﬂows before 1990, provided in Appendix A.2, does not suggest a decline
before 1990. We can estimate the year in which the stock of cultural trading capital
is exhausted, which is when the curves in Figure 1.3 become zero: around 2010. If
we assume that the Soviet Union worked as a freezer of cultural capital and count
the years 1918-1945 and 1990-2010 as years of decay we end up with an expected
boost of 225.6 percent in year zero, compared to 350 percent implied in HMR,
which would amount to 65 percent. Assuming that after the Iron Curtain fell
people looked to the year before the wars and communism and that the decay was
only for 20 years (1990-2010) we estimate the historical and cultural component.
It amounts to 27 percent of trading capital. If we normalize the start year such
that trading capital and its cultural component become zero at the same point in
time, we estimate four ﬁfths. We include this exercise as a natural comparison,
but of course it is rather crude.
1.7 Conclusion
The countries of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy trade substantially more
after the fall of the Iron Curtain than a standard gravity model would predict. This
initial Habsburg surplus trade is large, about four times the eﬀect of a currency
union. It deteriorates rapidly, in a monotonic and linear way, and disappears
within one or two decades.
We suggest that the most likely explanation is that these forces relate to historical
legacies and cultural memory parts of trading capital. These forces, established
under Habsburg rule, seem to have survived over four decades and gave an ini-
tial trade boost which disappeared rapidly as countries arranged themselves with
the new geopolitical circumstances. This is consistent with the following observa-
tions: (i) This surplus is found for the Habsburg countries, but not for placebo
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combinations of Austria-East or Eastern-Habsburg and Germany, Switzerland or
the Netherlands, so it is very targeted to the area where we expect it. (ii) The
eﬀect is stronger for homogeneous goods as we would expect. Since substitution
is less costly for homogeneous goods, our ﬁndings point to a preference not based
on economic calculation. (iii) The eﬀect is double for the main goods traded in
the Habsburg Monarchy than for other goods which could point to some persis-
tence of trading legacies. (iv) A number of alternative explanations, such as better
infrastructure, can be ruled out. (v) This surplus trade coincides with a certain
Habsburg nostalgia in the 1990s found among historians of that time.
Empires leave a lasting legacy that aﬀects trade for decades to come. We conclude
that a big part of this legacy seems to be neither physical capital nor institutional
capital nor infrastructure, but is in fact some nostalgic attachment to the brand
of the former empire, that we could call cultural capital.
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Impact of European
Food Safety Border Inspections
on Agri-Food Exports:
Evidence from Chinese Firms
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2.1 Introduction
Trade liberalization has driven tariﬀs down. For example, the average tariﬀ applied
to Chinese agri-food exports to the European Union (EU) dropped to a low of 13
percent in 2007. However, access to the European market remains diﬃcult because
individual exporters are required to meet regulatory standards and face procedu-
ral obstacles. Non-tariﬀ measures (NTMs) may act as substantial barriers in the
decision to export because they potentially increase the cost of exporting. This
problem applies particularly to agri-food products due to stringent sanitary and
phyto-sanitary (SPS) regulations in most developed markets.1 Exporters from de-
veloping countries often hold a comparative advantage in these products and tend
to be over-represented in sectors heavily aﬀected by border rejections. Conse-
quently they are most likely to struggle with meeting stringent sanitary standards
due to inadequate traceability, poor storage, limited access to certiﬁcation bodies
etc. (Essaji, 2008). While European standards are not designed to discriminate
against imported goods, exporters in poor countries may be driven out of exporting
completely.
If shipments do not comply with regulations, NTMs introduce an element of uncer-
tainty related to possible border rejections. While the cost of meeting a standard is
usually certain, there remains the risk of rejection at the importer's border.2 The
risk of rejection is determined by the variation in the quality of the exported prod-
ucts and the stringency of controls at the border. The former can be reduced by
investment in quality or controls prior to shipment. In this paper, we are concerned
with the latter: the impact of the stringency of border controls on imports. These
1Sanitary risk refers to food-borne human illness and animal diseases, and phyto-sanitary risk
refers to risks from plant pests and transmission of diseases. In the literature sanitary measures
are interchangeably referred to as health regulations or food hygiene regulations.
2The cost of meeting a standard is certain for exporters producing a good with their own
inputs. If an exporter sources his inputs from many diﬀerent suppliers, it may be diﬃcult for
him to assess the cost of meeting a standard.
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are observable by the exporter but likely endogenous to past rejections which signal
a high variance in the quality of the exported products. This is where externalities
among exporters from the same country, region, or both emerge. Part of the cost
of being rejected may be borne by competitors from the same exporting country.
A spell of rejections can ultimately lead to an outright ban of a product from a
particular origin. In some cases, negative externalities induced by rejections may
have a product rather than a product-country dimension. However, our data sug-
gest that such cases are rare. Most rejections have a product-country dimension
and are due to production methods, climatic conditions, or both aﬀecting a given
country.
In this chapter we study the impact of the risk of rejection at the European border
on Chinese agri-food exporters.3 We ﬁnd that exporters are more likely to exit the
European market if the product they export has been aﬀected by a rejection in
previous years. At the same time, rejections favour the entry of new ﬁrms. Thus,
border rejections increase turnover at the extensive margin of trade. Furthermore,
the impact is heterogeneous across ﬁrms. Small ﬁrms are aﬀected more strongly
than big ﬁrms by this turnover. At the intensive margin, surviving ﬁrms increase
their exports after a spell of border rejections. This suggests a re-allocation eﬀect
towards big and productive exporters.
This chapter's contribution to the literature is threefold. Firstly, whilst details on
the occurrence of regulations gives evidence on de jure NTMs, knowledge about
rejections sheds light on their de facto trade impact. Border rejections represent
an example of NTMs where regulations are actually enforced. It follows that our
NTM measure can be considered a de facto barrier for exporters.4 Food sanitary
standards have become an important policy concern in the EU making this market
3We do not investigate the eﬀects of European rejections on exports to non-European markets.
See Baylis et al. (2011) for an example of diversion eﬀects for seafood products. Our research
only concerns rejections from the EU as we do not have data on rejections elsewhere in the world.
4For additional evidence on the importance of distinguishing between de jure and de facto
institutions see, for example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).
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particularly sensitive to the issue at stake. Further, European standards are often
more restrictive than international ones.
Secondly, to the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to look at the eﬀect
of SPS measures on ﬁrm-level exports from a large and signiﬁcant developing econ-
omy, namely China. Since its accession to the WTO in 2001, China's impressive
trade growth has accelerated further. Arguably, China is the world's most dynamic
and important exporter. At the same time, anecdotal evidence suggests that Chi-
nese agri-food exporters are struggling to meet sanitary standards.5 Our dataset
covers the universe of Chinese agri-food exports. It permits us to study the eﬀect
of rejections at the extensive and intensive margin of trade and to pay explicit
attention to the role of ﬁrm heterogeneity. Theory suggests that large and more
productive ﬁrms are likely to react diﬀerently to NTMs than small ﬁrms.
Thirdly, we use a rarely exploited dataset of rejections to measure the trade-
impeding impact of SPS regulations at the European border.6 The Rapid Alert
System for Food and Feed (RASFF) database records all European border rejec-
tions of shipments due to sanitary concerns. Among other information, it includes
the origin of the rejected shipment and a product description. We manually match
the product descriptions in RASFF with HS codes at the 4-digit level of disaggre-
gation. Although we cannot identify individual exporters that have been rejected,
we merge the ﬁrm-level data with the RASFF rejections at the product and year
dimension. The resulting dataset permits us to analyse the impact of border re-
jections on ﬁrms' export decisions.
5Frequent scandals, press articles, and anecdotes have documented the problems among Chi-
nese exporters to meet sanitary standards. For example, German newspaper Der Spiegel reports:
In recent years, China has become a major food supplier to Europe. But the low-cost goods are
grown in an environment rife with pesticides and antibiotics, disproportionately cited for contam-
ination and subject to an inspection regime full of holes. (17/10/2012)
6The exception, again, is Jaud et al. (2013). However, they treat the data in a totally diﬀerent
way.
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Enforcing sanitary standards is diﬃcult, especially for imports from developing
countries. Most agri-food imports have passed through multiple middlemen before
reaching supermarket shelves. This makes it extremely diﬃcult to trace their
origins. Regulatory agencies conduct spot checks, but inspections are not random.
Certain countries, ﬁrms, or products may be subject to special focus. Similarly,
repeated controls are not random if custom oﬃcials expect large variations in
quality from one shipment to the next. Even if one assumes an equal distribution
of quality failures across countries and random inspections, shipments from large
countries will be targeted more frequently by inspections if controls disregard the
origin of the products. Chinese exporters thus present an interesting case study.
They face considerable uncertainty concerning the probability of successful entry
and costs involved in exporting. They could well be targeted by custom oﬃcials,
who maximize their chance of identifying a fraudulent shipment.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the
related literature and provides additional motivation for the research question.
Section 2.3 presents the data on border rejections and Chinese ﬁrm-level exports.
Section 2.4 describes the empirical strategy. Section 2.5 reports the estimation
results and robustness checks. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
Frontiers in research on NTMs
Non-tariﬀ measures (NTMs) have attracted a great deal of attention in the re-
cent trade literature. The two main issues highlighted are information sources
and trade restrictiveness. Most of the research focuses on agri-food products and
related sanitary measures because these are the primary drivers of safety and trace-
ability concerns in an international trade context. Seminal contributions to this
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literature are Kee et al. (2009) and Disdier et al. (2008). The former measures the
trade restrictiveness of NTMs by computing tariﬀ equivalents. The latter sheds
light on the magniﬁed impact of NTMs on developing countries. All these stud-
ies face a common dilemma. On the one hand, one can use indirect evidence on
border protection in a gravity equation setting. This risks capturing much more
than NTMs. On the other hand, one can use direct de jure evidence on the pres-
ence of NTMs. This approach has the drawback that data is often outdated and
incomplete.7
However, two much more important issues must be considered. First, not all NTMs
are actual barriers to trade. This issue casts doubt on the validity of systematic
assessment of their trade reducing impact. Second, not all exporters are aﬀected
equally by an NTM. This highlights the importance of studying the impact of
these measures at the micro level as in Fontagné et al. (2015). Hence, this chapter
combines information on rejections  a measure identiﬁed as obstacle to trade 
with ﬁrm-level export data. This allows us to explore the impact of NTMs on
individual exports in terms of the uncertainty introduced.
Uncertainty and export ﬂows
Uncertainty in relation to trade costs has been addressed from two perspectives.
Firstly, uncertainty is an impediment to trade from the exporting country perspec-
tive. Red tape or deﬁcient infrastructures can generate uncertainty about delivery
dates and the quality of the batch delivered (Nordas and Piermartini, 2004). Using
data on internal transport costs of 24 sub-Saharan countries, Freund and Rocha
(2011) demonstrate that uncertainty from inland transit times reduces export val-
ues. An extra day of time uncertainty reduces export values by 13 percent. Using
a heterogeneous-ﬁrms model, Handley (2014) shows that trade policy uncertainty
delays the entry of exporters into new markets. He argues that uncertainty about
7See Chen and Novy (2012) on the distinction between direct and indirect approaches.
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future tariﬀs creates a real option value for waiting. Binding tariﬀs reduce such
uncertainty. Osnago et al. (2015) illustrate the eﬀect of trade policy uncertainty
at the product level. A one percent reduction in the diﬀerence between bound and
applied tariﬀs increases exports by one percent. Feng et al. (2014) measure the
uneven impact of uncertainty on exporters in China. They study the US market
in the years surrounding China's WTO accession and ﬁnd that a reduction in tar-
iﬀ uncertainty induces a reallocation among Chinese exporters. Their work also
indicates that ﬁrm entry and exit increases.
Secondly, uncertainty is an impediment to trade from the importing country's
perspective. The importer cares about the quality, safety, or both of the product,
which is typically unobservable. For goods traded repeatedly, reputation from a
given origin may overcome the problem. For example, the consumer (importer)
must be able to precisely identify the identity of the producer (exporter) (Shapiro,
1983). If the exporter's identity is unknown, the challenge to distinguish between
safe and unsafe goods is more diﬃcult. This case applies particularly to commercial
relationships in international trade and with developing countries. In such cases,
it is conceivable that the importer forms his expectation about the quality of a
product on the exporting country's total record of quality problems. In our case,
he or she obtains information from border rejections. It follows that individual
exporters suﬀer from the problems encountered by other exporters of the same good
from the same country. These information externalities can be accommodated
or magniﬁed by minimum quality standards or origin labelling (Falvey, 1989).
Since information externalities are not internalized by the individual exporter, the
quality provided by a large country with many ﬁrms tends to be low  a collective
reputation problem. Mcquade et al. (2012) propose a theory related to these eﬀects
and argue that it ﬁts the Chinese case well.
In this chapter, we apply our data to the issues of reputation and uncertainty
raised in the literature. If the importer cannot distinguish between `safe' and
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`unsafe' trading partners, or if it is too costly to acquire the necessary information,
we expect negative spillovers among Chinese exporters of the same good following
a spell of border rejections.
Finally, the issue of spotting shipments which fail to comply with regulations relates
to the broader literature on optimal auditing and the associated discrimination
bias. The literature refers to statistical discrimination in a situation where oﬃcers
target a speciﬁc group in order to maximize successful searches (Becker, 1957).
For example, Knowles et al. (2001) use information on outcomes to disentangle
racial prejudice from such statistical discrimination. While related to our research
question, statistical discrimination is a theme with implications beyond the scope
of this chapter. We do not have information on the frequency of controls, but
rather solely on the incidence of rejections. Hence, we can neither assess whether
Chinese ﬁrms are over-represented in controls, nor whether the rate of rejection of
shipments is equal across groups.
Uncertainty component of NTM-related barriers
Somewhat surprisingly, the uncertainty component of NTM-related barriers has
been mostly overlooked in the literature on NTMs and border inspections. To
the best of our knowledge, there are four main papers that provide econometric
investigations of the impact of import rejections on agri-food trade but none uses
ﬁrm-level export data. Three of these papers deal with rejections conducted by
the United States (US), while the fourth examines European rejections.
First, Baylis et al. (2009) investigate whether exporters learn from import re-
jections and whether these are inﬂuenced by political economy concerns. Using
monthly rejections by country and product from 1998-2004, they ﬁnd that new
exporters are less aﬀected by rejections than are experienced ones. This suggests
that inspections are not random but are instead targeted at exporters, who have
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been identiﬁed as unsafe. Furthermore, rejections are not only driven by safety
concerns but also by domestic political concerns.
Second, Jouanjean et al. (2015) focus on reputation. Using a sample of US rejec-
tions at the country-product dimension from 1998-2008, they highlight neighbour
and sector reputation eﬀects. If a product from a neighbouring country is rejected
in the previous year, the probability of a country experiencing at least one border
rejection of the same product this year more than doubles. At the sector level,
the probability of a rejection increases by 62% if a related product from the same
country is rejected in the preceding year.
Third, Grundke and Moser (2014) consider to what extent border rejections deter
entry into the US. Using a gravity equation approach, they show that the cost
of rejections at the US border falls heavily on developing countries. They use
EU rejections as an instrument in part of their analysis. Grundke and Moser
(2014) focus their argument on the demand for protection in the US and stricter
enforcement of NTMs. Like the two papers above, they do not explicitly refer to
uncertainty as a trade barrier.
Fourth, Jaud et al. (2013) study the eﬀect of European rejections on aggregate
trade ﬂows. They document that the EU increases the number of countries it
sources agri-food imports from, but that import volumes are concentrated among
a small number of exporting countries. They conclude that entrants ﬁrst start
small. Later incumbent exporters, who have proved safe, grab most of the EU
market share. Although the paper does not mention uncertainty in the import
market, the mechanism they refer to is clearly linked to the mechanism studied in
this chapter.
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2.3 Data and descriptive statistics
2.3.1 Data
Although products subject to sanitary requirements experience systematic controls
before shipment in the exporting country, controls at the border of the importing
country ensure fairness of the process and retain the possibility of recognizing
problems related to transportation. If a problem is identiﬁed, the shipment is
likely to be rejected. We combine information on rejections of agri-food shipments
at the European border with Chinese ﬁrm level export data. This allows us to
measure the impact of uncertainty and regulations on ﬁrms' export decisions. We
cannot identify individual exporters that have been rejected. Hence, we use the
incidence of rejections as the unit of measurement of the rejection variable. Further,
we merge the ﬁrm-level data with the RASFF rejections at the product and year
dimension.
Food alerts and border rejections
The Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) consists of a cross-border
information exchange system on emergency sanitary measures in the European
Economic Area (EEA).8 RASFF members must notify the European Commission
about any serious health risk deriving from food or feed. Starting from its creation
in 1979, all notiﬁcations are publicly available via the RASFF portal.
To construct our dataset, we record all notiﬁcations by RASFF member states
over the period 1979-2011 and make several cleaning decisions:
• First, we keep notiﬁcations over the entire period 1979-2011 even if our ﬁrm-
level data cover a shorter period in order to exploit the variation in notiﬁca-
tions over time and their cumulated eﬀect on trade ﬂows.
8EEA includes the EU27 countries plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.
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Table 2.1
RASFF members
Since 1995 from 2004 from 2007
Austria Italy Cyprus Lithuania Bulgaria
Belgium Liechtenstein* Czech Republic Malta Romania
Denmark Luxembourg Estonia Poland
Finland Netherlands Hungary Slovenia
France Norway* Latvia Slovakia
Germany Portugal
Greece Spain
Iceland* Sweden
Ireland United Kingdom
Notes: * not EU, but EEA members
• Over our sample period, two rounds of RASFF membership enlargements
occurred, both of which we account for. The list of RASFF members is
reported in Table 2.1.9
• We treat the RASFF border as the relevant location for observing notiﬁ-
cations and consider all notiﬁcations by RASFF members regarding non-
RASFF countries. We ignore notiﬁcations concerning products originating
from other RASFF countries.
• Since we are concerned with rejections due to SPS concerns, we restrict our
analysis to agri-food products; i.e. products belonging to chapters 01-24 of
the HS classiﬁcation.
• Some shipments may be initially rejected but allowed entry into the RASFF
market after some improvements. For example, entry may be allowed after
the exporter has made changes to the product labelling. However, the major-
ity of inspected shipments declared `unsafe' are permanently rejected entry
into the RASFF market. Using information available on the RASFF portal,
we can identify whether or not entry was ultimately rejected.10 Since we
9We exclude Switzerland which from 2009 is included in RASFF border controls of products
of animal origin but not in other types of controls.
10We use information on border rejections for the period 2008-2011. This is reported on the
RASFF portal and refers to consignments that have failed entry to the RASFF market, and are
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are interested in de facto restrictive rejections, we retain only observations
related to permanent import rejections.
• If a rejection speciﬁes two origin countries, we split the observation into two:
one for each origin.
Taking these factors into account leaves us with a total of 14,860 rejections for
the period 1979-2011. Among these, 1,690 rejections are related to Chinese ship-
ments.
The RASFF portal contains information on products only in verbal form. We
code the rejection data at the HS 4-digit level  the most disaggregated level at
which we can identify rejections. We provide a detailed description of the applied
methodology in Appendix B.1. Using this approach, we are able to match 89
percent of all rejections with an HS4 code (13,241 out of 14,860), and 91 percent
of Chinese rejections (1,537 out of 1,690).
Unfortunately, the RASFF portal neither provides the quantity or value of rejected
products, nor the name of the exporting ﬁrms. Therefore, we use the incidence of
rejections as measure for the rejection variable.
Chinese exports at the ﬁrm-level
Chinese customs data provide information on exports by ﬁrm, HS6 product, des-
tination and year.11 Our dataset covers the universe of Chinese agri-food exports
for the period 2000-2011. Thus it avoids stratiﬁcation or sampling issues or both;
as such it is preferable to surveys often used in the literature.
Further, our dataset identiﬁes whether the ﬁrm is a wholesaler. We use this infor-
mation to restrict our attention to non-wholesalers. While intermediaries play an
not allowed to enter through another border post. Before 2008, this precise information on border
rejections is not available. We exploit information on notiﬁcations and on the action taken by
RASFF authorities to identify a border rejections. This change in rejections' identiﬁcation before
and after 2008 does not aﬀect our estimation results.
11We thank Sandra Poncet for providing the data.
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important role in trade, we want to focus on the direct decisions of ﬁrms. Inter-
mediaries may display diﬀerent export behaviour and may react less strongly to
border rejections.
We aggregate all exports by ﬁrm-destination-year at the HS4 level. This corre-
sponds to the level to which we are able to code the RASFF border rejections. It
is possible that some ﬁrms might export diﬀerent HS6 products within one HS4
sector. To address this concern, we verify that the large majority of HS4-ﬁrm obser-
vations also uniquely identify an HS6 shipment (see Table B.2 in Appendix B.2).
Even among multi-HS4 product ﬁrms around 70 percent of HS4 sectors include
only a single HS6 product.12
12Econometric estimations conducted only on ﬁrms exporting a single HS6 product within an
HS4 sector do not provide results signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the ones obtained with the entire
sample of ﬁrms. Table B.2 shows also that the majority of ﬁrms are present in only one HS4
sector. Therefore, in our sample the impact of spillovers within ﬁrms and across HS4 sectors is
likely to be small.
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2.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.2 reports the number of Chinese exporters present in all world markets, and
in the RASFF market. In the sample period, between 24 percent and 32 percent
of Chinese exporters are present in the RASFF market. The number of active
exporters rose between 2001 and 2007 and again after 2009, with a small drop
in export activity during the 2008-2009 ﬁnancial crisis. The sample of products
exported over time is relatively stable, with a decrease after 2007. Contrary to the
number of exporters, no further increase is observed at the end of the crisis. Many
exporters to the RASFF market are single-product ﬁrms. On average, ﬁrms export
1.6 products to the RASFF market and the median is equal to one. Figure 2.1
plots Chinese agri-food exports over the sample period. Total exports and ﬂows
to the RASFF market are separately reported. In line with the growth in the
number of exporting ﬁrms, exports tend also to increase over the period (except
in 2009).
Figure 2.2 provides statistics related to RASFF rejections for all shipments re-
gardless of origin. A signiﬁcant rise in the number of RASFF rejections between
2000 and 2003 is depicted in Panel 1. This increase primarily reﬂects growing
attention to sanitary risks and the increased application of the RASFF system by
its members. The increase in rejections in 2003 is likely linked to Central and
Eastern European countries harmonizing their regulations before their accession
to the EU in 2004. Starting in 2003 the annual number of rejections oscillates
between 1,000 and 1,500. The decreases in 2006 and 2007 are neither driven by
changes in RASFF membership, nor the moving EU border. Panel 2 highlights
that China, our country of interest, is among the countries most aﬀected by RASFF
rejections.13
13Turkey and Iran are ranked among the top rejected origin countries. Mycotoxins are a well
known issue of Turkish exports of pistachios and dried ﬁgs, and Iranian pistachios. All Iranian
exports of pistachios are double checked for freedom from mycotoxins.
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Table 2.2
Chinese ﬁrms: basic descriptive statistics
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
World agri-food exports
Nb. of ﬁrms 7,340 8,834 12,321 12,259 11,314 11,604
Nb. of HS4 products 192 195 196 192 185 185
Agri-food exports to RASFF market
Nb. of ﬁrms 1,800 2,083 3,176 3,604 3,548 3,730
Nb. of HS4 products 137 135 150 151 140 136
Nb. of HS4 products per ﬁrm mean 1.68 1.57 1.64 1.68 1.61 1.59
median 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: These statistics exclude wholesalers.
Figure 2.1
Chinese agri-food exports between 2000-2011 (in logs)
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Notes: These statistics exclude wholesalers. For clarity, the statistics are presented every two
years.
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Figure 2.2
RASFF rejections on all shipments
(1) Border rejections over time
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Figure 2.3
RASFF rejections on Chinese shipments
(1) Chinese border rejections over time
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Figure 2.4
Correlation between current and lagged RASFF rejections (in logs)
(1) Current vs. Lagged Border Rejections
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Notes: y-axis: lagged rejections (in t− 1); x-axis: current rejections (in t).
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Figure 2.3 reports the number of RASFF rejections aﬀecting Chinese shipments
(Panel 1) and the main HS2 sectors aﬀected by rejections (Panel 2). Rejections of
Chinese shipments increase over time with a dip in 2009 related to the crisis. This
suggests a positive correlation between Chinese exports, depicted in Figure 2.1,
and Chinese rejections at the RASFF border. In addition, we observe a strong
increase in the number of rejections in 2008. This increase could be driven by a
diversion of Chinese exports from countries strongly hit by the economic crisis to
the EU. Firms exporting to countries with lower standards may try to export to
the EU if demand in the countries with lower standards decreases. If their products
do not satisfy EU requirements, this could result in an increase in rejections. An
alternative explanation is related to protectionism. At the beginning of the 2008-
2009 crisis, inspections and rejections were potentially used to protect European
producers from Chinese competition. In our empirical analysis, we include sector-
time ﬁxed eﬀects to control for this increasing trend. Panel 2 shows that oil seeds
(HS12) and ﬁsh and ﬁshery products (HS03) are the Chinese sectors most aﬀected
by rejections. Jointly they account for more than 60 percent of all rejections. The
high share of sector HS12 in Chinese rejections relates to mycotoxin problems in
peanuts (HS1202).
Figure 2.4 shows whether hysteresis is driving RASFF rejections. It compares
current and lagged rejections at the same country-HS4 product dimension for all
countries (Panel 1) and for China (Panel 2). It provides descriptive evidence of
positive correlations. It also highlights that inspections, and therefore rejections,
are not random but driven largely by past rejections. In the following section, we
present more rigorous evidence to this initial analysis.
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2.4 Empirical strategy
We investigate the trade impact of RASFF border rejections on Chinese ﬁrms. As
discussed above, border inspections and possible rejections create some uncertainty
and may impact exporters. Furthermore, this impact is likely to be heterogeneous
across ﬁrms because not all shipments are inspected and inspections are not ran-
dom. Certain ﬁrms or products, which present a higher safety risks, tend to attract
particular scrutiny. In addition, some exporters are more able than others to in-
vest in maintaining the quality of their products or in controls prior to shipment.
Especially the biggest and most productive ﬁrms can likely aﬀord to reduce their
risk of rejections in this way.
An apparent limitation of our data is that we cannot directly identify the shipments
and exporters aﬀected by a RASFF rejection. The `natural' model to be estimated
would be:
yi,s,t = α + βd,1 rejection
1
i,s,t−1 + βs,1 rejection
2
i,s,t−1
+ µi + φHS2,t + i,s,t,
(2.1)
where i refers to the ﬁrm, s to the HS4-digit product category and t to the year.
rejection1i,s,t−1 is a dummy=1 if ﬁrm i had a border rejection in product s in period
t − 1, and 0 otherwise; and rejection2i,s,t−1 indicates if another ﬁrm had a border
rejection in period t − 1, and 0 otherwise. Thus, βd,1 would measure the direct
eﬀect of having a border rejection and βs,1 would measure any spillovers to other
ﬁrms. Consequently, (βd,1+βs,1) would measure the direct and spillover eﬀects for
a ﬁrm that had a border rejection and other rejections which occurred in the same
HS4 category.
However, two issues raise obstacles on that natural route. Firstly, we lack the
information on the aﬀected Chinese exporter. We can only observe the overall
eﬀect of a rejection on the Chinese exports of a given product, i.e. our rejection
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variable is a combination of reject1 and reject2. Hence, our coeﬃcient of interest
measures the eﬀect of a rejection of a particular product on all exporters of that
product. Our estimated eﬀect, thus, combines the direct eﬀect of rejections as well
as the indirect eﬀect on Chinese competitors of that same product.
Secondly, although a rejected shipment is not present in EU import statistics it
may be present in the Chinese customs data if it has passed through Chinese
customs. It follows that the impact on Chinese exporters may not be observed
in the current period. Hence, we choose to consider the incidence of rejections in
t− 1.
Against this background, we follow the empirical strategy suggested by Fontagné
et al. (2015) and estimate the following equation:
yi,s,t = α + β1 rejections,t−1
+ β2 ln(size)i,t−1 + β3 (rejections,t−1 × ln(size)i,t−1)
+ µi + φHS2,t + i,s,t,
(2.2)
where i refers to the ﬁrm, s to the HS4-digit product category, and t to the
year.
We introduce HS2 sector-year (φHS2,t) and ﬁrm (µi) ﬁxed eﬀects to control for
unobserved heterogeneity. Sector-year ﬁxed eﬀects control for business cycles and
import-demand shocks at the sector level. Industry ﬁxed eﬀects also capture the
fact that rejections may be more frequent in industries where EU food safety
standards are particularly stringent or in industries where shipments occur many
times over the course of a year or both. Firm ﬁxed eﬀects control for time-invariant
characteristics speciﬁc to a ﬁrm such as productivity or average size.
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We do not cluster the standard errors. Our main variable of interest is the inter-
action term between rejections and ﬁrm size. This variable varies at the ﬁrm-HS4-
year level, negating the need to cluster.14
As explained above, the RASFF border is the relevant location for our study. Since
RASFF countries exchange information on rejections, a rejected product will not
be able to enter the market via another RASFF border. Therefore, we do not
consider export ﬂows to each RASFF country separately, but aggregate exports to
all RASFF countries. Thus, the RASFF market as a whole is the only destination
in our analysis. This aggregation presents another advantage. A product could be
rejected by a country which is not its ﬁnal destination. However, Chinese customs
data report only ﬁnal destinations. This divergence between the ﬁnal destination
and the country of rejection could bias the results of an analysis conducted at the
country level. Aggregation at the RASFF market level addresses this issue.
Considering the RASFF market as a whole does not allow us to properly control
for tariﬀ protection. However, in our analysis, this is not a major issue. All
importing countries (except Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway) are part of the
EU and apply the same common external tariﬀs. Therefore, tariﬀs are almost
invariant across RASFF countries. Also, the tariﬀs imposed by RASFF countries
on Chinese products did not vary signiﬁcantly between 2000 and 2011, and a large
part of any variation is captured by the set of sector-year ﬁxed eﬀects included in
our estimations below. Therefore, the absence of a control for tariﬀs does not bias
our results.
We deﬁne three dependent variables, yi,s,t:
• A dummy for exit that equals 1 if the ﬁrm exports the HS4 product to the
RASFF market in t− 1 but not in t, and 0 otherwise. The counterfactual is
14We conduct a robustness check with clustered standard errors in section 2.5.3; the results
remain unchanged.
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ﬁrms that export a given HS4 to RASFF countries in t− 1 and also in t. We
disregard re-entry in later periods;15
• A dummy for entry that equals 1 if the ﬁrm exports the HS4 product to
the RASFF market in t but not in t − 1, and 0 otherwise. As in Javorcik
(2004) and Nabokin (2014), this requires inﬂating the dataset, since we need
to account for the counterfactual ﬁrms that could have chosen to enter, but
chose not to. We inﬂate the dataset to include all Chinese exporters as
potential entrants that at some point in the sample period export the HS4
product. Hence, the counterfactual is ﬁrms that do not enter the market; i.e.
do not export a given HS4 to RASFF countries in t− 1 or in t.
The entry and exit variables capture the extensive margin of trade at the ﬁrm-HS4
dimension. They are not analogous. As highlighted by the counterfactual, exit
is conditional on the ﬁrm being active in t − 1, while entry is conditional on not
exporting in t− 1.
• The value of the export ﬂows for the intensive margin  speciﬁcally, the value
exported by the ﬁrm to the RASFF market for a given HS4 product in year
t. We focus on survivors. That are those ﬁrms that are already present in
t − 1 and continue to export in year t. In other words, we do not consider
ﬁrms that start to export in year t.
Our set of explanatory variables includes border rejections and ﬁrm characteristics.
We consider two diﬀerent measures for border rejections. Our rejection measures
(rejections,t−1) are:
• A dummy for past rejections that equals 1 if at least one shipment from
China of that particular HS4 product was rejected at the RASFF border
15Recall that we focus on the RASFF market only and do not consider exports to non-RASFF
countries. Therefore, a ﬁrm may exit the European market but may continue to export to non-
RASFF countries.
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in t − 1, and 0 otherwise. Essaji (2008) suggests using lagged rejections as
internal instruments; i.e. before actual exports in t;
• The cumulated number of past rejections from China for that HS4 product.
This number is computed simply as the sum of Chinese shipments of that
particular HS4 product which were rejected in the past; i.e. from 1979 until
year t− 1.
The trade literature highlights that ﬁrms' export performance is heterogeneous
and driven largely by their productivity (Melitz, 2003). Unfortunately, Chinese
customs data do not provide details on ﬁrms' characteristics such as productivity,
employment, or total sales. Thus, to control for ﬁrm heterogeneity and its impact
on export performance, we refer to ﬁrm size, deﬁned as the natural log of their
total agri-food exports in t − 1, ln(size)i,t−1.16 As shown in the literature, export
values are a good proxy for ﬁrm size, and big exporters are usually more eﬃcient
and more productive (Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008). For ease of interpretation, we
center ﬁrm size around the median size of all ﬁrms in that year.
To capture heterogeneous eﬀects on the impact of rejections across ﬁrms, we in-
teract both our rejection variables (the dummy and cumulated number) with ﬁrm
size.
We estimate all equations by ordinary least squares (OLS). The extensive margin
dependent variables are dichotomous in nature. However, we prefer the linear
probability model (LPM) to non-linear models such as logit or probit since LPM
avoids the incidental parameter problem in the presence of the large number of
ﬁxed eﬀects we employ. Besides, the LPM model provides good estimates of the
partial eﬀects on the response probability near the centre of the distribution of the
explanatory variables' vector (Wooldridge, 2010).17
16Firm size is computed as log(1+ total agri-food exports in t− 1). This approach allows us
to keep brand new ﬁrms for which lagged size is equal to zero in our entry estimations.
17The LPM model is often used in the trade literature.18 An alternative approach consists in
using a random eﬀects probit model. However in this model, the unobservable random variable
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We conduct a series of robustness checks with wholesalers in section 2.5.3; our
main conclusions remain unchanged.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Extensive margin of trade
The ﬁrst three columns in Table 2.3 present the impact of Chinese rejections on
the exit of Chinese ﬁrms from the RASFF market. In columns 1 and 2, rejections
are measured using a dummy that is set to 1 if at least one shipment of the same
HS4 was rejected in t − 1. We investigate exit in year t. Column 3 reports the
cumulated number of past rejections of Chinese shipments for that HS4 over time
until t− 1. In all columns we control for ﬁrm size. Columns 2 and 3 also include
an interaction term between ﬁrm size and past rejections. The results suggest
that when we control for heterogeneity in the impact of rejections across ﬁrms,
past rejections increase the probability of exit of Chinese ﬁrms from the RASFF
market. According to column 3, past rejections raise the probability of exit by
4.8 percent. In addition, exit aﬀects small and less productive ﬁrms more than
bigger and more productive ones; the estimated coeﬃcient of the interaction term
between ﬁrm size and rejections is negative. We ﬁnd that small ﬁrms tend to exit
more, regardless of past border rejections.
Columns 4-6 in Table 2.3 report the impact of Chinese rejections on the entry
of Chinese ﬁrms into the RASFF market. The estimations include the same ex-
planatory variables as in columns 1-3. We ﬁnd that rejections tend to favour the
entry of new ﬁrms. The estimated coeﬃcients on both rejection measures (dummy
and cumulated number) are positive and signiﬁcant. The magnitude of the eﬀects
is between 0.8 percent (column 3) and 1.1 percent (column 2) depending on the
should have a normal distribution and be independent from the observable variables, which is a
strong assumption (Wooldridge, 2010).
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measure used for rejections. Also, it seems that rejections promote the entry of
small ﬁrms more than big ﬁrms; the estimated coeﬃcient of the interaction term
between ﬁrm size and rejections is negative and signiﬁcant. Finally, regardless
of past rejections, big and productive ﬁrms enter the RASFF market more easily
than small ones. If we compare the estimated coeﬃcients of the exit and entry
probability, we ﬁnd that past rejections have a much stronger impact on ﬁrm exit
than on ﬁrm entry.
Our results are in line with Jaud et al. (2013), who ﬁnd that sanitary risk increases
the diversiﬁcation of European imports at the extensive margin. Here, we observe
turnover among Chinese ﬁrms exporting to the RASFF market. Past rejections
increase both the exit of Chinese exporters and the entry of new ones. Furthermore,
the eﬀect on both exit and entry is stronger for small ﬁrms.
The last column in Table 2.3 does not examine exit and entry probabilities, but
aggregates the observations at the HS4 sector-year level and instead considers
the log number of Chinese ﬁrms exporting to the RASFF market. Interestingly,
the estimated coeﬃcient of the cumulated number of past rejections is negative
and signiﬁcant, suggesting that exit tends to dominate entry. Border rejections
reduce the total number of Chinese ﬁrms exporting to the RASFF market. Also,
the number of small ﬁrms shows a bigger decrease compared to big ﬁrms, and
the estimated coeﬃcient of the interaction with ﬁrm size is positive and strongly
signiﬁcant. As expected, the presence, in the past, of big ﬁrms in the market has
a negative eﬀect on the number of ﬁrms currently in the market.
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2.5.2 Intensive margin of trade
Table 2.4 reports results on the intensive margin of trade. Columns 1-3 focus on
the value of exports to the RASFF market by survivors, that is ﬁrms present in
years t − 1 and t. Our results highlight three main facts. First, and independent
of border rejections, bigger ﬁrms tend to survive and increase their exports to the
RASFF market. Second, on average ﬁrms that continue exporting products hit
by rejections neither increase nor decrease their exports to the RASFF market.
The two variables, the dummy and cumulated number of past rejections, have no
signiﬁcant impact on the export values in columns 2 and 3. Third, some hetero-
geneity is observable across ﬁrms, and the results for the interaction terms between
past rejections and ﬁrm size suggest that big and more productive incumbent ﬁrms
increase their exports to the RASFF market in the year(s) following a rejection.
Therefore, large ﬁrms do beneﬁt from the exit of small exporters consecutive with
a rejection.
Column 4 investigates the impact of border rejections on the quantity exported by
incumbents, while column 5 examines the price  measured as the unit value  of
the products exported by these ﬁrms.19 The heterogeneous eﬀect of past rejections
across ﬁrms remains positive but is less signiﬁcant (p < 0.05 for quantity and
p < 0.10 for price). In terms of magnitude, the eﬀect on price is smaller than the
eﬀect on quantity. Finally, regardless of past rejections, ﬁrm size has no impact
on price. These results suggest that big and productive incumbent ﬁrms increase
the quantity exported to the RASFF market, and perhaps to a lesser extent, the
product price.
Our results at the intensive margin show a concentration of Chinese exports among
big and productive exporters. The eﬀect is stronger for products hit by past re-
19Some prices exhibit extreme values. We exclude these outliers by deleting the top and
bottom 1 percent of the price observations.
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Table 2.4
Intensive-margin estimations
Ln exports to the RASFF market in t
(Surviving ﬁrms)
Value Quan- Unit
tity value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dummy = 1 if at least
one rejection in t− 1
0.269*** -0.193
(0.031) (0.165)
Dummy for rejection
in t− 1
× Firm
size
0.035***
(0.012)
Cumulated nb. of past
rejections until t− 1
-0.010 -0.007 -0.002
(0.067) (0.070) (0.027)
Cumulated nb. of past
rejections
× Firm
size
0.014*** 0.010** 0.003*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002)
Firm size 0.163*** 0.151*** 0.149*** 0.141*** 0.008*
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.005)
Observations 30999 30999 30999 30982 30486
R2 0.623 0.623 0.625 0.651 0.788
Note: Fixed eﬀects for ﬁrms and HS2-year in all estimations (not reported). Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Firm size is deﬁned as the log of ﬁrm's total agri-food exports in t − 1.
***/**/* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
jections. As above these results conﬁrm Jaud et al. (2013), who also highlight
concentration at the intensive margin, especially for risky products. When re-
jections are more frequent and cumulate, European importers concentrate their
orders on large, and plausibly more reliable Chinese exporters, who increase their
exports to the RASFF market.
Thus, we observe two eﬀects: turnover of ﬁrms at the extensive margin of trade
accompanied by a concentration at the intensive margin.
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2.5.3 Robustness checks
In this section, we investigate the robustness of our results to alternative speciﬁ-
cations and samples. We perform all the tests using our preferred estimations, i.e.
those including the cumulated number of past rejections as a measure of border
rejections and the interaction term between this rejection measure and ﬁrm size.
We run three estimations in each case: one for the probability that the Chinese
ﬁrms will exit the RASFF market, one for the probability of entry into that market
and one for the intensive margin of trade.
First, we test whether our results change if the standard errors are clustered. As
mentioned in Section 2.4, clustering is not mandatory in our case because our
variable of interest, the interaction term between rejections and ﬁrm size, varies at
the ﬁrm-HS4-year level. However as a robustness check, columns 1-3 in Table 2.5
include clusters deﬁned at the HS4-year level. The results are not aﬀected by their
inclusion.
A second source of potential bias relates to churning ﬂows and potential reverse
causality. To check for this, we introduce in the estimation a measure of the
mean length of HS4 ﬂows exported to the RASFF market. We report the results
in columns 4-6 of Table 2.5. This variable has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on both the
extensive and intensive trade margins but its inclusion does not aﬀect our previous
conclusions.
Endogeneity may stem also from our focus on Chinese rejections and Chinese ﬁrms'
exports. Potential bias is reduced by the use of lagged rejections. In addition, we
replicate our main estimations using two alternative sets of rejections: (i) non-
Chinese rejections, (ii) all rejections whatever the product origin; i.e. Chinese and
non-Chinese. Table 2.6 reports the results. For the extensive margin of trade,
the magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcients is lower, but they have the same sign
and level of signiﬁcance as in Table 2.3. This suggests that rejections related
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Table 2.5
Robustness: clustering and churning ﬂows
With clusters Churning ﬂows
Exit Entry IM Exit Entry IM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cum. nb. past rej.
until t− 1
0.048*** 0.008*** -0.010 0.065*** 0.007*** -0.107
(0.013) (0.001) (0.085) (0.012) (0.001) (0.066)
Cum. nb.
past rej.
× Firm
size
-0.005*** -0.001*** 0.014** -0.006*** -0.001*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.0001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.005)
Firm size -0.041*** 0.014*** 0.149*** -0.041*** 0.014*** 0.149***
(0.002) (0.0003) (0.013) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.012)
Mean length of ﬂows -0.271*** 0.042*** 1.566***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.048)
Observations 49220 178951 30999 49220 178951 30999
R2 0.392 0.082 0.625 0.405 0.042 0.640
Note: Fixed eﬀects for ﬁrms and HS2-year in all estimations (not reported). Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Firm size is deﬁned as the log of ﬁrm's total agri-food exports in t − 1.
Columns 1-3: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at HS4-year level. Columns 4-6: Regres-
sions also include the mean length of ﬂows. ***/**/* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10%
level.
Table 2.6
Robustness: Non-Chinese and entire sample of rejections
Non-Chinese rejections All rejections
Exit Entry IM Exit Entry IM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cum. nb. past rej.
until t− 1
0.024*** 0.005*** 0.116** 0.024*** 0.005*** 0.117**
(0.008) (0.001) (0.049) (0.008) (0.001) (0.047)
Cum. nb.
past rej.
× Firm
size
-0.002*** -0.001*** -0.004 -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.004
(0.001) (0.0001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.003)
Firm size -0.042*** 0.014*** 0.171*** -0.042*** 0.015*** 0.171***
(0.002) (0.0003) (0.013) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.013)
Observations 49220 178951 30999 49220 178951 30999
R2 0.391 0.082 0.623 0.391 0.082 0.623
Note: Fixed eﬀects for ﬁrms and HS2-year in all estimations (not reported). Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Firm size is deﬁned as the log of ﬁrm's total agri-food exports in t − 1.
Columns 1-3: Non-Chinese rejections. Columns 4-6: All rejections whatever the origin of the
products. ***/**/* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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to products imported into Europe from non-Chinese suppliers but also exported
by Chinese ﬁrms shape the participation of Chinese ﬁrms. Rejections for a given
product category increase the probability of additional controls on similar products
from all origins. This restrains Chinese export participation, although the impact is
weaker compared to the eﬀect of rejections of Chinese products. Chinese exporters
fear tighter controls on the type of products they export, even if these controls do
not necessarily target their own ﬂows. Results at the intensive margin of trade
ﬁrst conﬁrm the expected market shares redistribution. Chinese ﬁrms substitute
at least partially for competitors following rejection of non-Chinese products. The
estimated coeﬃcient of the cumulated number of past rejections becomes signiﬁcant
at the intensive margin. Second, we cannot reject the hypothesis that Chinese ﬁrms
beneﬁt equally, whatever their size, from this redistribution of market shares. The
estimated coeﬃcient of the interaction terms is not signiﬁcant at the intensive
margin, so the heterogeneous eﬀect of past rejections disappears.
A potential issue raised by the previous estimations is the sensitivity of exported
products to control. For instance, among oil seeds certain product categories (e.g.
peanuts) are highly sensitive to mycotoxins and should be more often subjected
to control at the RASFF borders. This outcome is not captured by our previous
set of ﬁxed eﬀects. We control for the time-invariant characteristics of products
by introducing HS4 ﬁxed eﬀects in addition to the HS2 ﬁxed eﬀects. This strategy
allows us to disentangle the product-country vs. product-only dimensions related
to inspections. The ﬁrst three columns in Table 2.7 control for these unobservable
product characteristics. At the extensive margin of trade, our previous results
remain unchanged. At the intensive margin, however, the estimated coeﬃcient
of the border rejection variable becomes negative and signiﬁcant. This suggests
that ﬁrms export fewer HS4 products hit by rejections if we control for unobserved
characteristics. Even for big ﬁrms the eﬀect is negative; the sum of the coeﬃcients
of the cumulated number of past rejections and of the interaction term is negative.
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Table 2.7
Robustness: HS4 unobservable characteristics and trade ﬂows intensity
HS4 characteristics Trade ﬂows intensity
Exit Entry IM Exit Entry IM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cum. nb. past rej.
until t− 1
0.078*** 0.004** -0.159** 0.254*** 0.046*** 0.077
(0.013) (0.002) (0.070) (0.082) (0.008) (0.459)
Cum. nb.
past rej.
× Firm
size
-0.005*** -0.001*** 0.013*** -0.025*** -0.007*** 0.057**
(0.001) (0.0001) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.025)
Firm size -0.042*** 0.014*** 0.152*** -0.043*** 0.014*** 0.154***
(0.002) (0.0003) (0.011) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.012)
Observations 49220 178951 30999 49169 177252 30987
R2 0.409 0.083 0.655 0.391 0.082 0.624
Note: Fixed eﬀects for ﬁrms and HS2-year in all estimations (not reported). Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Firm size is deﬁned as the log of ﬁrm's total agri-food exports in t − 1.
Columns 1-3: Regressions also include HS4 ﬁxed eﬀects (not reported). Columns 4-6: Cumulated
number of past rejections weighted by the cumulated number of past export ﬂows. ***/**/*
indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Our results suggest also that the negative externalities induced by border rejections
have primarily a product-country rather than a product-only dimension. In other
words, Chinese exporters are aﬀected negatively by rejections which hit the same
Chinese product as the one they export. This is in line with the results in columns 3
and 6 in Table 2.6. At the intensive margin, Chinese exporters seem to beneﬁt from
rejections aﬀecting non-Chinese products but are negatively aﬀected by rejections
targeting Chinese products.
The last three columns in Table 2.7 account for the intensity of Chinese export
ﬂows to the RASFF market for each HS4 sector. The number of rejections of
Chinese shipments varies across sectors (see Panel 2 of Figure 2.3). Part of this
variation is due to the sanitary risk which of course may diﬀer across products, but
partly originates from the intensity of trade between China and RASFF countries.
A sector characterized by many ﬂows is likely  all else being equal  to encounter
a higher number of rejections. To control for the intensity of trade, diﬀerent
weighting schemes can be used. For example, rejections could be weighed by trade
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volume or the number of export ﬂows. Here, we weigh the cumulated number
of past rejections by the cumulated number of past export ﬂows. We compute
this as the sum of the cumulated number of export ﬂows by Chinese ﬁrms to
RASFF countries within one HS4 sector over time. The results conﬁrm, and even
strengthen, our previous ﬁndings since the magnitude of estimated coeﬃcients is
larger than those reported in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
Next, we test whether our results are sensitive to the sample of ﬁrms considered
in the estimations.20 First, we exclude exporters that only serve the RASFF mar-
ket for a short period. To do so, we compute the number of years of presence
of each Chinese ﬁrm exporting to the RASFF market. We restrict our sample
to ﬁrms where the number of years of presence is above the median. The ﬁrst
three columns in Table 2.8 present the results of these estimations. The sample
restriction has no impact on our previous conclusions. The three last columns in
Table 2.8 add wholesalers to the sample of ﬁrms. So far, our analysis has excluded
wholesalers in order to examine active ﬁrm export decisions. However, wholesalers
represent a non-negligible number of Chinese exporters. In fact, their inclusion in
the sample has almost no impact on the estimated coeﬃcients, and the previous
ﬁndings remain valid.
Firms exporting to other non-EU OECDmarkets may be more successful in passing
RASFF inspections.21 These markets also impose stringent safety regulations, and
conduct inspections. Therefore, exporters to these markets are more likely to sell
safe products and to have higher productivity. This may help them deal with
inspections, their related costs, and uncertainty. Table 2.9 distinguishes between
ﬁrms exporting to at least one OECD market outside the RASFF market in t− 1
vs. other ﬁrms. We investigates whether rejections have diﬀerent trade eﬀects on
20Unfortunately, information on ownership is missing for many ﬁrms. Therefore, we cannot
test whether rejections have a diﬀerentiated impact on foreign, private, and state-owned ﬁrms.
21Non-EU OECD countries are Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, South
Korea, and the US.
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Table 2.8
Robustness: ﬁrms' number of years of presence and wholesalers
Above median nb. With wholesalers
year of presence
Exit Entry IM Exit Entry IM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cum. nb. past rej.
until t− 1
0.050*** 0.009*** -0.010 0.043*** 0.008*** -0.039
(0.013) (0.001) (0.067) (0.009) (0.001) (0.054)
Cum. nb.
past rej.
× Firm
size
-0.005*** -0.001*** 0.014*** -0.004*** -0.002*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.0001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.004)
Firm size -0.041*** 0.014*** 0.149*** -0.037*** 0.015*** 0.128***
(0.002) (0.0003) (0.012) (0.002) (0.0002) (0.009)
Observations 45469 133977 30999 88858 352192 51998
R2 0.293 0.094 0.523 0.363 0.067 0.595
Note: Fixed eﬀects for ﬁrms and HS2-year in all estimations (not reported). Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Firm size is deﬁned as the log of ﬁrm's total agri-food exports in t − 1.
Columns 1-3: Firms with a number of years of presence above the median. Columns 4-6: With
wholesalers. ***/**/* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Table 2.9
Robustness: OECD presence in t− 1
Exit Entry IM
No Yes No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cum. nb. past rej.
until t− 1
0.089*** 0.030** 0.004*** 0.006** -0.150 0.001
(0.030) (0.014) (0.001) (0.003) (0.149) (0.079)
Cum. nb.
past rej.
× Firm
size
-0.008*** -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.001** 0.024** 0.013**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.011) (0.006)
Firm size -0.052*** -0.036*** 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.089*** 0.153***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.029) (0.014)
Observations 11528 37692 126216 52735 6213 24786
R2 0.603 0.366 0.118 0.187 0.796 0.604
Note: Fixed eﬀects for ﬁrms and HS2-year in all estimations (not reported). Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Firm size is deﬁned as the log of ﬁrm's total agri-food exports in t − 1.
Columns 1, 3, and 5: Firms not exporting to at least one OECD market (other than the RASFF
market) in t − 1. Columns 2, 4, and 6: Firms exporting to at least one OECD market (other
than the RASFF market) in t− 1. ***/**/* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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these two groups of ﬁrms. First, we observe that our previous conclusions, namely
the diversiﬁcation at the extensive margin and concentration at the intensive one,
are accurate for both groups of ﬁrms. However, there are some diﬀerences in
the magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcients. Firms already exporting to another
OECD market in t − 1 are less likely to exit from the RASFF market due to
border rejections. In addition, this eﬀect is magniﬁed for big and productive ﬁrms.
Columns 3 and 4 indicate that entry to the RASFF market induced by rejections
is slightly stronger for ﬁrms already exporting to at least one other OECD market.
At the intensive trade margin, productive incumbent ﬁrms exporting to OECD
markets in t − 1 are also more likely to increase their exports to the RASFF
market in t compared to other ﬁrms (columns 5 and 6).
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study whether a rise in uncertainty related to the risk of border
rejections aﬀects imports from a large developing economy. NTMs may act as
substantial barriers in the decision to export because they potentially increase the
cost of exporting. If border rejections result in an increased likelihood of inspection,
a series of import rejections could induce negative spillovers for competitors from
the same origin, the same product or both.
Our results show that Chinese exporters of agri-food products are more likely to
exit the European market if the product they export has been rejected in previous
years. At the same time, rejections favour the entry of new ﬁrms. This high-
lights turnover eﬀects at the extensive margin of trade. At the intensive margin,
border rejections increase the exports of surviving ﬁrms; i.e. a re-allocation eﬀect.
Furthermore, the microeconomic impact of the risk of rejection is heterogeneous
across ﬁrms. Turnover at the extensive margin mainly concerns small ﬁrms, while
concentration at the intensive margin beneﬁts big ﬁrms more. Overall, the num-
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ber of exporting ﬁrms tends to decrease, but total exports of the surviving ﬁrms
increases. Our results conﬁrm the key role played by uncertainty, and that big
and more productive ﬁrms are more resilient than small ones to the risk of border
rejections.
Our results contribute to the literature on ﬁrm heterogeneity and trade. We provide
a more nuanced understanding of the impact of de facto restrictive regulations on
exporting ﬁrms. Furthermore, given the importance of food safety and importers'
emphasis on sourcing from reliable producers, our results suggest that policy mak-
ers and law enforcers should adopt a comprehensive approach and pay attention
to individual ﬁrms rather than focusing on entire sectors.
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3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation and Outline
Does a temporary shock such as a strike boost one's competitors' demand? Can
such shocks have lasting demand eﬀects? I analyse these general questions in the
context of the German railway strikes of 2014-2015. The strikes forced travellers to
use alternative transport modes. For many travellers this was their ﬁrst encounter
with inter-city buses  a newly liberalized market.1 Such a shock  in introducing
new customers to the railway's key rival  has the potential to result in new, long-
term customers for buses who otherwise would have routinely stayed with rail.2
A German newspaper article suggested that "the young bus market could beneﬁt
sustainably from the strike".3 To the best of my knowledge, this study is the ﬁrst
to present systematic evidence of these qualitative accounts.
This chapter combines three novel and extremely rich datasets: detailed booking
data provided by Germany's largest bus provider MeinFernbus (MFB), emergency
timetables published by Deutsche Bahn (German Rail; hereafter referred to as DB)
during the strikes, and a web-crawled dataset of all rail itineraries. Using this data,
I study the adjustments of travellers to inter-city buses during the strike, and test
for demand persistence. The German railway strikes of 2014-2015 provide several
desirable features for a quasi-natural experiment setting. Competition from buses
1The market was liberalized by law as of January 2013. Previously the Passenger Transporta-
tion Act only permitted inter-city bus services if the state-owned railway company was unable
to provide an acceptable service. Dürr et al. (2015) provide more details on the liberalization.
2Inter-city buses are deﬁned as regularly scheduled services exceeding a distance of 50km. In
the literature they are often interchangeably referred to as `inter-urban' or `long-distance' buses.
3Full relevant excerpt: "(...) The young bus market could beneﬁt sustain-
ably from the strike. (...) Due to the strikes business travellers are com-
pelled to try the bus and then use it again (...) The number of repeat bookings
climbs." (url: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wer-vom-bahnstreik-proﬁtiert-mietwagen-
und-fernbusse-13603674.html ; 20/05/2015) Other anecdotal evidence is provided by Spiegel
magazine who suggested that "(...) the structural change will accelerate in the German
domestic inter-city market." (url: http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/service/bahn-streik-fernbus-
unternehmen-proﬁtieren-von-gdl-ausstand-a-1001003.html ; 05/11/2014)
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played no role in the exposure across routes, the occurrence, or the timing of the
railway strikes. Furthermore, this was the ﬁrst German railway strike in which
buses  a viable alternative  were available.
My empirical strategy consists of two steps. Firstly, I test which routes were
primarily aﬀected during the rail strike. While the exposure of rail routes to
the strike can be deduced from the emergency timetables, the exposure of bus
routes is not ex-ante clear to the researcher. On the one hand, it is not clear
how well travellers were informed about variations in DB service cancellations
across routes. On the other hand, travellers may only switch if the bus service
is a close enough substitute to rail. I demonstrate that the only channel driving
MFB ticket sales during the strikes is the closeness of substitution, measured by
the bus travel time. Travellers switched to buses even on routes with little or no
rail service cancellations. This suggests that they were not well informed about
their exposure to the rail strike or had no trust in DB's ability to implement the
emergency timetables. I show that the eﬀect of the rail strikes was largest on
routes with a short absolute bus travel time.
Secondly, I estimate the eﬀects of the strikes on ticket sales after DB operations
returned to normal; i.e. whether there was a persistent eﬀect. In a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences setting, I use the channel identiﬁed in the ﬁrst step to deﬁne treatment
and control group. More precisely, I compare the change in the number of cus-
tomers between high (short bus travel time) and low (long bus travel time) strike-
exposed routes. Although the common trend assumption does not seem to be
completely tenable in the given context, my results point to a persistent eﬀect on
the ticket sales for inter-city buses on the aﬀected routes. I follow the methodology
of Nunn and Qian (2011), who employ a similar strategy in a diﬀerent setting.4
They estimate period-speciﬁc treatment eﬀects for the pre-period in order to com-
4Nunn and Qian (2011) study the impact of the introduction of the potato from the Americas
on Old World population growth and urbanization.
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pare these to the post-treatment coeﬃcients. Following their methodology, my
results also remain largely unaltered to a number of alternative speciﬁcations and
robustness checks.
This chapter proceeds as follows: The remainder of this section reviews the related
literature and discusses several features of the railway strikes in 2014-2015. Section
3.2 introduces the datasets and provides new descriptive statistics on the inter-city
bus market. Section 3.3 introduces potential transmission channels and tests which
bus routes were most aﬀected during the rail strike. Section 3.4 uses the results
from the previous section to test for demand persistence after the strike. Section
3.5.2 reports robustness tests. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.1.2 Related Literature
The literature on the subject of rail strikes and their eﬀects on traveller behaviour
is surprisingly sparse. Bauernschuster et al. (2015) and Van Exel and Rietveld
(2001) provide overviews. Often inference relies on survey data and the eﬀect of
the strike is studied retrospectively. While strikes occur on a regular basis, they
are not easily anticipated and may not last long enough to formulate an appropri-
ate research design. To the best of my knowledge, the only notable exception is
Larcom et al. (2015), whose contribution is closely related to this chapter. They
show that the 2014 London underground strike resulted in about 5 percent of
commuters permanently changing their commuting route. They suggest that in-
dividuals under-experiment in normal times. Public transport strikes are often
considered to be highly economically damaging (Kennan, 1986). Larcom et al.
(2015) and this chapter highlight an unintended and potentially positive channel,
which is often overlooked in the literature: if the rail strike revealed information, it
may have been welfare improving. Some customers, who were forced to experiment
with buses, discovered that their previous choice was not optimal.
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This chapter contributes to this strand of the literature in two ways. Firstly, I
study inter-modal switching across transport modes for inter-city transport  a
less-frequent travel decision than daily commuting. The frequency of the travel
decision might matter, as suggested by the behavioural economics literature on
salience (Chetty et al., 2007). Secondly, in comparison to Larcom et al. (2015) the
longer post-strike period allows me to better understand the short- and medium-
term impacts of any eﬀect.
This chapter supplements the classic literature relating to the way in which in-
dividuals decide between alternatives. There is a large and long-standing debate
on rational decision-making (Weitzman, 1979; Morgan and Manning, 1985) and
constraints such as search costs (Baumol and Quandt, 1964) or information asym-
metries. My results cannot be reconciled with the classical economic assumption
of perfectly informed and rational consumers. After all, bus services were available
before the strikes and the availability of internet bookings  the primary booking
channel  remedy some of the search costs. Porter (1991) argues that exogenous
shocks may help individuals ﬁnd their optimal choice by triggering a period of
experimentation. The underlying idea of experimentation due to exogenously-
imposed constraints, such as the non-availability of rail services, applies to the
setting in this chapter.
Furthermore, learning could explain a permanent increase in demand for bus ser-
vices. Travellers may learn about the service and quality of buses by actually test-
ing and experiencing them. Foster et al. (2012) link the importance of consumer
learning to plant growth. Alternatively, consumers may be pushed out of previous
habits or update their beliefs on the relative quality of the two goods. In addition,
they may have changed their perception about the reliability of rail, or they may
have obtained new information from increased media coverage of inter-city buses
during the strikes. Coates and Harrison (2005) ﬁnd a negative impact of labour
disputes over player salaries on future game attendance in Major League Baseball
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in the US. Their results point to additional potential mechanisms at play: retal-
iatory motives and damage to the brand. While related to my research question,
the precise mechanism at work is a question for future research beyond the scope
of this chapter. This chapter's main contribution is to show the demand eﬀects on
inter-city buses during the rail strike, and to test the eﬀect's persistence.
Finally, this chapter is among the ﬁrst of a small but growing body of literature
which studies the German market for inter-city buses. The German market for
buses was liberalized with the explicit intent of increasing inter-modal competi-
tion. New liberalizations are currently under consideration in several other Euro-
pean economies. Thus, the primary concern of this literature has been to study
the impact of the market liberalization of German buses on rail ticket prices and
services. Böckers et al. (2015) ﬁnd that the eﬀect on the DB network was larger
at the periphery of the network.5 Bataille and Steinmetz (2013) and Hirschhausen
et al. (2008), provide theoretical models on the eﬀect of the liberalization. These
studies of inter-modal competition relate to a slightly older literature on the en-
try of low-cost airlines into Germany in the early 2000s (Friebel and Niﬀka, 2009).
Dürr et al. (2015) study competition within the inter-city bus market, and estimate
the price eﬀect of a recent large merger of MeinFernbus and Flixbus.6 Neither of
these studies considers the eﬀect of the recent German railway strikes. Further,
the studies rely on data from online price comparison websites which usually pro-
vide few time-series observations. Given the uniqueness and level of detail of the
booking dataset, the descriptives presented in this chapter contribute to a much
improved insight into this young market and its dynamics.
5See also Evangelinos et al. (2015).
6See Gagnepain et al. (2011) for a more general review of bus market competition.
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3.1.3 The German railway strikes of 2014-2015
The locomotive drivers' union (Gewerkschaft Deutscher Lokomotivführer; here-
after referred to as GDL) is a relatively small but powerful union, and has a long
history of disputes with DB. The 2014-2015 negotiations, however, constituted
the most ferocious industrial action in the history of DB. Two factors contributed
to the ferocity of the dispute: GDL was in a power struggle with a rival union,
and new legislation was under review which threatened GDL's right to represent
service personnel in future wage negotiations. Between September 2014 and May
2015 the dispute resulted in nine strike waves and 22 days aﬀected by strikes  354
hours of service disruptions. Because of the importance of the rail network to the
economy, the dispute was followed extremely closely by both the German media
and the public.7
In the 2014-2015 labour dispute, there were nine strike waves as speciﬁed in Table
3.1. I study the eﬀects of the three major waves in 2014 (strikes 4-6; bold in Table
3.1), and disregard all strikes in 2015, because they coincide with the merger of
MFB and rival competitor Flixbus in January 2015. In addition, I disregard minor
warning strikes, as they only lasted a few hours and were announced with many
days advance warning. My data suggest that the strikes were too short to have
any measurable impact on the bus market. Customers could re-arrange their travel
plans within the rail network at little cost.
The 2014-2015 strikes display several desirable features for an ideal quasi-natural
experiment. Firstly, the timing of the strikes was arguably exogenous. Strikes re-
sult from a breakdown of negotiations, the exact timing of which is unpredictable
as negotiations often collapse quickly and unexpectedly. Once negotiations have
broken down, the exact timing of a strike is still not clear. It could be delayed by
7This chapter is concerned with passenger transport. Note, however, that the railway strikes
aﬀected both passenger and freight services by DB.
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Table 3.1
Dates and duration of railway strike waves in 2014-2015
Duration
Nr. Strike Begin:  Strike End: (in hours):
1 Mon. 01/09/2014, 18:00  Mon. 01/09/2014, 21:00 3*
2 Sat. 06/09/2014, 06:00  Sat. 06/09/2014, 09:00 3*
3 Tue. 07.10.2014, 21:00  Wed. 08.10.2014, 06:00 9*
4 Wed. 15/10/2014, 14:00  Thu. 16/10/2014, 04:00 14
5 Sat. 18/10/2014, 02:00  Mon. 20/10/2014, 04:00 50
6 Thu. 06/11/2014, 02:00  Sat. 08/11/2014, 18:00 64
7 Wed. 22/04/2015, 02:00  Thu. 23/07/2015, 21:00 43
8 Tue. 05/05/2015, 02:00  Sun. 10/05/2015, 09:00 127
9 Wed. 20./05/2015, 02:00  Thu. 21./05/2015, 19:00 41
Notes: Bold rows indicate waves studied in this chapter. Strikes in 2015 are disregarded, because
they coincide with the merger of MFB and rival competitor Flixbus in January 2015. * indicates
warning strikes. Warning strikes are ignored, because they only lasted a few hours and were
announced with many days' advance warning.
days, weeks or months if the parties are hopeful of making progress or political
pressure is exerted. The trade union centrally decides to go on strike after con-
sulting its members. Importantly, there is no evidence to suggest that competition
from buses played any role in the occurrence, timing or length of the strikes. The
strikes can be considered an exogenous positive demand shock to the German bus
market. Having reached a decision, GDL usually announced strikes at short no-
tice to maximize their impact. Each strike was typically announced only two days
in advance.8 Delaying or rescheduling a trip in anticipation of a strike was not
possible for the majority of travellers. Consumers were directly aﬀected. Figure
3.1 provides a detailed timeline of the two distinct weeks in which the rail strikes
took place, which I cover in this chapter. It outlines the short pre-announcement
period before each wave and the length of the strike.
8In the empirical exercise, I drop the two departure days before and after each strike wave
to remove any anticipatory eﬀects (see Ashenfelter and Card, 1985). The descriptives presented
in Section 3.2.2 suggest that anticipatory eﬀects are negligible.
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Figure 3.1
Timeline of rail strike in weeks October 13-20 and November 03-10, 2014
Mo, 03.11.14 Tue, 04.11. Wed, 05.11. Thu, 06.11. Fri, 07.11. Sat, 08.11. Sun, 09.11. Mon, 10.11 
Strike 6 
announced 
End on Sun 
announced 
DB disruptions: 
GDL strike: 
Mo, 13.10.14 Tue, 14.10. Wed, 15.10. Thu, 16.10. Fri, 17.10. Sat, 18.10. Sun, 19.10. Mon, 20.10 
Strike 4 
announced 
Strike 5 
announced 
DB disruptions: 
GDL strike: 
Strike wave 1 Strike wave 2 
Strike wave 3 
Week A 
Week B 
Notes: DB disruptions start before the ﬁrst strike wave because DB adopted its emergency
timetables with the beginning of the departure day to minimize the overall impact of the strike.
DB disruptions lasted beyond the duration of each strike wave as it took time to return to normal
timetable operations. Furthermore, the third rail strike wave in week B was ended prematurely
on Saturday, although it had initially been announced to last until Sunday (as indicated by the
dashed line). Following public pressure, the GDL announced it would return to work on Sunday
November 9th to allow travellers to reach the anniversary festivities of the Fall of the Berlin Wall
around the country. Strikes 4-6 refer to Table 3.1. Throughout this paper I refer to the strikes
as waves 1-3.
Secondly, GDL called for a strike nationwide. However, neither did GDL shut the
network down entirely, nor were rail routes exposed to the same degree. GDL
membership strength is weaker in West Germany, because many West German
train drivers have civil servant status  a relic of DB's historical status as a state
company.9 The emergency timetables operated during the rail strike reﬂect the
varying power of GDL across Germany. The change of service frequency speci-
ﬁed in the emergency timetables was exogenous to the bus market: DB did not
strategically focus rail services on routes which were under particular threat of
competition from buses. The emergency timetables were the same in all strike
waves in 2014-2015 and they are almost identical to those employed by DB in the
last railway strikes of 2007-2008; i.e. long before the liberalization of the inter-city
bus market in 2013.10 Finally, DB made no attempt to employ locomotive drivers
9German civil servants have by law no right to strike or unionise.
10A direct comparison of emergency timetables in 2007-2008 and 2014-2015 is diﬃcult because
normal DB timetables have changed substantially. However, rail lines have changed little. Over
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outside their usual geographic area of deployment for fear that they might be un-
able to return at the end of the day. While the exact rationale for oﬀering some
services over others is unclear, the geographic variation in strike exposure mirrors
GDL membership, not the inter-city bus network. I discuss the transmission of
the rail strike on bus routes in Section 3.3 below.
Thirdly, excluding those under focus, the last major rail strikes date back to 2007-
2008, but the market for inter-city buses was not liberalized until 2013. In the
2014-2015 labour dispute, inter-city buses  a clearly deﬁned rail substitute  were
a viable alternative for the ﬁrst time. Car and airline services were, of course,
available in previous strikes. The inter-city bus market not only received substan-
tial media coverage during the strikes but also attracted many travellers who had
never travelled via inter-city buses before. For example, in an April 2014 survey
prior to the strike, only 12 percent of young Germans indicated that they had
used the newly available bus services (YouGov, 2014). Among older age groups
this percentage is likely to be even lower because the trade-oﬀ in accepting longer
travel times and less convenience for cheaper fares typically appeals to younger
customers.
Fourthly, switching between rail and bus can be done quickly and easily.11 Tickets
can be bought through price comparison websites via the internet or on the bus.
Furthermore, bus departure terminals are located directly next to the rail station
in most cities (Guihéry, 2015). Travellers could arrive at the rail station and easily
transfer to inter-city buses when the implications of the rail strike became clear to
them.
60 percent of rail lines had nearly the same fraction of service cancellations in 2007-2008 and
2014-2015.
11DB does not oﬀer season passes on speciﬁc routes. It oﬀers the BahnCard which grants
ﬁxed price reductions to card holders. BahnCard subscriptions can be cancelled annually. This
may have locked travellers in to the services of DB, in which case any lasting eﬀect beyond the
strike would not be visible until the medium or long-term.
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3.2 Data and descriptive statistics
3.2.1 Data
This chapter combines three novel and extremely rich datasets: detailed book-
ing data provided by MFB, DB emergency timetables, and a dataset of all rail
itineraries. The latter dataset is collected using a web-crawler linked to the web-
site of a leading price comparison website  a collection approach rarely used in the
economics literature. I combine the emergency timetables and travel itineraries to
create a dataset of service cancellations and expected delays caused by the rail
strike. I summarize key features of the data below. Given the novelty of the data,
I document additional information on the construction of all variables in Appendix
C.1.
MeinFernbus booking data
MFB is Germany's largest bus provider with a market share of roughly 50 percent
during the sample period. In addition to being the key player in the German
inter-city bus market, MFB's service quality as well as strategic use of local bus
partners are representative of the entire inter-city bus industry.12
The dataset provided by MFB contains the universe of MFB ticket sales between
any combination of 33 large German cities for departure dates from September
01st to December 31st 2014. Individuals who departed in the sample period, but
who booked their ticket outside the sample period are also included. The original
dataset contains about 1.7 million individual bookings. A booking observation
includes detailed information on the bus service such as the route, price, departure
date and time as well as information on the individual in form of an anonymized
12For example, free internet, luggage allowance, and leg-room are almost identical across the
industry. See Dürr et al. (2015) for detailed introduction and comparison of players in the
inter-city bus market.
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e-mail address. The e-mail address identiﬁes ﬁrst-time and repeat bookings by an
individual, and thus allows following a customer over time.
The key variable of interest is the natural logarithm of the number of tickets sold
at the route and departure day level.13 Thus, I aggregate the individual bookings
at the route and departure day level  the unit of analysis in this paper.14 A route
is the combination of an origin- and destination- city, so diﬀerent routes may be
served by the same bus journey. For example, a bus ride from Munich to Berlin
with a stop in Dresden serves three routes: MunichDresden, MunichBerlin and
DresdenBerlin. I treat each route as an independent and separate market. This
has the advantage that it captures travellers such as commuters who repeatedly
travel. For these people I can calculate their precise exposure to the rail strikes.
The drawback is that this deﬁnition does not capture travellers who return after
the strike but travel on a diﬀerent route.15
While rail strikes continued beyond the sample period to May 2015, I restrict the
sample period to 2014. This is because MFB unexpectedly merged with rival bus
provider Flixbus in January 2015. Any changes after this date may be driven by
the eﬀects of the merger and not the rail strike.
Figure 3.2 lists and maps all 33 cities in the sample. However, not all route
combinations are served. Inter-city buses are not legally permitted to connect
cities at less than 100km distance or where local train travel time does not exceed
one hour. Some routes are only served on some weekdays or not served at all. I
13The dependent variable is computed as ln(1+tickets sold) at the route departure day level.
This approach is common in the trade literature, and allows me to keep route-day observations
with zero tickets sold (see Felbermayr and Kohler, 2006). In the dataset, zero observations only
account for 0.3 percent of tickets sold and 7 percent of tickets sold to new customers. I conﬁrm
that my results are unaltered if I drop all zero observations.
14For clarity note that there are two time dimensions to each individual booking: the date of
the booking and the date of the departure. I aggregate ticket sales to the route and departure
date dimension. 95 percent of bus travellers arrive on the same date as they depart.
15In the later diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis, strike-exposed customers, who return on a
diﬀerent (non-treated) route in later journeys, would bias the estimated eﬀect downwards. Thus,
the estimated eﬀect could be interpreted as a lower bound to the true eﬀect.
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Figure 3.2
Map and list of German cities in the sample
Cities:
Augsburg Heidelberg
Berlin Karlsruhe
Bonn Kassel
Braunschweig Kiel
Bremen Leipzig
Cologne Mainz
Dortmund Magdeburg
Dresden Mannheim
Duesseldorf Munich
Erfurt Muenster
Essen Nuremberg
Frankfurt (Main) Rostock
Freiburg Saarbruecken
Goettingen Stuttgart
Hamburg Ulm
Halle (Saale) Wuerzburg
Hanover
employ a strict deﬁnition of which routes to include in the dataset: I drop those
routes on which the number of days in the sample in which no customer travels
that route exceeds ten. I conﬁrm that my results are not sensitive to this cutoﬀ.
Cutting the dataset in this way represents a trade-oﬀ between clarity and statistical
power. Given the size of the dataset, however, this is not a major problem.
The ﬁnal panel contains a cross-section of 312 routes and roughly 34,000 observa-
tions at the route and departure day level. The dataset is balanced in the sense
that all routes are observed over the entire sample period and through all strike
waves.
DB Emergency timetables and web-crawled itineraries
In addition to the MFB booking data, I construct a dataset of DB service can-
cellations and expected delays for each route during the rail strikes. This dataset
combines emergency timetables provided by DB during the strikes and a dataset
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of all DB travel itineraries, which was collected using a web-crawler linked to the
website of a leading price comparison website. The former provide data on normal
frequency and the frequency during the strikes of all rail lines. The latter dataset
includes all travel itineraries for the routes of the dataset during a complete week.
A travel itinerary is deﬁned as the speciﬁc departure times, stopovers and train
numbers a traveller needs to take on a rail journey.
The DB emergency timetables list DB services at the line level. For example, ICE
line 25 from Hamburg to Munich halved its operations from once every hour to
once every two hours. However, actual travel itineraries are much more complex
and often involve stopovers. A typical itinerary involves the use of multiple rail
lines. Using actual itineraries takes into account that some DB routes are served
through diﬀerent paths in the rail network. Only the combination of emergency
timetables and the travel itineraries allows me to construct the average exposure
of each route to the rail strike. One data limitation remains, however: the DB
emergency timetables do not include information on regional trains. I disregard
routes where more than 10 percent of itineraries include the use of regional trains.
This is not a major problem. Since the data focus on connections between the
largest German cities, most itineraries include inter-city lines only.
To measure each route's exposure to the rail strike, I construct two variables: the
fraction of cancelled rail departures during the strikes (fraction services cancelled)
and the expected time delay (additional travel time). The expected additional
travel time travellers have to incur to reach their destination is calculated as the
time a traveller has to wait for the next train if their service is cancelled. On the one
hand, this measure takes into account the typical stopovers involved on each route.
On the other hand, I neither observe delays in the travel time due to unexpected
stopovers, nor delays due to unexpected additional halts. Furthermore, actual
waiting times may have diﬀered substantially depending on the actual arrival of
travellers at the rail station, which is unobserved. However, deﬁning additional
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Figure 3.3
Panel A: DB travel time normal vs. expected additional travel time.
Panel B: DB travel time normal vs. and fraction of services cancelled for each route
during the rail strike
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Notes: Datasource DB emergency timetables. Routes MunichBerlin and HamburgBerlin are
highlighted as examples.
travel time in this way has the advantage that it mirrors the structure of the
emergency timetables, the primary source of information available to customers.
Figure 3.3 plots the rail travel time in normal times against the additional travel
time (Panel A) and the fraction of rail services cancelled (Panel B) for all routes.
The routes BerlinMunich and HamburgBerlin highlight the diﬀerence between
the two measures. While both routes had almost identical service cancellations
(about 75 percent), the time a customer had to wait for the next train was much
longer for BerlinMunich. This is because HamburgBerlin operated at a much
higher frequency even in times of the strike. In addition, note that there is no
visible systematic relationship between rail travel time and the strike-exposure
measures.
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3.2.2 Descriptive statistics
Before turning to the econometric analysis, I present some descriptive statistics.
Given the novelty and level of detail of the dataset, they may be of more general in-
terest. Additionally they highlight some important features of the data and clarify
some selection choices I make for the empirical regression exercise below.
Figure 3.4 presents aggregate changes to MFB services over the sample period.
For ease of interpretation I report weekly data.16 Panel 1 plots the key variable of
interest ln ticket sales for each departure. Sales peak during each strike wave as
well as on national holidays such as October 3rd which in 2014 fell on a Friday, thus
creating a long weekend. As expected, the increase in ticket sales is particularly
pronounced for ﬁrst-time customers (Panel 2). Panels 3-6 plot supply related
descriptive statistics. Panels 3 and 4 display the negative trend in total capacity
and departures over the sample period, reﬂecting the seasonality of public transport
demand. Demand is weaker in winter and MFB reduced the frequencies of its
services, especially on oﬀ-peak weekdays. Panel 4 indicates that MFB, despite the
short time-frame of each strike announcement, was able to increase its capacity
during the rail strikes. Panels 5 and 6 address the capacity utilization of MFB.17 A
concern might be that customers were not able to switch to inter-city buses during
the rail strikes, because buses were operating at full capacity. If so, the number of
people exposed to inter-city buses would be much lower, and the estimated eﬀect
on bus ticket sales should be considered a lower bound. As indicated in Panels
5 and 6 MFB buses have additional tickets available in more than 80 percent of
16Ticket sales on Friday and Sunday exceed weekday sales on Tuesdays and Wednesdays by
a factor of almost two. Share of ticket sales per weekday for the dataset: Monday 13%, Tuesday
10%, Wednesday 10%, Thursday 12%, Friday 19%, Saturday 15%, Sunday 20%.
17Because a bus has multiple stops, the remaining capacity for each route does not correspond
to the number of ticket sold for that route. For example, a bus that travels from Munich to Berlin
via Dresden with 50 seats may be at capacity between Dresden and Berlin if 30 tickets were sold
from Munich to Berlin and 20 from Dresden to Berlin. To address this issue, Panels 5 and 6 plot
the bottleneck capacity: the remaining capacity for the section of the bus trip where the bus was
most full.
3.2. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 101
Figure 3.4
Aggregate weekly descriptives on MFB ticket sales and supply
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Notes: Sample at route - departure date dimension. Panels 1-4 report weekly averages over
all routes. Panels 5 and 6 report averages for each bus journey. Panel 1 reports the average
log number of total tickets. Panel 2 reports the log number of total tickets sold to ﬁrst-time
customers. Panel 3 reports the average daily departures per route. Panel 4 the daily capacity
per route. Panels 5 and 6 report descriptives relating to the capacity utilization of MFB services.
Vertical line and bold circles indicate weeks in which GDL was on strike.
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Figure 3.5
Mean total ticket sales split by returning and new customers
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Notes: Data are split by weekday and bold circles indicate that the weekday was aﬀected by a
strike.
departures. This fraction does not increase substantially during the rail strike.
Even if customers were faced with a fully-booked bus during the strike, there is
a high probability that they could have successfully bought a ticket on the next
bus.
The key takeaways from Figure 3.4 are twofold. Firstly, MFB ticket sales data
display seasonality. To make sense of the eﬀect of the strike, it is important to
have an appropriate control group in the empirical analysis. Secondly, I drop the
ﬁnal two weeks of observations. Figure 3.5 displays how exceptional the Christmas
travel period is. I do not want this seasonal shock to obscure my results. Cutting
the dataset in this way represents a trade-oﬀ between clarity and statistical power.
Given the size of my dataset, this is not a major problem. The remaining 36 post-
strike departure days allow me to estimate the short- and medium-run eﬀects of
the rail strike.
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Figure 3.6
Mean cumulative bookings for Friday departures
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Notes: Data are split into bookings for Friday-departures in September, the month just preceding
the rail strike, and bookings for departures for strike day November 07, 2014. The strike was
announced 3 days prior to the strike (as indicated by the dashed line). Note that ticket sales are
not in log scale here.
Figure 3.5 splits ticket sales into returning and new customers. The ﬁgure suggests
the positive eﬀect of the rail strikes on ticket sales during each strike wave. Sales
during the strikes were almost exclusively driven by customers who had never pre-
viously travelled by inter-city buses. On average, 30 percent of bus passengers are
ﬁrst-time customers, and two thirds of these undertake at least one more booking
in the future.
An additional concern may be that customers switched to buses for reasons unre-
lated to the strike. While my regression analysis controls for unobservable eﬀects
with ﬁxed eﬀects and indicators for observable events such as school holidays,
there may have been unobserved parallel events that drove bus ticket sales during
the rail strikes. To address this concern, Figure 3.6 compares cumulative book-
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ings prior to departure for a day aﬀected by railway strike with a typical booking
curve. The dashed vertical line indicates the moment of the strike announcement
for the third strike wave on November 07, 2014.18 As is apparent, ticket sales only
diverge from their usual trend after the rail strike was announced. The small sales
departure from the usual trend before the announcement suggests that a few trav-
ellers booked bus tickets after negotiations had broken down, but before the strike
was announced; i.e. very few travellers anticipated the strike. If travellers booked
tickets for buses for departure days before the strike in anticipation, my results
would be downward biased. While I cannot observe whether new bus customers
switched from the railway, Figure 3.6 provides strong descriptive evidence that it
was the rail strikes that drove the peak in ticket sales on the striking days.
3.3 Impact during the strike
3.3.1 Potential transmission channels
While the exposure of rail routes to the strikes can be deduced from the emergency
timetables, the exposure of bus routes is not ex-ante clear to the researcher. In an
ideal natural experiment rail and bus would be perfect substitutes, and customers
would be perfectly informed about the exposure of their proposed route to the
strike. They would experiment with buses only if aﬀected by the strikes, and
if inter-city buses were a reasonably attractive alternative. However, bus and
rail services are neither perfect substitutes nor were customers perfectly informed
about each route's exposure to the strike.
Thus, this section tests three potential channels that could determine the variation
in exposure of the strike on inter-city buses during the rail strikes, and consequently
the deﬁnition of the treatment group.
18See week B of Figure 3.1.
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The transmission channels can be broadly categorized as follows. Firstly, bus and
rail services are not perfect substitutes. The quality of bus and rail services diﬀers
both in observable characteristics, such as travel time, as well as unobservable
characteristics, such as comfort. Relative and absolute travel time matter. For
example, a trip from Hamburg to Berlin takes two hours by rail and three hours
by bus while a trip from Munich to Berlin takes about six hours by rail, and only
one hour more by bus despite the longer absolute travel time. It is unlikely that
many travellers would have opted to take the bus on routes where the bus travel
time signiﬁcantly exceeds that of the railway. Instead, they may have simply
cancelled their trip or opted for other transport modes such as cars or aircraft.
Another quality characteristic is comfort. Despite oﬀering free internet access,
the comfort of travelling by bus is generally regarded to be lower than rail travel.
In this case consumers may value additional travel time in a bus diﬀerently to
additional travel time by rail. They may be unwilling to take the bus above a
certain threshold travel time. Finally, bus and rail services diﬀer in price. Buses
are generally cheaper than DB services. It follows that it is unlikely that customers
weren't able to aﬀord to switch during the strike. Travellers, who had booked a
rail ticket, could demand a refund during the strikes even if some later trains were
available.
Secondly, travellers were not perfectly informed about emergency timetables and
their exposure to the strike. They may have struggled to obtain the relevant infor-
mation about their personal exposure to the rail strike. In addition to publishing
detailed emergency timetables, DB operated a free hotline for customers. Given
that rail strikes were announced with little notice, most travellers are likely to
have purchased their ticket previously. Thus, they had strong incentives to in-
form themselves about delays and service cancellations relevant to their itinerary.
However, it is unclear whether they were able to do so. It is indeed possible that
travellers on all routes considered themselves to be aﬀected by the strike. There
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is some anecdotal newspaper evidence which conﬁrms this suspicion. It reports
that some of the railways in operation during the strikes  instead of being over-
crowded  were emptier than usual.19 Moreover, travellers may not have trusted
DB's ability to successfully implemented its emergency timetables. The ability to
implement the emergency timetables often depended on the exact number of train
drivers that would turn up (or not) on the strike day  the precise number of which
was often uncertain until the last minute.
Thirdly, the eﬀect of the strike on MFB ticket sales may be the result of a com-
bination of service cancellations from the strikes and the closeness of substitution
between the transport modes. Travellers may have switched to inter-city buses
if their itinerary was signiﬁcantly aﬀected and inter-city buses were a suﬃciently
attractive alternative to DB services on their route.
Since it is not ex-ante clear which routes were aﬀected during the rail strike, and
which were not, I test each of these three potential transmission channels using a
number of proxy variables speciﬁed below.
3.3.2 Speciﬁcation
I restrict the dataset in three ways. Firstly, since the focus of this section is on the
eﬀect during the strike, I disregard the post-strike period so as not to condition
results on post-strike outcomes. Secondly, I restrict the data to focus on ticket
sales to ﬁrst-time customers that booked in the ﬁnal three days to departure.20
This decision uses the level of detail of the MFB booking data and is motivated by
the ﬁndings in the descriptives section: ticket sales to new customers give a clearer
indication of the transmission channel during the strikes. Further, strike-related
19Source: manager-magazine (url: http://www.manager-magazin.de/lifestyle/artikel/jeder-
zweite-gueterzug-und-jeder-dritte-personenzug-faehrt-a-1001657.html ; 07/11/2014)
20Note that there are two time dimensions to each booking observation: the date of the
booking and the date of the departure. Here I aggregate ticket sales to the route and departure
date dimension if the ticket was booked in the ﬁnal three days to departure. As outlined in
Figure 3.6 this primarily captures booking after the announcement of the strikes by GDL.
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bookings occurred primarily in the ﬁnal days before departure; i.e. after GDL
announced the precise timing of the strike. Thirdly, I disregard all ticket sales for
departures two days before and after each strike. As outlined in Figure 3.1, there
may be anticipatory eﬀects and lagged treatments as DB services require time to
return to normal operations. In addition, I disregard the intermediate fortnight
between the second and third strike wave. It is not clear whether there would be
a treatment eﬀect between the strike waves in my sample.
My baseline regression takes the following form:
ln ticket salesnewijt = αij + τt + Xit + Xjt + δ (channelij × striket) + ijt
(3.1)
where ij refers to a route from origin-city i to destination-city j, and t to the
departure day. The dependent variable ln ticket salesnewijt is deﬁned as the log of
tickets sold to new customers in the ﬁnal three days to departure. αij and τt are
route and departure day speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects respectively. The route ﬁxed eﬀects
capture observed and unobserved diﬀerences that are constant over time such as
distance. The time ﬁxed eﬀects capture the eﬀects of observed and unobserved
temporal factors common to all routes such as national holidays, MFB marketing
campaigns, or seasonal ﬂuctuations.
Xit and Xjt are vectors of city-departure date speciﬁc control variables: A dummy
for public holidays, school holidays and dummies for other major events.21 I list
all control variables used in the regressions in Table 3.2. Each control variable
is interacted with month and weekday indicators to capture more variation in
the data. Finally, the speciﬁcations with controls include origin- and destination-
speciﬁc linear time trends.
21Note that German school holidays vary at the state level. Thus, school holidays are not
captured by the departure day ﬁxed eﬀects. Source: schulferien.org
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In an additional speciﬁcation, I include origin- and destination- departure day
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, denoted γit and γjt respectively.22 This is my preferred spec-
iﬁcation. Note that the inclusion of these route-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects nests a com-
plete set of origin and destination speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Furthermore, these strong
ﬁxed eﬀects make the inclusion of the departure day ﬁxed eﬀects and the control
variables redundant.
ijt is the error term. Using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy with many years, I
have to worry about serial correlation at the group level. Conventional standard
errors may severely understate the true standard errors (Bertrand et al., 2004).
To address potential serial correlation within routes and time correlation, I cluster
standard errors by route throughout the paper.
(channelij × striket) is the interaction term of interest. On the one hand, striket is
a vector of indicators for each strike wave studied in this chapter. As discussed in
the background section, I disregard minor warning strikes, as they only lasted a
few hours and were announced with many days advance warning. Any impact of
these earlier warning strikes would bias my results downward. On the other hand,
channelij captures the diﬀerent potential transmission channels.
To capture the eﬀect of each potential transmission channel, I use proxy variables
as follows. Firstly, I proxy the degree to which rail and bus services are substitutes
using three variables: the relative travel time diﬀerence between rail and bus,
absolute travel time diﬀerence, and bus travel time. Panels 1 and 2 of Figure 3.7
show that routes with a short bus travel time also show a small absolute bus
travel time diﬀerence; i.e. both variables are strongly correlated. Thus, bus travel
time captures the likelihood that, even if the absolute travel time diﬀerence is
22Note that the inclusion of origin-day and destination-day ﬁxed eﬀects mirrors the ﬁxed eﬀects
typically used in the estimation of gravity trade models to address `multilateral resistance' terms
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003).
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small, travellers regard buses as suﬃciently comfortable only for bus routes below
a certain threshold travel time.
Secondly, I measure the strike exposure using the two variables constructed from
DB emergency timetables in the data section: the fraction of services cancelled
and additional travel time that customers had to endure to reach their destination
during the strikes. The latter explicitly takes into account the fact that some
routes operated at a much higher frequency even in times of the strike.
Thirdly, both the closeness of substitution and the exposure to the rail strike
could be the primary factors driving bus ticket sales during the strike. To capture
this channel, I estimate a set of regressions with a triple interaction between the
proxies of the above channels. The triple interaction takes the following form:
(channelsubij ×channelexpij × striket), where channelsub are the variables from the sub-
stitution channel (relative travel time, absolute travel time and bus travel time),
and channelexp includes the exposure channel variables (fraction services cancelled
and additional travel time). This speciﬁcation also includes the ﬁrst-order interac-
tion terms to distinguish the triple interaction term. Note that Equation 3.1 does
not include the lower-order terms as they are captured by the route and departure
day ﬁxed eﬀects.
I repeat separate regressions for each proxy variable. Moreover, I estimate each
channel variable as a dummy indicating whether it is above/below the median
value. This is to ease interpretation and to make the estimated regression coeﬃ-
cients for each proxy more easily comparable. Thus, the dummies for relative travel
time, absolute travel time and bus travel time equal one if the route is shorter than
the median. Likewise, the dummies for fraction services cancelled and additional
travel time equal one if the fraction of cancellations or travel delay exceed the
median value respectively. In the robustness section, I conﬁrm that my results are
unaltered to using continuous deﬁnitions for the treatment variables.
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Figure 3.7
Treated and control routes for each channel variable
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Notes: Each panels display scatter of routes in duration rail and duration bus space with 45
degree line. For each proxy transmission variable, Panels 1-5 indicates whether a route is part
of the treatment or control group. Relative travel time, absolute travel time and bus travel time
are treated if the route is shorter than the median. Fraction services cancelled and additional
travel time are treated if the route is above the median value. See Table C.1 for speciﬁc variable
deﬁnitions). Routes HamburgMunich and MunichBerlin plotted as examples.
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Table 3.2
Summary statistics for whole sample period
Variable: N Mean Median SD Min Max
Dependent variables:
ln ticket salesijt 33,384 2.50 2.40 1.12 0 6
ln ticket salesnewijt 33,384 1.35 1.39 1.01 0 6
Proxy channel variables (channelij):
Fraction services cancelled 17,762 0.63 0.63 0.19 0 1
Additional travel time 17,762 114.67 78.50 106.36 0 557
Relative travel time 17,762 1.64 1.64 0.34 1 4
Abs. travel time diﬀerence 17,762 116.99 109.89 67.53 5 285
Bus travel time 33,384 289.10 265.00 149.29 60 650
Control variables (Xit and Xjt):
School holiday 33,384 0.30 0.00 0.46 0 1
Public holiday 33,384 0.04 0.00 0.20 0 1
Bundesliga (Division 1) 33,384 0.00 0.00 0.05 0 1
Bundesliga (Division 2) 33,384 0.00 0.00 0.02 0 1
Munich Oktoberfest 33,384 0.02 0.00 0.14 0 1
Stuttgart Wasen 33,384 0.02 0.00 0.14 0 1
Notes: Variables fraction services cancelled, additional travel time, relative travel time and abso-
lute travel time diﬀerence have fewer observations because emergency time tables do not include
information on regional trains. In addition, Table C.1 in Appendix C.1 provides deﬁnitions of
all variables estimated in Equations 3.1 to 3.6.
Figure 3.7 displays how each channel variable divides routes into treatment and
control. Routes are of course not clearly divided into treatment and control, but
treatment is imprecise. A route which is classiﬁed as above the median for one of
the channel variables is best thought of as being `more treated' relative to a route
below the median. Deﬁning the treatment channel in this way has the drawback
that my measure includes a number of `false negatives' and leads to type II errors.
Fricke (2015) demonstrates that in this case the estimated result will be biased
downwards and could be interpreted as a lower bound to the true eﬀect. Finally,
Table 3.2 presents basic summary statistics (including the median) for the set of
explanatory variables. In addition, Table C.1 in Appendix C.1 provides speciﬁc
deﬁnitions of all variables estimated in Equations 3.1 to 3.6.
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3.3.3 Results
Having employed this extensive combination of ﬁxed eﬀects and controls, the coef-
ﬁcient of interest indicates whether routes that were below (above) the median for
one of the proposed channels diﬀer signiﬁcantly compared to routes above (below)
the median. In total, I estimate Equation 3.1 in eleven regressions: a regression
for each of the diﬀerent proxy channel variables introduced above and triple inter-
actions between the combination of closeness of substitution and exposure to rail
strike proxies. Table 3.3 summarizes all regression results.
Based on the three transmission channels outlined above, I ﬁnd no evidence for the
exposure channel. The proxy variables measuring this channel, additional travel
time and fraction services cancelled, yield no robust statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects
during the strike. I do not ﬁnd evidence for the third channel, the combination of
exposure and closeness of substitution, either. None of the triple interaction terms
between the proxies yield robust statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. I move the
regression tables C.2-C.10 to Appendix C.2 for space concerns. See rows 3-11 in
Table 3.3 for a summary.
Table 3.5 reports the regression results for the proxy variable absolute travel time
diﬀerence and Table 3.4 the results for the variable bus travel time. They are
the only two channel variables which yield consistently robust and statistically
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. Thus, my results suggest that the primary channel driving
MFB ticket sales during the strikes was the closeness of substitution as measured
by the proxy variables absolute travel time diﬀerence and absolute bus travel time.
This is surprising as it suggests that travellers switched to buses even on routes
with little or no service cancellations. It follows that either they were not well
informed about their exposure to the rail strike, or had no trust in DB's ability to
implement the emergency timetables.
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Table 3.4
Transmission channel: bus travel time
Dep. variable: ln ticket salesnewijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Channel × Strike
wave 1
0.257*** 0.265*** 0.249*** 0.262***
(0.0614) (0.0613) (0.0603) (0.0673)
Channel × Strike
wave 2
0.408*** 0.389*** 0.369*** 0.302***
(0.0516) (0.0513) (0.0512) (0.0633)
Channel × Strike
wave 3
0.488*** 0.451*** 0.426*** 0.395***
(0.0459) (0.0456) (0.0440) (0.0514)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 15600 15600 15600 15400
R2 0.748 0.754 0.757 0.816
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.1. Standard errors in paren-
theses, clustered at the route level. 166 clusters. ***/**/* indicate signiﬁ-
cance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit and
γjt  origin- and destination-day t speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 3.5
Transmission channel: absolute travel time diﬀerence
Dep. variable: ln ticket salesnewijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Channel × Strike
wave 1
0.154** 0.170*** 0.172*** 0.148**
(0.0605) (0.0593) (0.0578) (0.0720)
Channel × Strike
wave 2
0.218*** 0.218*** 0.220*** 0.234***
(0.0597) (0.0582) (0.0560) (0.0667)
Channel × Strike
wave 3
0.226*** 0.188*** 0.222*** 0.308***
(0.0521) (0.0559) (0.0512) (0.0607)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 15600 15600 15600 15400
R2 0.744 0.751 0.755 0.815
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.1. Standard errors in paren-
theses, clustered at the route level. 166 clusters. ***/**/* indicate signiﬁ-
cance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit and
γjt  origin- and destination-day t speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.
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As indicated in Figure 3.7 above, both bus travel time and absolute travel time
diﬀerence are strongly correlated. One proxy variable may capture the eﬀect of
the other. Thus, I run an additional speciﬁcation including both proxies simulta-
neously. This addresses whether travellers mainly disliked long bus travel times,
or primarily cared about the travel time diﬀerence of the bus relative to rail, or
both. Table 3.6 reports the results. I ﬁnd that the absolute travel time diﬀerence
proxy variable has no signiﬁcant explanatory power in explaining ticket sales dur-
ing the rail strikes once I control for the bus travel time. Thus, the primary factor
explaining increased ticket sales for inter-city buses during the strikes is the length
of the ride.
The magnitude of the eﬀect during the strikes is large, but in line with expectations.
Table 3.4 predicts that ticket sales to new customers in the ﬁnal three days to the
average route below the median bus travel time exceed ticket sales to the average
route above the median by almost 50% in the third strike wave (column 1). The
magnitude is similar but smaller for the other columns. As expected strike wave 1
yields the smallest coeﬃcients as it fell on a Wednesday. Strike waves 2 and 3 fell
on a weekend, whereby strike wave 3 was a longer strike.
Before using these ﬁndings to test whether the rail strike had an eﬀect beyond
the duration of the strike, I provide an additional test to conﬁrm the results. I
re-run the regression with bus travel time splitting the variable into 3-hour bins.
The results are reported in Table 3.7. The table conﬁrms the earlier result: the
closer the substitution between bus and rail, the larger the eﬀect during the rail
strike. Column 1 of Table 3.7 suggests that routes connecting cities with a travel
time below three hours observed almost twice as many bookings in the third strike
wave than the longest routes in the sample. The estimated coeﬃcients are sim-
ilar in columns 2-4, where I include control variables and more demanding ﬁxed
eﬀects.
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Table 3.6
Transmission channel: Absolute travel time diﬀerence vs. bus travel time
Dep. variable: ln ticket salesnewijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Absolute
diﬀerence
× Strike
wave 1
-0.0219 -0.0379 -0.0460 -0.166*
(0.0793) (0.0758) (0.0756) (0.0886)
Absolute
diﬀerence
× Strike
wave 2
-0.0926 -0.0920 -0.101 -0.200***
(0.0665) (0.0659) (0.0671) (0.0765)
Absolute
diﬀerence
× Strike
wave 3
-0.0740 -0.0858 -0.0954 -0.103
(0.0634) (0.0613) (0.0608) (0.0650)
Duration
bus
× Strike
wave 1
0.247*** 0.248*** 0.228*** 0.189**
(0.0677) (0.0664) (0.0665) (0.0755)
Duration
bus
× Strike
wave 2
0.365*** 0.346*** 0.323*** 0.215***
(0.0570) (0.0571) (0.0568) (0.0687)
Duration
bus
× Strike
wave 3
0.453*** 0.411*** 0.382*** 0.351***
(0.0485) (0.0487) (0.0505) (0.0573)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 15600 15600 15600 15400
R2 0.748 0.754 0.757 0.816
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.1. Standard errors in paren-
theses, clustered at the route level. 166 clusters. ***/**/* indicate signiﬁ-
cance at the 1%/5%/10% level. γit and γjt refer to speciﬁcations with origin-
and destination-day t speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 3.7
Transmission channel: Transmission channel: 3 hour bins for bus travel time
Dep. variable: ln ticket salesnewijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Strike
wave 1
× Duration
6 - 9 hours
0.0936 0.135 0.101 0.108
(0.133) (0.130) (0.126) (0.143)
Strike
wave 1
× Duration
3 - 6 hours
0.289** 0.310** 0.280** 0.324**
(0.126) (0.125) (0.120) (0.143)
Strike
wave 1
× Duration
0 - 3 hours
0.411*** 0.472*** 0.435*** 0.472***
(0.129) (0.131) (0.125) (0.154)
Strike
wave 2
× Duration
6 - 9 hours
0.408*** 0.405*** 0.366*** 0.345**
(0.119) (0.115) (0.123) (0.142)
Strike
wave 2
× Duration
3 - 6 hours
0.556*** 0.543*** 0.508*** 0.495***
(0.117) (0.113) (0.120) (0.146)
Strike
wave 2
× Duration
0 - 3 hours
0.942*** 0.920*** 0.878*** 0.800***
(0.119) (0.116) (0.122) (0.157)
Strike
wave 3
× Duration
6 - 9 hours
0.411*** 0.378*** 0.326*** 0.351***
(0.131) (0.126) (0.122) (0.124)
Strike
wave 3
× Duration
3 - 6 hours
0.702*** 0.642*** 0.606*** 0.630***
(0.129) (0.124) (0.120) (0.123)
Strike
wave 3
× Duration
0 - 3 hours
0.980*** 0.911*** 0.861*** 0.869***
(0.131) (0.126) (0.123) (0.131)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 15500 15500 15500 15300
R2 0.750 0.756 0.759 0.817
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.1. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses, clustered at the route level (166 clusters). ***/**/* indicate signiﬁcance
at the 1%/5%/10% level. Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit and γjt 
origin- and destination-day t speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.
3.4. IMPACT AFTER THE STRIKE 119
3.4 Impact after the strike
As established in the previous section, it is primarily the closeness of substitution
which increased demand during the rail strike. In this section, I test for any
persistence of the eﬀect after the rail strikes. Treatment and control groups are
deﬁned using the channel identiﬁed in the ﬁrst step, namely the bus travel time
proxy variable. As previously done, I code the treatment variable as a dummy equal
one if the bus travel time of the route is below the median bus travel time.23
The post-strike regression takes the following form:
ln ticket salesijt = αij + τt + Xit + Xjt
+ δ1 (treatedij × striket) + δ2 (treatedij × postt) + ijt
(3.2)
Equation 3.2 is very similar to Equation 3.1 in Section 3.3. I employ the same
combination of speciﬁcations, control variables and ﬁxed eﬀects. The diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences (DD) methodology compares changes in the ticket sales of MFB
between routes that diﬀered in their closeness of substitution as measured by the
absolute bus travel time.
However, the underlying data now also includes the post-strike period. I am inter-
ested in whether routes that were `more treated' had signiﬁcantly more customers
beyond the strikes compared to the `less treated' routes. Furthermore, the depen-
dent variable ln ticket salesijt is deﬁned as the log total number of MFB customers.
I no longer restrict it to new customers who booked during the ﬁnal three days
to departure, because I would like to investigate whether customers adjust their
modal choice after their ﬁrst experience of buses during the strike. The dependent
variable now includes returning customers, some of whom travelled by bus for the
ﬁrst-time during the strike.
23See the robustness section for a continuous deﬁnition of the treatment variable.
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Table 3.8
Impact after the strike  bus travel time
Dep. variable: ln ticket sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Treated × Strike
wave 1
0.131*** 0.136*** 0.137*** 0.127***
(0.0462) (0.0453) (0.0440) (0.0464)
Treated × Strike
wave 2
0.291*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.230***
(0.0356) (0.0348) (0.0335) (0.0389)
Treated × Strike
wave 3
0.387*** 0.359*** 0.356*** 0.322***
(0.0377) (0.0373) (0.0344) (0.0396)
Treated × Post 0.301*** 0.284*** 0.277*** 0.282***
(0.0228) (0.0221) (0.0196) (0.0224)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 26832 26832 26832 26488
R2 0.875 0.878 0.881 0.912
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.2. Standard errors in paren-
theses, clustered at the route level. 166 clusters. ***/**/* indicate signiﬁ-
cance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit and
γjt  origin- and destination-day t speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.
treatedij indicates if a route was part of the treatment group, i.e. whether the bus
travel time is shorter than the median. The interaction term (treatedij × striket)
captures the eﬀect during the strikes and should yield positive and statistically
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients because this is how treatment was selected. The coeﬃcient
of (treatedij × postt) then captures the treatment eﬀect of interest: whether the
treated group has signiﬁcantly higher ticket sales after the rail strikes, that is after
DB services returned back to normal operations.
Table 3.8 reports regression results for Equation 3.2. The table indicates that
there was a statistically positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect beyond the duration of the
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rail strike. While the eﬀect is signiﬁcantly smaller in magnitude than the eﬀect of
treatment during the rail strike, it is remarkably persistent. Column 1 of Table
3.8 suggests that total ticket sales for the treated routes were almost 15 percent
higher in the ﬁrst strike wave, 30 percent higher in the second strike wave, and 40
percent higher in the third strike wave. Ticket sales were about 25 percent higher
for the treated group after rail operations returned back to normal. Its magni-
tude is roughly the same once I include controls and diﬀerent sets of ﬁxed eﬀects,
and robust to a number of alternative speciﬁcations provided in the robustness
section.
However, whether the eﬀect can be interpreted causally depends on the identiﬁca-
tion assumption: would ticket sales for routes in the treatment group have changed
the same during and after the railway strikes in the absence of a strike. I address
this assumption below and present a number of robustness checks.
3.4.1 The common trend assumption
This chapter shares the typical advantages and disadvantages of a standard DD
strategy. On the one hand, DD allows me to control for all time-invariant dif-
ferences across routes as well as changes over time by including both route and
time-period ﬁxed eﬀects. On the other hand, the DD identiﬁcation hinges on the
strong but easily stated assumption of a common trend: would treatment and
control groups move in parallel in the absence of treatment? There may be time-
varying confounding factors that are correlated with the treatment group.
To address whether the common trend assumption holds in this setting, I discuss a
number of tests. Firstly, I use strong sets of ﬁxed eﬀects. My speciﬁcation includes
a number of time- and route-varying controls, as well as origin- and destination-
speciﬁc linear trends. The diﬀerent ﬁxed eﬀects capture any level eﬀects such as
distance or common seasonal variations. They also capture time-varying omitted
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Figure 3.8
Mean log ticket sales split by treatment and control group
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Notes: Sample period September 2014-January 2015. Vertical lines and bold circles indicate
weeks and days, respectively, in which GDL was on strike.
variables such as MFB marketing expenditures. The origin- and destination-day
ﬁxed eﬀects also capture possible linear trends. In addition, I estimate a speciﬁ-
cation with route-speciﬁc trends in Section 3.5.1 below. What remains are time-
varying confounding factors that are correlated with the treatment groups.
Secondly, Figure 3.8 graphically compares the trend between the treatment and
control groups for the mean log number of ticket sales to all and ﬁrst-time cus-
tomers. The common trend assumption meets the eyeball test. Before the rail
strike, treatment and control group move remarkably in parallel. As expected, the
treated group displays a visibly larger increase in sales during the strikes. The
ﬁgure reports weekly averages, but a graph of daily ticket sales split by weekday
yields the same result.
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Thirdly, I re-estimate Equation 3.2 with pre-strike and post-strike treatment ef-
fects.24 I report weekly coeﬃcients to remove any weekday cyclicality. The esti-
mated treatment eﬀects for the pre-strike period act as a test for the common trend
assumption. The pre-strike coeﬃcients can be thought of as placebos. If trends are
the same, the pre-strike coeﬃcients should be constant and small in magnitude. If,
however, pre-trends are present they would show up in the treatment group.
The speciﬁcation takes the following form:
ln ticket salesijt = αij + τt + Xit + Xjt
+ δt (treatedij × weekt) + ijt
(3.3)
where weekt is a vector of week-ﬁxed eﬀects. The coeﬃcients of interest, that is
vector δt, must be measured relative to a baseline period. I normalize with respect
to the ﬁrst week of the sample which is standard in the literature. As above I run
an additional speciﬁcation with origin- and destination-departure day ﬁxed eﬀects.
Unlike the previous speciﬁcations Equation 3.3 includes observations for the two
days before and after each strike as well as the intermediate period between the
second and third strike wave.
The plot of coeﬃcients is reported in the main results section as Figure 3.9.25 The
coeﬃcients report the correlation between the treated group (short bus routes) and
the outcome of interest (log ticket sales) for each period. This has the additional
advantage that I can evaluate the eﬀect of the strikes over the course of the post-
period: the week coeﬃcients allow me to evaluate the eﬀect at diﬀerent elements of
the post-period, as opposed to estimating an average eﬀect only. It may take some
time for the full eﬀect to show up or for it to die out over time. The estimated
24Nunn and Qian (2011) and Autor (2003) provide good examples of estimating period-speciﬁc
treatment eﬀects in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences setting.
25Tables reporting coeﬃcients of control variables and the exact coeﬃcients are omitted for
length but available upon request.
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Figure 3.9
Coeﬃcients of the (treatedij × weekt) interaction term in Equation 3.3 with 95
percent conﬁdence intervals.
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Notes: Dashed vertical line indicates weeks in which GDL was on strike. Standard errors clustered
at the route level (166 clusters). Treatment variable: bus travel time.
weekly treatment coeﬃcients are ﬂexible in assessing the short- and medium-term
eﬀects.
The weekly treatment coeﬃcients are reported in Figure 3.9. They display a
remarkably persistent eﬀect of the rail strike. There is a jump in the magnitude
of the estimated treatment coeﬃcients at the time of rail strikes. This jump in
the magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcients persists beyond the rail strikes until
the end of the sample period. The post-strike treatment coeﬃcients are constant
around 0.4. Thus ticket sales to the treatment group are 40% higher than in the
baseline period. The pattern of period-speciﬁc treatment coeﬃcients is analogous
to that of Nunn and Qian (2011). They also estimate period-speciﬁc treatment
eﬀects, and ﬁnd coeﬃcients that are constant and small in in the pre-period and
increase in magnitude after treatment.
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While there is a clear jump in the magnitude of the coeﬃcients around the time
of the strike, two issues cast doubt on the parallel trends assumption. Firstly, the
magnitude of the treatment coeﬃcients starts increasing too early, i.e. a week before
the ﬁrst two strike waves. This suggests that ticket sales for short routes already
grew more strongly before the rail strike. Secondly, the post-strike coeﬃcients are
larger than the treatment coeﬃcients during the strike, which is worrisome. This
suggests that the common trend assumption is not completely tenable in the given
context. If these diﬀerent trends would simply reﬂect the heterogeneous eﬀect of
seasonality on short and long routes, and I had data from 2013, this problem may
be addressed using a triple-diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach. However, even if
these data were available the large changes in the inter-city bus market may not
allow for an appropriate removal of seasonal eﬀects.
3.5 Robustness
3.5.1 Route speciﬁc trends
Based on these results, this subsection estimates possible remedies. The possible
violation of the common trend assumption suggests that there are factors which
cause ticket sales to evolve diﬀerently on the control and treatment routes. For
instance, there might be route-speciﬁc trends related to characteristics that aﬀect
ticket sales. I estimate two additional speciﬁcations with route-speciﬁc trends,
(αij × t). These capture any potential linear trend speciﬁc to each route. The
regression takes the following form:
ln ticket salesijt = αij + τt + γit + γjt + Xit + Xjt + (αij × t)
+ δt (treatedij × weekt) + ijt
(3.4)
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The estimated coeﬃcients of the (treatedij × weekt) interaction term in Equation
3.4 are plotted in Panels 1 and 2 of Figure 3.10. Because I cannot include route-
clustered standard errors due to insuﬃcient observations, I report robust standard
errors. With this speciﬁcation, the eﬀect of the strikes will only be captured if
there is a stark deviation from the trend (Angrist and Pischke, 2014). In this case,
the common trend assumption does not appear to be violated.
A second speciﬁcation with route-speciﬁc trends repeats the estimation using pre-
period observations only following Repetto (2016): I estimate φ1ij and φ2ij using
only data from the pre-strike period (September 01-October 14) in a quadratic
trend model:
ln ticket salesijt = φ1ijt + φ2ijt
2 + uijt (3.5)
I then add the estimates for φ1ij and φ2ij, that is φ̂1ij and φ̂2ij, back into the main
speciﬁcation. This method `projects' pre-strike trends into the post-strike period:
ln ticket salesijt = αij + τt + γit + γjt + Xit + Xjt
+ δφ1 (φ̂1ij × t) + δφ2 (φ̂2ij × t2)
+ δt (treatedij × weekt) + ijt
(3.6)
This speciﬁcation controls for route-speciﬁc trends that were in place before the
strikes and that may cause ticket sales patterns to be diﬀerent across groups. I
report results in Panels 3 and 4 of Figure 3.10. As above, I report results for both
variables in the same ﬁgure, and only report coeﬃcients for regressions including
the complete set of control variables.
On the one hand, Panels 1 and 2 of Figure 3.10 report the speciﬁcation with
route-speciﬁc trends. I no longer ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. However,
this result may simply be due to the inability to include clustered standard errors
into this speciﬁcation. The route-speciﬁc pre-trends, on the other hand, conﬁrm
the earlier result. Although the common trend assumption does not appear to
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Figure 3.10
Coeﬃcients of the (treatedij × weekt) interaction term (route-speciﬁc trends)
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Panel 3-4: route clustered standard errors. 166 clusters.
be completely tenable in the given context, the lasting and remarkably persistent
post-treatment eﬀects for the treated routes is still visible.
3.5.2 Other robustness
In this subsection, I consider a host of additional factors, alternative speciﬁcations,
and diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the dataset to verify my previous results. For length,
all regression tables are reported in Appendix C.3.
First, I conduct a robustness check with treatment deﬁned as a continuous variable.
A continuous `treatment' is harder to interpret, but captures more variation in the
channel variable. The regression results with the explanatory variable speciﬁed
as the natural logarithm of bus travel time yield statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃ-
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cients equivalent to my previous results. In addition, I conﬁrm that using variable
absolute travel time diﬀerence for the post-strike regressions yields equivalent re-
sults.
Second, GDL membership rates are higher in East Germany because many train
drivers in West Germany are civil servants. Travellers may not have been aware
of the precise emergency timetables, and simply considered the eﬀect of GDL
strikes to be starker in East Germany. In that case, the relevant transmission
channel would be to split routes into West- and East- Germany. Note that this
speciﬁcation does not allow for the inclusion of origin-day and destination-day ﬁxed
eﬀects. I do not ﬁnd that using this distinction explains MFB ticket sales during
the strikes.
Third, I re-run my estimation with Berlin omitted from the sample. Berlin is
special because inter-city buses were liberalized before 2013  a historical relic
from the Cold War division of Germany. My results are unaltered if I drop all
routes to and from Berlin.
Fourth, I re-run my estimation of the eﬀect during the strikes using ticket sales
to all consumers as the dependent variable. While the estimated coeﬃcients are
lower, this change does not alter the previous results in a meaningful way. Bus
travel time is the only factor that signiﬁcantly explains MFB ticket sales during
the strike. The same holds true if I do not drop the two days before and after each
rail strike and include the intermediary week between the second and third strike
wave.
Fifth, long routes are more likely to be served by aeroplanes. Customers may
have switched to buses on routes with a short bus travel time because aircraft
do not serve these routes. In this case, the short bus travel time would not be
a proxy for closeness of substitution, but lack of other alternatives to rail. To
address this concern, I show that my main results is insensitive to a re-run of
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Figure 3.11
Mean fraction of tickets sold with a discount by treatment and control group
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my estimation where I restrict the sample to routes with no substantial national
ﬂight service.26 During the sample period Germany's largest airline Lufthansa was
also aﬀected by strikes due to a labour dispute with its pilots. While an airline
strike would primarily aﬀect long bus routes, this robustness check also addresses
spillover concerns from Lufthansa strikes.
Sixth, a concern might be the presence of unobserved marketing activity by MFB.
A marketing campaign may have coincided with the rail strikes and targeted routes
with a short bus travel time. While I do not have data on MFB's marketing budget,
my dataset includes information on whether MFB sold a ticket at a discount. For
example, MFB may have handed out vouchers or oﬀered discounts via its mobile
phone Application. Using discounts as a proxy for MFB marketing activity, Figure
3.11 plots the mean fraction of tickets that received a discount for each departure
day split by treatment and control group. The fraction of tickets that receive a
discount ﬂuctuates between 2 and 4 percent in the sample period. Based on this
26To be precise, I drop the largest 10 bi-directional connections (20 routes) within Germany.
This covers all city connections with an excess of 0.4 million annual passengers in 2016. Source:
ADV Airport association
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proxy measure, there is neither evidence that MFB increased its marketing activity
in general, nor for the treatment group.
Seventh, an additional concern might be that travellers booked bus tickets after
the November 2014 rail strike, because they were worried about potential future
strikes. The rail strikes lasted beyond the strikes in 2014, and the labour dispute
was only resolved after additional strike waves in April and May 2015. However,
immediately after the strike wave in November GDL announced a temporary truce.
It would refrain from industrial action until the new year. Even though some
customers may have distrusted the truce, it is unlikely that increased bus ticket
sales in this period are driven by the fear of new strikes.
Eighth, a further concern might be that many travellers are locked in to DB because
they hold season passes. While DB does not oﬀer season passes, it operates the
BahnCard  a frequent traveller card granting ﬁxed price reductions. More than
half of all DB ticket sales receive discounts through the BahnCard.27 Travellers may
have waited for their BahnCard to expire before they switched to inter-city buses.
While it is possible that any eﬀects may not show up until later, my period-speciﬁc
treatment eﬀects suggest an immediate impact.
Finally, my dataset permits me to observe return ticket bookings. I conﬁrm that
my results are not sensitive to the inclusion of return tickets bought in a single
booking session.
27Source: Welt.de (url: https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article1069965/Die-Bahncard-hat-
Verspaetung.html ; 31/07/2007)
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3.6 Conclusion
This chapter exploits a novel and extremely rich dataset to investigate the eﬀects
of the 2014-2015 German railway strikes  the largest in German history  on the
domestic demand for inter-city buses. The railway strikes provide a quasi-natural
experiment setting to analyse the general question of whether a temporary shock
can have lasting eﬀects on one's competitors' demand.
I ﬁrst test a number of potential transmission channels for inter-city bus demand,
since it is not ex-ante clear which bus routes were aﬀected during the rail strike.
The results show that the only channel predicting peak ticket sales for MeinFern-
bus during the rail strikes is the closeness of substitution to the rail. Customers
switched to inter-city buses if the absolute travel time diﬀerence was small or the
absolute bus travel time was short. There is no evidence that travellers took into
account the regional variation of the exposure to the rail strike, as measured by
the fraction of cancellations and expected delay, in their decision on whether to
switch to buses or not. Either they were not well informed about their exposure to
the strikes as speciﬁed in the emergency timetables published by DB, or they may
simply not have trusted DB's ability to implement the emergency timetables. In a
second step, I use the channel identiﬁed in the ﬁrst step, to test whether the strikes
brought about lasting changes after DB services returned to normal operations.
Although the common trend assumption does not seem to be completely tenable
in the given context, my results still suggest a lasting eﬀect on the ticket sales
for inter-city buses on the aﬀected routes. This result is robust to a number of
alternative speciﬁcations, such as the inclusion of route-speciﬁc pre-trends.
The ﬁndings of this chapter open questions for future research. Given the history
of interaction between GDL and DB, future rail strikes are very likely. Since
the inter-city market for buses has consolidated substantially since 2014, future
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research may be able to remove seasonal eﬀects and establish a stronger causal
eﬀect for the persistence of rail strikes on bus demand. Another intriguing avenue
would be to uncover the potential mechanisms at play. These may range from new
information asymmetries to retaliatory motives.
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Data
The main source we rely on to obtain bilateral trade ﬂows is the standard United
Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (Comtrade). While a cleaned ver-
sion of these data are available (Feenstra et al. 2005) we use the raw data as it
gives us more years after 2000, up to 2011. We undertake some data cleaning
ourselves, as described below. We verify that our main results are robust to using
the Feenstra data up to 2000. We download aggregate trade data.1 Our original
sample of annual aggregate trade ﬂow contains 32,386 observations reported as
imports from 47 European economies over the period 1990 to 2011. The year 1990
marks the fall of the Iron Curtain and 2011 is the most recent year for which a full
set of reported trade statistics is available. We use the 4-digit Standard Interna-
tional Trade Classiﬁcation, revision 2, commodity code (SITC2) as it is the most
detailed product classiﬁcation for which the Comtrade database oﬀers data span-
ning back to 1989, and it is the same as used by Feenstra et al. (2005). Individual
1Comtrade data are revised over time. The data described here were accessed on June 23,
2013 via the website http://comtrade.un.org.
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observations are identiﬁed by origin-destination-year dimensions. Table A.1 lists
all countries in the dataset.
The ﬁrst problem we encounter is that of missing reported trade values. These
are especially common in early years after a break-up or creation of an economy
in the aftermath of the fall of the Iron Curtain. For example, Slovakia only starts
reporting its trade ﬂows in 1994, one year after the break-up of Czechoslovakia.
Following the approach taken by Feenstra et al. (2005) we prefer importer reported
statistics, assuming these are more accurate than those trade values reported as
exports. Wherever possible we use exporter reported trade ﬂows if the import
reported trade ﬂows is missing for a pair of countries. By this method we re-
place 2,293 missing observations in the total trade dataset - about ten percent of
observations.
Within Comtrade, import reported data is valued CIF (cost, insurance and freight)
and export reported data is valued FOB (free on board). FOB-type values include
the transaction value of the goods and the value of services performed to deliver
goods to the border of the exporting country. CIF in addition includes the value
of the services performed to deliver the goods from the border of the exporting
country to the border of the importing country. Following the methodology of
HMR we correct this discrepancy by discounting CIF values by 10 percent. We
compare the import and exported reported trade statistics whenever both reports
are available. If we ignore all exporter and importer reported values that diﬀer
by a factor of greater than two either way, we ﬁnd that reports valued as CIF
exceed FOB reported values by a factor 1.12 on average, which conﬁrms the HMR
methodology.
For the product level regressions we rely on the BACI dataset from CEPII.2 BACI
provides bilateral values and quantities of exports at the HS 6-digit product disag-
2See Gauillaume and Zignago (2010).
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gregation, for more than 200 countries. BACI data are available from 1995 only, we
are grateful for CEPII to provide us with data from 1992. We cannot include 1990
and 1991 in our product level analysis. Services are not included in this dataset,
and thus services is the HS 2-digit category that we do not include in the analysis.
It is the only omitted category.
We use UN deﬁnitions (2013) to determine which countries to include as Europe.
We start with all European countries, but undertake some aggregations to balance
the data. Some of the nation break-ups following the fall of the Iron Curtain occur
within key economies of the former Habsburg Empire. We prefer to work with a
panel of stable country boundaries so that compositional diﬀerences do not drive
our results. Fortunately these border changes consisted of splits in such a way
that they can easily be mapped into larger units that remain stable over time.
We aggregate trade ﬂows to the smallest possible country which we can observe
continually over the sample period. Table A.1 lists all country groups and years
that merge/split and that we aggregate. After aggregating we drop within country
trade (i.e. trade ﬂows that were formerly reported as Czech Republic to Slovakia).
Note that we only observe trade statistics from the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia starting in 1993. Usually Comtrade country borders changes only
occur at the beginning of a calendar year. There is one notable exception to
this: both Serbia and Serbia-Montenegro report trade data in 2005. We keep and
aggregate these observations within the same year as it might be due to Serbia-
Montenegro breaking up at some point during the year, such that Serbia starts
reporting its imports from some month when Serbia-Montenegro ceases to do so.
Consequently, our measure of Yugoslavia contains reports from former Yugoslavia
in 1990-1991, reports from four countries in 1992, ﬁve countries from 1992 to 2004,
six countries in 2005 where both Serbia and Serbia-Montenegro report data, and
six countries from 2006 and thereafter as Montenegro replaces Serbia-Montenegro.
We drop a number of countries that belong to the former Soviet Union from the
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Table A.1
List of European Economies and our aggregation method
Albania Fmr Yugoslavia Poland
Andorra* France Portugal
Austria Germany Rep. of Moldova**
Belarus** Gibraltar* Romania
Belgium*** Greece Russian Federation**
Belgium-Luxembourg Vatican City State* San Marino*
Bosnia Herzegovina*** Hungary Serbia***
Bulgaria Iceland Serbia and Montenegro***
Croatia Ireland Slovakia***
Czech Rep.*** Italy Slovenia***
Czechoslovakia Latvia** Spain
Denmark Lithuania** Sweden
Estonia** Luxembourg*** Switzerland
Faroe Isds* Malta TFYR of Macedonia***
Finland Montenegro** Ukraine**
Fmr Dem. Rep. of Germany*** Netherlands United Kingdom
Fmr Fed. Rep. of Germany*** Norway
Notes: Trade values estimated following the methodology of Feenstra et al. (2005). * Only
appear as partner, not included as reporter country as trade and production data unreliable.
Do not report trade statistics themselves. ** Former Soviet Union with changing borders. ***
Aggregated with another country to balance the sample.
dataset (Belarus, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia as well as the Russian
Federation). With the dissolution of the Soviet Union these countries and the
consequent political turmoil these economies only appear in the trade statistics
two years after the beginning of the sample period (in 1992). We decide that the
cost of introducing noise by including them is greater than the beneﬁt of gaining
some more observations, especially as these countries are not directly relevant for
the question we study. We omit tiny countries such as the Vatican and the Faroe
Islands, but include them as partner countries. Given these changes, the resulting
panel of countries we work with is balanced throughout all the years we study.
We drop reported destinations that are designated `bunkers' (UN code 837), `free
zones' (838), `special categories' (839) and `areas not elsewhere speciﬁed (nes)'
(899). Moreover, we drop the highly incomplete observations reporting trade
with San Marino, the Vatican, Andorra, Faroe Islands and Gibraltar. Table A.2
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Table A.2
Aggregated Economies
Country Years observed
Germany
Germany 1991 - 2012
Fmr Dem. Rep. of Germany 1989 - 1990
Fmr Fed. Rep. of Germany 1989 - 1990
Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia 1989 - 1992
Czech Rep. 1993 - 2012
Slovakia 1993 - 2012
Yugoslavia
Fmr Yugoslavia 1989 - 1991
Slovenia 1992 - 2012
Bosnia Herzegovina 1992 - 2012
Croatia 1992 - 2012
TFYR Macedonia 1993 - 2012
Serbia and Montenegro 1992 - 2005
Serbia 2005 - 2012
Montenegro 2006 - 2012
Belgium-Luxembourg
Belgium-Luxembourg 1989 - 1998
Belgium 1999 - 2012
Luxembourg 1999 - 2012
reports the elements by year for the countries that involve aggregation for our
dataset.
We add a number of standard control variables, relying on standard sources. We
obtain data on aggregate GDP and populations from the World Banks World De-
velopment Indicators (2013). We compute GDP per capita as GDP divided by
population, both as reported by the UN. Following our methodology of aggre-
gating trade ﬂows, we derive GDP and population measures for Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia as the sum of GDP and populations of the underlying countries.
For example, Czechoslovakia's population is calculated as the sum of the Czech
Republic's and Slovakian populations. GDP is measured in current US dollars
(millions) and, in accordance with trade ﬂows, not deﬂated. We obtain a number
of gravity variables from the CEPII distance database used in Mayer and Zignago
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(2005).3 These include the country-speciﬁc variable landlocked as well as dyadic
variables. These are common border, common (oﬃcial) language, shared language
spoken by at least 9 percent of the population, and distance. As measure of dis-
tance we use distance between capitals as it is a consistent measure we can apply to
the aggregated economies. For example, we use Prague as the capital of Czechoslo-
vakia throughout the sample period. The variables time diﬀerence, shared legal
history, area and shared religion are from the gravity data set provided by HMR.4
We also use this source to add time varying variables GATT/WTO membership,
membership of RTAs (Regional Trade Agreements) and a common currency indi-
cator. Since the HMR dataset only spans the years up to 2006, we update the
time varying variables using data from the WTO.5 Finally, we construct dummy
variables for EU and Eurozone membership.6 This latest source also allows us to
generate a variable that indicates membership in the common currency.
3These data are available at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm (accessed
19/06/2013).
4These data are available at http://strategy.sauder.ubc.ca/head/sup (accessed 19/06/2013).
5Here we rely on two sources, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e for GATT/WTO mem-
bership and http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicPreDefRepByEIF.aspx for RTAs (both sites accessed
19/06/2013).
6We use the EU web site http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm (accessed
10/07/2013)
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A.2 Robustness and additional results
We verify that our results are robust to a number of alternative speciﬁcations and
estimation methods. We omit the detailed numbers and ﬁgures for some of these
robustness tests for reasons of space. Details on all robustness checks not displayed
here are available upon request.
Habsburg deﬁnition
We deﬁne the Habsburg measure in diﬀerent ways. We include all countries that
are at least partly former Habsburg members, thus adding Italy, Poland, Roma-
nia, Serbia and Ukraine to the countries covered by the Habsburg ﬁxed eﬀects.
The Habsburg coeﬃcients remain fairly similar, yet become somewhat statisti-
cally weaker. This is as expected, given that this measure includes areas that
were outside of the monarchy and thus should add more noise than signal. We
run a separate regression including only Yugoslavia as an additional Habsburg
member, and one in which we code Yugoslavia as being west of the Curtain. Yu-
goslavia is an ambiguous case given its unique history during the 20th century. The
monotonic downward slope is strongly robust to these speciﬁcations and variations
thereof.
Panel estimation
We address the concerns brought forward by Anderson and Yotov (2012), that a
disadvantage of pooling gravity data over consecutive years is that dependent and
independent variables cannot fully adjust in a single year's time. We address this
concern using the suggested methodology of keeping only intervals of 3 or 5 years.
The downward slope in Panel 1 in Figure 3 of chapter 1 becomes -.038 (.004) when
keeping only every third year from 1990, and -.034 (.002) when keeping only every
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Figure A.1
Anderson-Yotov 5 year intervals
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ﬁfth year. Our ﬁndings seem not to be much changed by this adjustment. See also
Figure A.1.
Additional control variables
Country pairs that are most aﬀected by the fall of the Iron Curtain are those
country pairs that shared an East-West border along the Iron Curtain, such as
Austria-Czechoslovakia, Italy-Slovenia, Greece-Albania. To avoid a potential omit-
ted variable bias we include time varying control variables for these country pairs.
We continue to observe the downward sloping Habsburg coeﬃcient with a fairly
similar magnitude. We also include a dummy variable indicating that both coun-
tries are west of the Iron Curtain. The slope in our preferred estimation remains
numerically at -0.044, and is not statistically signiﬁcant from any of our estimated
slopes at the 1% level of statistical signiﬁcance. We also add measures of cultural
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Figure A.2
Additional control variables: countries that share an east-west border (time vary-
ing), genetic distance, Eurovision voting, cultural and religious similarity.
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proximity. These are variables indicating Eurovision voting preference (data from
Felbermayr and Toubal, 2010), genetic distance (data from Spolaore and Wacziarg,
2009) and cultural and religious similarity (data from Spolaore andWacziarg 2015).
The inclusion of these additional control variables does not change the slope in our
main estimation, which remains at -0.047, close to the estimate in our main spec-
iﬁcation. These and other time invariant bilateral variables we may have omitted
are covered by our speciﬁcation that includes bilateral ﬁxed eﬀects. These results
are also reported in Figure A.2.
Placebo
We run a couple of placebo exercises where we replace Austria by other West-
ern European countries. These address the possibility that the opening of trade
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relations between East and West might be dynamic, increasing or decreasing, in
the ﬁrst years after the opening of the Iron Curtain because of various reasons
other than the decline of historic and cultural ties. For example, the installation
or reuse of transport infrastructure might suggest a dynamic trade relationship
between an eastern and a western country, or the slow establishment of personal
exchange and interaction. In both these examples we would expect an increasing
relationship, but there may be others. To mitigate concerns that such eﬀects drive
our results we run a placebo exercise in which we estimate `Habsburg' eﬀects on
a relationship other than Habsburg, for which we do not expect the same decay
of cultural ties. We chose Germany as our preferred placebo country. It shares
the language with Austria and also a direct border with many eastern countries.
When we estimate the trading relationship with Germany instead of Austria being
the `Habsburg' country west of the curtain, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant relationships.
These results are reported in Table A.3, and in this table we use the same speci-
ﬁcation as applied in Tables 2 and 3 of chapter 1. The PPML estimates display
an increase of the eﬀect for intermediate years, which may point to some form of
catch up in the interim years. This eﬀect however shows no monotonic trend in
t and is not robust to the other speciﬁcations displayed. Most of the coeﬃcients
in Table A.3, including in the PPML speciﬁcation are not statistically signiﬁcant.
We interpret this ﬁnding to cast doubt on the relevance of other dynamic eﬀects
shaping initial trade relationships. We also estimate further robustness tests using
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg and Italy as placebo coun-
tries. Switzerland is similar to Austria in some cultural aspects and geographically
close, yet does not share the Habsburg history. It also does not have a history of
division and uniﬁcation like Germany. The Netherlands and Belgium-Luxembourg
are other countries similar in size and wealth to Austria. Italy is geographically
close to both Austria and the Iron Curtain. As in the estimation with the Ger-
man placebo, these estimations are exactly like our main estimation for Habsburg
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Figure A.3
Further Placebo regressions.
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countries with the exception of replacing Austria by each of the placebo countries
in turn. We display the main OLS estimation for these four countries in Figure
A.3. The magnitudes of the slopes in all these four cases are much lower than for
the main Habsburg speciﬁcation. Switzerland and the Netherlands show a slightly
positive trend with small magnitudes. Only Italy shows a negative slope, moder-
ately signiﬁcant and also small in magnitude. Italy is the only country of the four
that partly had a Habsburg history herself, so the one placebo country where we
might have expected a small negative slope.
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Table A.3
Germany Placebo Coeﬃcients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS PPML Lag DV Dyad FE
Dependent variable: ln(xint) xint ln(xint) ln(xint)
1990 -0.230 0.342 -0.130
(0.375) (0.225) (0.238)
1991 -0.287 0.113 -0.213** -0.278
(0.285) (0.213) (0.0981) (0.181)
1992 -0.140 0.196 0.0853 -0.0514
(0.294) (0.171) (0.0944) (0.175)
1993 0.106 0.431*** 0.228*** 0.186
(0.286) (0.167) (0.0809) (0.162)
1994 -0.158 0.358** -0.227 -0.110
(0.318) (0.142) (0.196) (0.155)
1995 -0.0570 0.317* 0.108 -0.0191
(0.346) (0.180) (0.0817) (0.150)
1996 -0.0678 0.304* -0.0319 -0.0151
(0.307) (0.184) (0.0632) (0.138)
1997 -0.00333 0.395** -0.000351 0.0679
(0.296) (0.183) (0.0804) (0.132)
1998 -0.0299 0.490*** -0.0406 0.0433
(0.291) (0.177) (0.0752) (0.141)
1999 -0.00454 0.506*** 0.0522 0.104
(0.313) (0.177) (0.0796) (0.137)
2000 -0.0777 0.416** -0.0934 0.0192
(0.330) (0.178) (0.0848) (0.143)
2001 -0.0327 0.460*** 0.0385 0.0688
(0.305) (0.170) (0.0572) (0.134)
2002 -0.0519 0.530*** -0.0353 0.0493
(0.329) (0.158) (0.118) (0.169)
2003 0.0254 0.544*** 0.0483 0.133
(0.274) (0.144) (0.0480) (0.138)
2004 0.0509 0.462*** 0.0112 0.160
(0.263) (0.159) (0.0753) (0.133)
2005 -0.0569 0.316* -0.106 0.0521
(0.281) (0.189) (0.0753) (0.136)
2006 -0.115 0.268 -0.0585 -0.00521
(0.310) (0.184) (0.0903) (0.139)
2007 -0.145 0.214 -0.0530 -0.0417
(0.287) (0.175) (0.0634) (0.134)
2008 -0.183 0.154 -0.0743 -0.0802
(0.288) (0.172) (0.0656) (0.136)
2009 -0.156 0.0905 -0.00779 -0.0530
(0.291) (0.166) (0.0813) (0.143)
2010 -0.147 0.0673 -0.0296 -0.0469
(0.291) (0.166) (0.0813) (0.143)
2011 -0.102 0.102 0.0114
(0.323) (0.170) (0.103)
Notes: Placebo exercise: Habsburg coeﬃcients with
Germany instead of Austria. Stars denote statistical sig-
niﬁcance on the level of one (***), ﬁve (**) and ten (*)
percent. Robust standard errors used.
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Figure A.4
Aggregate Eastern countries.
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Aggregation
We test the sensitivity of our results to the choices of aggregating countries we
make. We go to both extremes, by creating the most disaggregated and the most
aggregated unit we can. In the most aggregated version we add all countries east
of the Iron Curtain that were part of Habsburg into one observation, such that
the dummy of interest becomes the bilateral ﬂow between one Eastern and one
Western aggregate. Despite the small sample of treatment in this robustness, which
is just one bilateral trade ﬂow between Austrian and the Eastern Aggregate, a
strong, signiﬁcant downward slope remains, although somewhat smaller in absolute
magnitude than in the main speciﬁcation (see Figure A.4). In this Figure we do
not include Yugoslavia. When we do include Yugoslavia in the eastern aggregate
we ﬁnd a very similar picture, with a strong, signiﬁcant downward slope of -0.033
(0.003) in our main speciﬁcation.
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Figure A.5
Disaggregate Eastern countries.
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In Figure A.5 we repeat the main table for the most disaggregated version of
countries, which splits Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia into its components today
from the moment of separation. This exercise is only possible for the years from
1993 onwards, when countries were separated. The downward slope remains strong
and negative in all four speciﬁcations. The turbulent history of the countries of
former Yugoslavia and the corresponding big shocks to their trade relationships
are likely to contribute to the increased noise apparent in this graph compared to
our main speciﬁcation.
Pre-1990 trend
The timing of the surplus trade is mainly observable after 1990, when the countries
fully integrate in the European market and rich trade datasets from the standard
sources become available. It is interesting for our conclusion however to see what
the pre-1990 trend looks like. A concern might be that Austria's special surplus
that we observe in the trade volumes with Eastern Europe had been large and
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Figure A.6
Pre-1990 trade (Datasource: Barbierei, 2002)
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built up before 1990. It may have also been that the built up had been temporary
due to the suspicion that the Iron Curtain may break with Austria ﬁrst.
It is not straight forward to obtain trade data for these countries and time periods.
To get some evidence we use the data by Barbieri (2002). These data cannot be
directly compared to the Comtrade data we rely on in the rest of chapter 1. Some
industries are missing, and the trade levels for ﬂows we can compare seem much
lower than those reported in Comtrade. They also do not match well with the
numbers reported in the history section (Butschek, 1996; Lazarevic, 2010; and
Pogany, 2010). Thus, while we do not want to over interpret the trade levels in
this dataset, we think that they are informative regarding trends, just as Barbieri
used data from uniﬁed sources to analyse trade developments over time. As the
sources from the history section make clear, these trends take place at very low
levels of trade.
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Given concerns over the levels of these data, missing data and lack of availability
we do not run a full gravity model here, but just report the relative trade levels of
Germany and Austria with respect to Hungary and Czechoslovakia before 1990 in
Figure A.6. This graph displays a few helpful facts on trade before 1990: Firstly,
Austria and Germany display a similar trend of growth with the Eastern Habsburg
Countries from 1950 to 1990. Thus, Austria seems not to particularly build up
the surplus trade in the years before 1990. Secondly, Austria seems not to have
had much of an advantage over Germany during the years of separation; while
Germany's trade with the East grows from 1935 to 1955, Austria starts at levels
slightly below the average from 1920-1940, and Austria never catches up to the
German advantage during the entire century. (On average, Germany's trade level
is about four times that of Austria in the period 1980-2010). Thirdly, these num-
bers also conﬁrm the claim that the fall of the Iron Curtain had not been widely
anticipated, and appears as a surprising event in these trade numbers. Fourthly,
there may be some suggestion that the Austrian surplus slowly builds up from 1955
to 1990, and then declines again. Yet given the limitations of this exercise, and
the data involved we urge the reader to treat these suggestions with caution.
Missing data
In the main parts of chapter 1 we treat missing trade ﬂows in the CEPII or Com-
trade data as a zero trade ﬂow and include such observations in the analysis. We
test the robustness of our results to treating zeros in diﬀerent ways. First, we omit
zeros from the sample or second, we replace zeros by 1. Again, our main conclu-
sions in the main results table do not seem to be altered by these speciﬁcations.
These results are available on request.
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Figure A.7
Include internal trade.
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Internal trade
Yotov (2012) argues that gravity models should not just focus on international
ﬂows but explicitly take into account national integration, internal distance and
internal trade costs. We follow the gravity literature on how to construct inter-
nal trade ﬂows. We construct internal trade ﬂows as the diﬀerence between GDP
from the World Bank (World Development Indicators) and total exports from our
Comtrade dataset. Related recent contributions (for example, Heid et al. 2015)
use production data from the UN's Industrial statistics database at the industry
level. This measure, however, suﬀers from signiﬁcant missing observations in the
early 1990s. Therefore, because our speciﬁcation focuses on aggregate trade ﬂows,
we prefer using GDP data. Regarding the coding of covariates for internal ﬂows,
we adopt the measures suggested by the CEPII. These standard deﬁnitions also
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include suggested controls for internal trade ﬂows. These are then consistent with
our previous controls. For example, the population-weighted distance allows for
a consistent use of internal and international distances. See Figure A.7 for the
results of this exercise. As shown in Figure A.7 the internal trade speciﬁcation
does not change the slopes or picture much compared with the main estimate.
We would have expected the results to be weaker, as we count the internal trade
ﬂow of Habsburg countries as part of the treatment eﬀect, but don't expect that
portion of the trade to be important. In other words, we add noise to the treat-
ment. And indeed the OLS slope is slightly smaller in magnitude than in the main
results speciﬁcation. This decrease is neither very pronounced nor robust across
all speciﬁcations.
Standard errors
As an alternative treatment of standard errors, we conduct a robustness test in
which we cluster standard errors by bilateral country pairs. Coeﬃcients remain
identical, we verify that this does not change the signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients reported
in Figure 3 in a meaningful way. Results indeed remain strongly signiﬁcant. It
should be quite apparent from the monotonic downward slope visible in that ﬁgure
that the signiﬁcance of this downward slope is strongly robust to other even more
demanding speciﬁcations.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Matching RASFF rejections with HS4 product
codes
One of the contributions made by chapter 2 is the method developed to assign
product codes to the verbal descriptions provided for notiﬁcations on the RASFF
portal.1 Attributing product codes is a prerequisite for matching sanitary rejec-
tions with Chinese export data.
To assign a product code to each notiﬁcation, we exploit information on product
category (e.g. `alcoholic beverages') and subject (e.g. `undeclared sulphite in Wine
from Chile') reported by the RASFF authorities. We assign observations to the HS
classiﬁcation in which our Chinese ﬁrm-level data are coded. We code to the HS
4-digit level - the most disaggregated level at which we can identify notiﬁcations.
We use the 2002 revision of the HS classiﬁcation.
A manual assignment of HS4 codes on an individual basis is not possible given the
number of notiﬁcations in our database (14,860 observations for the period 2000-
1url: http://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/rasﬀ/index_en.htm
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2011 after the cleaning procedure described in Section 2.3). Therefore, to assign
product codes we implement the following approach. We ﬁrst split subject in order
to extract the relevant information on the product (e.g. `wine'). Next, we rearrange
some product categories and align them more directly with HS2 sectors (e.g. `ﬁsh
and ﬁsh products' and `farmed ﬁsh and products thereof - other than crustaceans
and molluscs' are combined). We also conduct some re-assignments of observations
across product categories to ensure consistency. Finally, we disregard observations
from product category `food contact materials' as we are only interested in agri-
food products (HS chapters 01-24).
We identify the sector (HS2) wherever possible, and assign the HS4 product code
using Stata's regexm function. Regexm searches for keywords associated with a
speciﬁc HS4 code. For example, within product `ﬁsh', `frozen hake ﬁllets' can
be assigned HS4 code 0304 (`Fish ﬁllets and other ﬁsh meat - whether or not
minced, fresh, chilled or frozen') using keywords `ﬁllets' and `frozen'. Using the
same method chilled hake is assigned HS4 code 0302 (`Fish, fresh or chilled,
excluding ﬁsh ﬁllets and other ﬁsh meat of heading No 0304'). The full Stata
do-ﬁles with the matching correspondence and code mapping RASFF notiﬁcations
and HS codes are available on request from the authors.
This methodology has several advantages. Firstly, it is easily checked, veriﬁed, and
replicated, and ensures consistent treatment of RASFF observations. Secondly, it
can be extended to more data at a very low cost. For example, it can be applied
to additional observations as more RASFF notiﬁcations become available over
time.
Using this strategy, we successfully match 89 percent of rejections with an HS4
code (13,241 out of 14,860). Among border rejections applied to China we match
91 percent (1,537 out of 1,690). The incidence of rejections is fairly heterogeneous
across products but is clustered in some sectors. Our rejections are split over 115
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Table B.1
Chinese border rejections and percent of agri-food exports by HS2 (2000-2011)
HS Chapter % Chinese Nb. of
agri-food exports rejections
01 Live animals 0.1 0
02 Meat and edible meat oﬀal 0.6 32
03 Fish and crustaceans, molluscs 24.5 258
04 Dairy produce 0.9 59
05 Products of animal origin 9.9 40
06 Live trees and other plants 0.6 0
07 Edible vegetables 11.2 75
08 Edible fruits and nuts 4.6 24
09 Coﬀee, tea, mate and spices 2.9 76
10 Cereals 0.2 65
11 Products of the milling industry 0.2 0
12 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits 7.4 698
13 Lac; gums, resins 1.6 2
14 Vegetable plaiting materials 0.4 0
15 Animal or vegetable fats and oils; 1.2 1
16 Prep. of meat, of ﬁsh or of crustaceans, molluscs 5.5 1
17 Sugar and sugar confectionery 1.0 26
18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations 0.6 1
19 Preparations of cereals, ﬂour, starch or milk 2.0 87
20 Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts 17.7 29
21 Miscellaneous edible preparations 1.4 51
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar 0.7 4
23 Residues and waste from the food industries 2.2 8
24 Tobacco 2.7 0
diﬀerent HS4 codes out 201 potential ones in the 24 chapters of agri-food products
(for China we identify 67 diﬀerent HS4 products). If we look at all the rejections,
the majority of notiﬁcations concern HS08 `Edible fruits and nuts', HS03 `Fish
and Crustaceans, Molluscs', and HS12 `oil seeds and oleaginous fruits'. For China,
HS12 and HS03 are the two main chapters aﬀected by border rejections. We
conduct an additional visual check of the mapping in Table B.1. We compare the
percentage of Chinese exports and rejections by HS2 product category. While we
do not expect a strong correlation (small export sectors could plausibly be aﬀected
by a disproportionate number of rejections), we are able to conﬁrm that there
are no large sectors without rejections and no tiny agri-food sectors with many
rejections.
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B.2 Chinese ﬁrm-level exports
Table B.2 investigates whether aggregation of the observations at the 4-digit level
is a potential source of bias. If rejections occur at the HS6 product level but our
analysis is performed at the HS4 sector level, we could observe automatic higher
survival rates (and lower levels of exit) for larger ﬁrms. Large ﬁrms might export
multiple HS6 products within an HS4 sector. Even if one ﬁrm's HS6 product is
aﬀected by rejections, other HS6 products may remain unaﬀected. Thus, at the
HS4 level, we may observe large ﬁrms as less likely to exit the RASFF market.
To address this issue, we record the number of HS6 products exported by a ﬁrm
within each HS4 sector. Table B.2 summarizes the results. Columns 1 to 5 report
the fractions of ﬁrm-HS4 exports that have the underlying number of HS6 products.
We observe that ﬁrms  even multi-HS4 ﬁrms  usually export only one HS6
product within each HS4 sector. 89.66 percent of ﬁrms present in only one HS4
sector export just one HS6 product within that HS4 sector (and 8.52 percent of
these ﬁrms export two HS6 products within that HS4 sector). At the other end of
the spectrum, for ﬁrms present in 10 or more HS4 sectors, only one HS6 product
per HS4 sector is exported in 73.84 percent of the cases (and two products in 18.11
percent of the cases).
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Table B.2
Percentage of HS6 products within HS4 sectors for Chinese ﬁrms (2000-2011)
Nb. of HS4 Nb. of HS6 within HS4 % ﬁrms % exports
1 2 3 4 5+
1 89.66 8.52 1.19 .43 .19 12.69 15.48
2 86.52 10.71 1.71 .73 .33 10.2 10.96
3 84.12 12.16 2.27 .83 .62 8.42 8.85
4 82.38 13.41 2.39 1.01 .81 7.4 8.64
5 79.83 15.3 3.08 .91 .87 6.75 7.91
6 77.56 16.05 3.9 1.45 1.03 5.88 6.61
7 76.29 16.4 4.36 1.69 1.26 5.34 6.26
8 75.15 16.43 4.7 2 1.71 4.88 5.46
9 75.68 16.56 4.74 1.44 1.59 3.82 4.39
10+ 73.84 18.11 4.86 1.58 1.61 34.62 25.43
Notes: Excluding wholesalers.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Data
MeinFernbus booking data
The route-day level bookings are constructed from an underlying dataset provided
by MeinFernbus. It contains the universe of MFB bookings for all route combi-
nations of 33 large German cities over the sample period for departure days from
September 1st to December 31st 2014  roughly 1.7 million observations. The
dataset also includes individuals who departed in the sample period, but who
booked their ticket outside the sample period.
The dataset provides detailed information on each booking such as the origin,
destination, date and departure times of each service, as well as details on the
individual booking process such as the time, date and whether a booking was via
the web or an agency. The majority (>80%) of all bookings are made directly via
the MeinFernbus website. For each booking via the internet an anonymized e-mail
identiﬁer is provided. Assuming for simplicity customer e-mails remain the same
over time, this variable allows tracking individual booking behaviour over time.
For agency bookings no data on individual e-mails is available. Furthermore, for
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each individual's e-mail the dataset records the ﬁrst time a booking has been
undertaken even if this was before the sample period. This allows classifying each
bus customer into new and returning passengers. On the one hand, approximately
75 percent of bookings only appear once. On the other hand, about one percent of
all individuals in the sample period travel regularly (more than seven times over
the sample period).
In addition to the bookings, the dataset includes information on the supply of
MeinFernbus services. The dataset identiﬁes the total capacity of each bus, the
line number and bus partner, as well as information on the prices charged. This
allows identifying each individual journey (by bus id and route), and calculation
of the total capacity of MeinFernbus buses for each departure day.
The set of routes includes all route combination of 33 large cities as depicted in
Figure 3.2.1 The cities and routes are spread across the entirety of Germany.
Route selection was based on the most important cities in the bus network which
approximately corresponds to the largest German cities. The choice of each city
was justiﬁed based on the frequency of searches from a large online price com-
parison website. The data cover roughly 40 percent of the German inter-city bus
market.2 Exceptions are the exclusion of Bochum and Wuppertal as they are in
the densely populated Ruhr-valley. To protect local public services, German law
requires inter-city bus services to cover a minimum distance of 100km. Cities in
the Ruhr-valley are frequently at a closer distance so no data on inter-city buses
would be retrieved. I retain Ruhr-cities Dortmund and Essen. Furthermore, I
include Freiburg because it is an important university town and Wuerzburg for
its geographical centrality in Germany. Given the 33 cities in the sample there
are 1056 possible routes spanning the simplex of these cities. 588 are served at
least once. I focus on an even larger subset of routes: those routes that are served
1Note that I consider routes to be directional. For example, I treat HamburgBerlin and
BerlinHamburg as two separate markets.
2The author thanks the team of Fernbusse.de for making data on search queries available.
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almost every day; i.e. not without at least one customer for more than 10 days in
the sample.
A bus station is included if it is within 15 kilometre of the city centre. If there
exist multiple bus stops within one city, my dataset includes information on all
oﬀered combination of stops. However, I retain only the service between the main
bus terminals. Second, I exclude origins and destinations that are airports. All
airports are suﬃciently outside cities that consumers are likely to prefer a bus
service to the city center. Thirdly, the MFB booking data includes itineraries that
involve stopovers, even though I do not observe data on these. This, however, is
not a major concern. The German bus market primarily operates as a point-to-
point service: the majority of passengers travel directly, meaning few connect to
other buses. Buses typically have multiple stops on a line, so the travellers on a
given bus may travel very diﬀerent routes.
DB Emergency timetables and web-crawled itineraries
I construct a dataset of DB service cancellations and expected delays:
Emergency timetables measure the heterogeneity of diﬀerent routes exposed to the
rail strike. DB published emergency timetables for all inter-city (IC) and inter-city
express (ICE) lines during the strikes. A route may be served by multiple rail lines
and the emergency timetable only includes information on the changed frequency
of each DB line (e.g. IC line 31 which operates from Frankfurt to Hamburg via
Cologne usually operates every two hours but its service was cancelled entirely
during the strike). However, actual travel itineraries are signiﬁcantly more complex
because they often involve stopovers.
To address the issue of stopovers, I gather an additional dataset using an electronic
`web crawler' linked to an online price comparison website for the week April 18-
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24, 2016.3 DB has changed timetables twice since 2014, but changes have been
minor and after matching with rail lines the data are comparable to the DB service
oﬀered in 2014. The web-crawled data includes all travel itineraries for the routes
of the dataset in a complete week. A travel itinerary is deﬁned as the speciﬁc
departure times, stopovers and train numbers a traveller needs to take on a rail
journey.
Only the combination of emergency timetables and the web-crawled travel itineraries,
allow me to construct the exposure of each route to the rail strike. Using corre-
spondence tables of rail lines and train numbers, I match the emergency timetable
data with the crawled dataset. I construct the variables fraction services cancelled
and additional travel time as follows: I construct a variable measuring the trains
per hour for the normal and `treatment' (i.e. strike) period. For example, the route
HamburgBerlin is served with 1.2 trains per hour during normal operations and
0.2 trains per hour during the strike. Multiplying these numbers by 24 gives the
daily number of trains operating on the route; i.e. 28.8 trains during normal op-
erations and 4.8 daily trains during the strikes for HamburgBerlin. Using these
data, calculating the fraction of services that were cancelled is straightforward (i.e.
0.83 for HamburgBerlin). The expected additional travel time travellers have to
incur to reach their destination is calculated as the time a traveller has to wait for
the next train if his service is cancelled. For simplicity, I assume that the number
of daily connections are evenly spaced throughout the day. For example, travellers
on a route which is served by one train per hour in normal operations, and only one
train every two hours during the strikes had to endure an additional travel time of
one hour. I report the calculated fraction of service cancelled and additional travel
time in Figure 3.3 in the data section of chapter 3.
3The web crawling methodology closely follows a small but growing airline literature. See
Williams (2013) or Siegert and Ulbricht (2015).
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One data limitation, however, remains: the DB emergency timetables do not in-
clude information on regional trains. Regional and local trains are likely to have
been cancelled in a similar fashion to IC/ICE lines reﬂecting the local power of
the GDL. Since I have no information on the disruption of regional trains, I drop
all routes where more than 90 percent of all services oﬀered involve the use of RE
and RB trains. This is not a major concern, however, as the large majority of
inter-city services is conducted by ICE and IC trains.
The dataset contains all trains, stopovers and travel times for the remaining routes
in the sample. Using this information I construct a variable for the frequency in
which each route is served per hour. For example, HamburgBerlin is served by
1.2 trains per hour on average, while MunichBerlin is only served by 0.5 trains
per hour.
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Table C.1
Deﬁnition of variables used in Equations 3.1 to 3.6
Variable: Deﬁnition:
Dependent variables:
ln ticket salesijt
Log total MFB ticket sales on route ij on depar-
ture date t
ln ticket salesnewijt
Log total MFB ticket sales to new customers (NC)
in the ﬁnal three days to departure.
Channel variables (channelij):
Fraction services cancelled
Dummy = 1 if the fraction of DB services cancelled
on a route is above the median (i.e. above 63%).
Additional travel time
Dummy = 1 if the additional travel time on a route
is above the median (i.e. longer than 78.5 minutes).
Relative travel time
Dummy = 1 if the relative travel time (bus travel
time / rail travel time)on a route is below the me-
dian (i.e. below ratio 1.64).
Absolute travel time diﬀ.
Dummy = 1 if the absolute travel time diﬀerence
(bus travel time − rail travel time) on a route is
below the median (i.e. shorter than 109.9 minutes).
Bus travel time
Dummy = 1 if the bus travel time on a route is
below the median (i.e. shorter than 265 minutes).
Control variables (Xijt):
School holiday
Dummy = 1 if school holiday in German state
(Bundesland). Either origin or destination must
be in state.
Public holiday Dummy = 1 if national or state speciﬁc holiday.
Bundesliga (Div. 1) Dummy = 1 if division 1 football game at origin
or destination.
Bundesliga (Div. 2) Dummy = 1 if division 2 football game at origin
or destination.
Munich Oktoberfest
Dummy = 1 if route to or from Munich during
Oktoberfest (20/09/201403/10/2014).
Stuttgart Wasen
Dummy = 1 if route to or from Stuttgart during
Wasen (26/09/201412/10/2014).
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C.2 Potential transmission channels: additional re-
gression tables
Table C.2
Transmission channel: relative travel time diﬀerence
Dep. variable: ln ticket salesnewijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Channel × Strike
wave 1
-0.0664 -0.0616 -0.0683 -0.176**
(0.0654) (0.0635) (0.0628) (0.0755)
Channel × Strike
wave 2
0.0124 0.00719 -0.000987 -0.0637
(0.0627) (0.0608) (0.0588) (0.0694)
Channel × Strike
wave 3
0.0335 -0.000881 0.00898 0.0752
(0.0538) (0.0535) (0.0542) (0.0718)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 15600 15600 15600 15400
R2 0.743 0.750 0.754 0.814
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.1. Standard errors in paren-
theses, clustered at the route level (166 clusters). ***/**/* indicate signiﬁ-
cance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit and
γjt  origin- and destination-day speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.)
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Table C.3
Transmission channel: time delay
Dep. variable: ln ticket salesnewijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Channel × Strike
wave 1
-0.101 -0.0650 -0.0605 -0.136
(0.0672) (0.0663) (0.0647) (0.0834)
Channel × Strike
wave 2
-0.0583 -0.0297 -0.0258 -0.153**
(0.0612) (0.0617) (0.0596) (0.0730)
Channel × Strike
wave 3
-0.103* -0.0807 -0.0744 -0.0348
(0.0600) (0.0574) (0.0534) (0.0685)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 15600 15600 15600 15400
R2 0.743 0.751 0.754 0.814
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.1. Standard errors in paren-
theses, clustered at the route level (166 clusters). ***/**/* indicate sig-
niﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit
and γjt  origin- and destination-day speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.)
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Table C.4
Transmission channel: fraction cancelled
Dep. variable: ln ticket salesnewijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Channel × Strike
wave 1
-0.0693 -0.0199 -0.0273 -0.0552
(0.0666) (0.0655) (0.0650) (0.0820)
Channel × Strike
wave 2
-0.0896 -0.0464 -0.0555 -0.206***
(0.0652) (0.0650) (0.0637) (0.0712)
Channel × Strike
wave 3
-0.0536 -0.0173 -0.0346 0.0189
(0.0560) (0.0531) (0.0568) (0.0729)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 15600 15600 15600 15400
R2 0.743 0.750 0.754 0.814
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.1. Standard errors in paren-
theses, clustered at the route level (166 clusters). ***/**/* indicate sig-
niﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit
and γjt  origin- and destination-day speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.)
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Table C.5
Transmission channel: triple interaction  time delay, bus travel time
Dep. variable: ln ticket salesnewijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Time
delay
× Strike
wave 1
0.172 0.151 0.194 0.159
(0.216) (0.207) (0.206) (0.212)
Time
delay
× Strike
wave 2
-0.364** -0.331* -0.282 -0.315
(0.181) (0.177) (0.179) (0.204)
Time
delay
× Strike
wave 3
-0.246 -0.204 -0.136 -0.215
(0.169) (0.164) (0.158) (0.171)
Duration
bus
× Strike
wave 1
0.274*** 0.283*** 0.274*** 0.292***
(0.0728) (0.0732) (0.0715) (0.0774)
Duration
bus
× Strike
wave 2
0.344*** 0.333*** 0.322*** 0.219***
(0.0597) (0.0604) (0.0596) (0.0649)
Duration
bus
× Strike
wave 3
0.442*** 0.419*** 0.403*** 0.343***
(0.0531) (0.0521) (0.0488) (0.0556)
Duration
bus
× Time
delay
× Strike
wave 1
-0.0488 -0.0581 -0.0878 -0.112
(0.132) (0.128) (0.127) (0.127)
Duration
bus
× Time
delay
× Strike
wave 2
0.240** 0.206* 0.172 0.278**
(0.116) (0.113) (0.111) (0.128)
Duration
bus
× Time
delay
× Strike
wave 3
0.175* 0.114 0.0856 0.186*
(0.103) (0.104) (0.0955) (0.104)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 15600 15600 15600 15400
R2 0.748 0.754 0.757 0.816
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.1. Standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at the route level (166 clusters). ***/**/* indicate signiﬁcance at the
1%/5%/10% level. Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit and γjt  origin- and
destination-day speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.)
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Table C.6
Transmission channel: triple interaction  fraction cancelled, bus travel time
Dep. variable: ln ticket salesnewijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Fraction
cancelled
× Strike
wave 1
0.0323 -0.00689 0.0547 -0.0307
(0.218) (0.211) (0.206) (0.221)
Fraction
cancelled
× Strike
wave 2
-0.00471 -0.0168 0.0534 -0.00633
(0.174) (0.172) (0.170) (0.190)
Fraction
cancelled
× Strike
wave 3
-0.329* -0.323* -0.224 -0.298
(0.183) (0.180) (0.171) (0.186)
Duration
bus
× Strike
wave 1
0.254*** 0.261*** 0.254*** 0.271***
(0.0726) (0.0731) (0.0725) (0.0782)
Duration
bus
× Strike
wave 2
0.404*** 0.386*** 0.378*** 0.266***
(0.0609) (0.0611) (0.0608) (0.0678)
Duration
bus
× Strike
wave 3
0.432*** 0.403*** 0.391*** 0.337***
(0.0502) (0.0489) (0.0498) (0.0572)
Duration
bus
× Fraction
cancelled
× Strike
wave 1
0.0280 0.0212 -0.0135 -0.0316
(0.131) (0.128) (0.125) (0.133)
Duration
bus
× Fraction
cancelled
× Strike
wave 2
0.0218 0.00724 -0.0317 0.102
(0.116) (0.114) (0.110) (0.122)
Duration
bus
× Fraction
cancelled
× Strike
wave 3
0.204* 0.157 0.123 0.202*
(0.110) (0.113) (0.104) (0.112)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 15600 15600 15600 15400
R2 0.748 0.754 0.757 0.816
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.1. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at the route level (166 clusters). ***/**/* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit and γjt  origin- and destination-day speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects.)
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Table C.7
Transmission channel: triple interaction  time delay, absolute travel time diﬀer-
ence
Dep. variable: ln ticket salesnewijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Time
delay
× Strike
wave 1
0.324 0.392 0.425* 0.363
(0.270) (0.260) (0.256) (0.272)
Time
delay
× Strike
wave 2
-0.336 -0.265 -0.231 -0.325
(0.233) (0.228) (0.222) (0.254)
Time
delay
× Strike
wave 3
-0.249 -0.167 -0.118 -0.139
(0.242) (0.231) (0.202) (0.210)
Absolute
duration
× Strike
wave 1
0.312*** 0.377*** 0.391*** 0.357***
(0.112) (0.111) (0.107) (0.120)
Absolute
duration
× Strike
wave 2
0.262*** 0.285*** 0.302*** 0.215**
(0.100) (0.100) (0.0978) (0.0967)
Absolute
duration
× Strike
wave 3
0.312*** 0.333*** 0.373*** 0.366***
(0.104) (0.0997) (0.0865) (0.0899)
Absolute
duration
× Time
delay
× Strike
wave 1
-0.102 -0.190 -0.227 -0.140
(0.157) (0.153) (0.152) (0.171)
Absolute
duration
× Time
delay
× Strike
wave 2
0.271* 0.197 0.156 0.358**
(0.144) (0.140) (0.136) (0.165)
Absolute
duration
× Time
delay
× Strike
wave 3
0.247* 0.168 0.106 0.120
(0.139) (0.135) (0.120) (0.135)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 8300 8300 8300 8000
R2 0.773 0.783 0.787 0.844
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.1. Standard errors in parentheses, clus-
tered at the route level (166 clusters). ***/**/* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10%
level. Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit and γjt  origin- and destination-day speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects.)
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Table C.8
Transmission channel: triple interaction  fraction cancelled, absolute travel time
diﬀerence
Dep. variable: ln ticket salesnewijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Fraction
cancelled
× Strike
wave 1
0.0710 0.104 0.196 0.0554
(0.269) (0.262) (0.254) (0.280)
Fraction
cancelled
× Strike
wave 2
0.141 0.128 0.239 0.139
(0.237) (0.231) (0.225) (0.245)
Fraction
cancelled
× Strike
wave 3
-0.557** -0.555** -0.391** -0.444**
(0.231) (0.222) (0.193) (0.199)
Absolute
duration
× Strike
wave 1
0.235** 0.297*** 0.328*** 0.281**
(0.110) (0.110) (0.109) (0.116)
Absolute
duration
× Strike
wave 2
0.412*** 0.413*** 0.452*** 0.359***
(0.107) (0.104) (0.101) (0.107)
Absolute
duration
× Strike
wave 3
0.225** 0.226*** 0.302*** 0.297***
(0.0910) (0.0833) (0.0761) (0.0788)
Absolute
duration
× Fraction
cancelled
× Strike
wave 1
0.0311 -0.0495 -0.116 0.0170
(0.156) (0.153) (0.148) (0.162)
Absolute
duration
× Fraction
cancelled
× Strike
wave 2
-0.0227 -0.0580 -0.136 0.0724
(0.147) (0.143) (0.136) (0.153)
Absolute
duration
× Fraction
cancelled
× Strike
wave 3
0.396*** 0.355*** 0.238** 0.261**
(0.134) (0.133) (0.111) (0.119)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 8300 8300 8300 8000
R2 0.773 0.783 0.787 0.845
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.1. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at the route level (166 clusters). ***/**/* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit and γjt  origin- and destination-day speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects.)
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Table C.9
Transmission channel: triple interaction  time delay, relative travel time diﬀerence
Dep. variable: ln ticket salesnewijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Time
delay
× Strike
wave 1
-0.159 -0.0474 -0.0459 0.174
(0.298) (0.295) (0.284) (0.339)
Time
delay
× Strike
wave 2
-0.227 -0.177 -0.171 -0.108
(0.249) (0.251) (0.250) (0.257)
Time
delay
× Strike
wave 3
0.0507 0.0882 0.112 0.0328
(0.293) (0.284) (0.253) (0.299)
Relative
duration
× Strike
wave 1
-0.137 -0.0949 -0.106 -0.0715
(0.132) (0.132) (0.127) (0.145)
Relative
duration
× Strike
wave 2
0.0113 0.00686 -0.00242 -0.0768
(0.105) (0.108) (0.109) (0.105)
Relative
duration
× Strike
wave 3
0.156 0.150 0.143 0.114
(0.128) (0.126) (0.110) (0.125)
Relative
duration
× Time
delay
× Strike
wave 1
0.187 0.0664 0.0465 -0.0311
(0.181) (0.177) (0.171) (0.191)
Relative
duration
× Time
delay
× Strike
wave 2
0.188 0.121 0.0957 0.161
(0.158) (0.157) (0.158) (0.178)
Relative
duration
× Time
delay
× Strike
wave 3
0.0506 -0.0158 -0.0608 0.00329
(0.167) (0.162) (0.147) (0.178)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 8300 8300 8300 8000
R2 0.770 0.780 0.784 0.842
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.1. Standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at the route level (166 clusters). ***/**/* indicate signiﬁcance at the
1%/5%/10% level. Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit and γjt  origin- and
destination-day speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.)
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Table C.10
Transmission channel: triple interaction  fraction cancelled, relative travel time
diﬀerence
Dep. variable: ln ticket salesnewijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Fraction
cancelled
× Strike
wave 1
-0.0610 -0.0537 -0.0368 0.0537
(0.275) (0.267) (0.262) (0.305)
Fraction
cancelled
× Strike
wave 2
0.232 0.207 0.234 0.364
(0.259) (0.252) (0.249) (0.270)
Fraction
cancelled
× Strike
wave 3
-0.119 -0.178 -0.114 -0.226
(0.263) (0.248) (0.241) (0.274)
Relative
duration
× Strike
wave 1
-0.112 -0.0962 -0.100 -0.101
(0.118) (0.116) (0.118) (0.124)
Relative
duration
× Strike
wave 2
0.156 0.133 0.133 0.0637
(0.117) (0.114) (0.114) (0.116)
Relative
duration
× Strike
wave 3
0.0952 0.0628 0.0739 0.0409
(0.102) (0.0967) (0.0946) (0.107)
Relative
duration
× Fraction
cancelled
× Strike
wave 1
0.0896 0.0235 0.00540 -0.0230
(0.169) (0.162) (0.159) (0.173)
Relative
duration
× Fraction
cancelled
× Strike
wave 2
-0.0938 -0.126 -0.150 -0.0977
(0.159) (0.154) (0.153) (0.172)
Relative
duration
× Fraction
cancelled
× Strike
wave 3
0.0974 0.0781 0.0296 0.0963
(0.154) (0.144) (0.139) (0.164)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 8300 8300 8300 8000
R2 0.769 0.780 0.784 0.842
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.1. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at the route level (166 clusters). ***/**/* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit and γjt  origin- and destination-day speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects.)
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C.3 Robustness and additional results
Table C.11
Robustness: continuous dependent variable: ln(bus travel time)
Dep. variable: ln ticket sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Treated × Strike
wave 1
0.906*** 0.975*** 0.994*** 0.991***
(0.204) (0.206) (0.202) (0.222)
Treated × Strike
wave 2
1.821*** 1.735*** 1.752*** 1.576***
(0.160) (0.161) (0.156) (0.191)
Treated × Strike
wave 3
2.228*** 2.095*** 2.092*** 1.992***
(0.168) (0.169) (0.156) (0.183)
Treated × Post 1.513*** 1.427*** 1.416*** 1.454***
(0.108) (0.103) (0.101) (0.118)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 26832 26832 26832 26488
R2 0.876 0.879 0.881 0.913
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.2. Standard errors in paren-
theses, clustered at the route level (166 clusters). ***/**/* indicate signiﬁ-
cance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit and
γjt  origin- and destination-day speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.)
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Table C.12
Robustness: treatment absolute travel time diﬀerence
Dep. variable: ln ticket sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Treated × Strike
wave 1
0.0293 0.0445 0.0542 0.0374
(0.0488) (0.0471) (0.0451) (0.0530)
Treated × Strike
wave 2
0.130*** 0.134*** 0.145*** 0.154***
(0.0421) (0.0405) (0.0386) (0.0416)
Treated × Strike
wave 3
0.219*** 0.202*** 0.225*** 0.238***
(0.0425) (0.0426) (0.0388) (0.0455)
Treated × Post 0.140*** 0.147*** 0.177*** 0.179***
(0.0276) (0.0256) (0.0247) (0.0274)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 26832 26832 26832 26488
R2 0.871 0.874 0.878 0.910
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.2. Standard errors in paren-
theses, clustered at the route level (166 clusters). ***/**/* indicate signiﬁ-
cance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit and
γjt  origin- and destination-day speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.)
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Table C.13
Robustness: treatment routes from or to East German cities
Dep. var.: ln ticket salesnewijt
(1) (2) (3)
Basic
DD
DD
+trend
DD
+ controls
Channel × Strike
wave 1
0.113 0.127 0.135
(0.128) (0.125) (0.130)
Channel × Strike
wave 2
0.0655 0.0515 0.0771
(0.117) (0.0941) (0.125)
Channel × Strike
wave 3
0.163** 0.183* 0.215**
(0.0794) (0.0968) (0.106)
Add. Controls X
Route - trend X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X
Observations 15600 15600 15600
R2 0.721 0.736 0.728
Clustered SEs X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.2. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses, clustered at the route level
(166 clusters). ***/**/* indicate signiﬁcance at the
1%/5%/10% level.)
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Table C.14
Robustness: excluding Berlin
Dep. variable: ln ticket sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Treated × Strike
wave 1
0.172*** 0.187*** 0.195*** 0.235***
(0.0446) (0.0457) (0.0445) (0.0487)
Treated × Strike
wave 2
0.351*** 0.325*** 0.334*** 0.355***
(0.0345) (0.0342) (0.0328) (0.0427)
Treated × Strike
wave 3
0.413*** 0.387*** 0.396*** 0.418***
(0.0373) (0.0370) (0.0342) (0.0396)
Treated × Post 0.283*** 0.264*** 0.277*** 0.286***
(0.0217) (0.0211) (0.0205) (0.0248)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 21672 21672 21672 20984
R2 0.824 0.828 0.832 0.879
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.2. Standard errors in paren-
theses, clustered at the route level (166 clusters). ***/**/* indicate signiﬁ-
cance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit and
γjt  origin- and destination-day speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.)
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Table C.15
Robustness: dependent variable ln(total ticket sales); excluding post-strike period
Dep. variable: ln ticket salesnewijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Channel × Strike
wave 1
0.131*** 0.148*** 0.131*** 0.128***
(0.0462) (0.0453) (0.0436) (0.0464)
Channel × Strike
wave 2
0.291*** 0.277*** 0.258*** 0.225***
(0.0356) (0.0349) (0.0344) (0.0394)
Channel × Strike
wave 3
0.387*** 0.355*** 0.330*** 0.326***
(0.0377) (0.0376) (0.0328) (0.0396)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 15600 15600 15600 15400
R2 0.881 0.885 0.888 0.917
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.2. Standard errors in paren-
theses, clustered at the route level (166 clusters). ***/**/* indicate signiﬁ-
cance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit and
γjt  origin- and destination-day speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.)
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Table C.16
Robustness: including two days before and after each strike, and intermediate
period
Dep. variable: ln ticket sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Treated × Strike
wave 1
0.134*** 0.158*** 0.159*** 0.164***
(0.0378) (0.0377) (0.0373) (0.0410)
Treated × Strike
wave 2
0.306*** 0.301*** 0.300*** 0.276***
(0.0287) (0.0294) (0.0288) (0.0355)
Treated × Strike
wave 3
0.386*** 0.361*** 0.355*** 0.354***
(0.0294) (0.0297) (0.0273) (0.0330)
Treated × Post 0.255*** 0.242*** 0.229*** 0.260***
(0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0158) (0.0185)
Add. Controls X X X
Origin - trend X X
Destination - trend X X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 33384 33384 33384 32956
R2 0.877 0.880 0.882 0.914
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.2. Standard errors in paren-
theses, clustered at the route level (166 clusters). ***/**/* indicate signiﬁ-
cance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit and
γjt  origin- and destination-day speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.)
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Table C.17
Robustness: excluding within-German ﬂights
Dep. variable: ln ticket salesnewijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
Channel × Strike
wave 1
0.235*** 0.252*** 0.234*** 0.273***
(0.0632) (0.0635) (0.0625) (0.0697)
Channel × Strike
wave 2
0.425*** 0.406*** 0.385*** 0.333***
(0.0526) (0.0526) (0.0526) (0.0664)
Channel × Strike
wave 3
0.458*** 0.427*** 0.396*** 0.371***
(0.0476) (0.0471) (0.0458) (0.0544)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 14800 14800 14800 14600
R2 0.740 0.746 0.749 0.811
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.2. Standard errors in paren-
theses, clustered at the route level (166 clusters). ***/**/* indicate signiﬁ-
cance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit and
γjt  origin- and destination-day speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.)
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Table C.18
Robustness: excluding return ticket bookings
Dep. variable: ln ticket sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic
DD
DD
+ controls
DD
+ trend
Orig.-, Dest.-
Day FE
treated × Strike
wave 1
0.153*** 0.159*** 0.162*** 0.152***
(0.0375) (0.0384) (0.0375) (0.0410)
treated × Strike
wave 2
0.355*** 0.341*** 0.345*** 0.314***
(0.0296) (0.0299) (0.0296) (0.0392)
treated × Strike
wave 3
0.367*** 0.350*** 0.351*** 0.337***
(0.0313) (0.0315) (0.0295) (0.0340)
treated × Post 0.255*** 0.243*** 0.244*** 0.255***
(0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0166) (0.0193)
Add. Controls X X
Origin - trend X
Destination - trend X
Day FEs X X X
Route FEs X X X X
Origin-Day FEs X
Destination-Day FEs X
Observations 26832 26832 26832 26488
R2 0.873 0.875 0.877 0.909
Clustered SEs X X X X
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients from Equation 3.2. Standard errors in paren-
theses, clustered at the route level (166 clusters). ***/**/* indicate signiﬁ-
cance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Column 4 refers to the inclusion of γit and
γjt  origin- and destination-day speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.)
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